Is something wrong with the second pillar in Switzerland?: Gender inequalities from a perspective of two Private Occupational Pension Institutions by Kucera, Jacqueline et al.
 Is something wrong with the second pillar in Switzerland? 
Gender inequalities from a perspective of two 
Private Occupational Pension Institutions 
 
 
 
University of Neuchatel 
Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines 
Neuchâtel, Switzerland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directeur de thèse:  Dr. Christian Suter, Professor, University of Neuchâtel 
Rapporteurs : Dr. Susan Halford, Professor, University of Southampton, UK 
Dr. Eric Crettaz, University of Applied Sciences, Geneva 
Date of Defense:  28th Mai 2015 
 
  



5 
 
Key words     Mots clés 
Gender inequalities    Inégalités entre femmes, hommes 
Occupational pension institutions  Institution de prévoyance 
The Swiss pension system  Le système Suisse de pension 
The gender pension gap   L’écart de rente entre femmes/hommes 
The gender pay gap   L’écart de salaire entre femmes/hommes 
The Swiss welfare state   L’Etat providence en Suisse 
The workplace in Switzerland  Le lieu de travail Suisse 
The Swiss labour market   Le marché de travail Suisse 
Institutional inequalities   Inégalités institutionnels 
Old-age pension income   La rente vieillesse 
Pension inequalities   Inégalités entre les rentes 
Retirement     La retraite    
Social policy     Politique sociale 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  

7 
 
Summary 
Inequalities and old age pension systems have been analyzed in depth by many 
scholars. This study tackles the question of gender inequalities in a propaedeutic 
manner and asks: “Is something wrong with the second pillar in Switzerland?” By 
perceiving the occupational pension system as secure and safe, the focus of this 
thesis lies in the idea of guaranteeing equality for future pensions. The thesis asks 
whether gender inequalities occur through the mechanism of interpretation of the 
Federal Law of occupational pension schemes (LPP). In addition to that, the paper 
discusses the impact of the labor market on pension inequality. The focus lies on 
the analysis of gender inequalities at an institutional level, affecting retirees and 
employees of private occupational pension institutions in Switzerland. 
The thesis investigates how two specific pension institutions have designed their 
regulations in the context of legislative freedom, investigating whether the LPP is 
part of the problem causing gender inequalities between old age provisions. By 
using a mixed methods approach, the study demonstrates how two pension 
institutions are reproducing and enhancing employment and labor market 
inequalities at the intersection of the labour market, the occupational pension law, 
institutional regulations and organizational structures.  
The empirical findings in this thesis confirm the hypotheses that each occupational 
pension institution potentially enhances or reduces income inequalities at the 
institutional level. The type of pension fund may reinforce or reduce (pre-) existing 
(gender) inequalities within or between pension schemes by incorporating their 
own norms in their pension regulations, hereby offering better conditions than 
legally defined. The study illustrates that, independent on the labor market 
mechanisms, the affiliation of an employee to a specific type of pension institution 
is most important as the pension regulations are strongly determinant for the level 
of second pillar benefits. Thus, the thesis shows that pension fund regulations are 
of crucial importance. The thesis provides insight into the functioning of and the 
mechanisms within the LPP. It offers a roadmap with issues that people involved 
in the occupational pension system may bear in mind when they (re-) design the 
second pillar pension system. 
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1. Introduction and Hypotheses 
In Switzerland, there are several components of old-age provision that are 
regulated in a three pillar system. The first is the public scheme regulated by the 
Federal law on old age and survivors schemes (LAVS), guaranteeing a minimal 
old age pension income for every citizen. The second pillar, the occupational 
pension, is regulated by the Federal Law on occupational pension schemes (LPP), 
with the particularity that it leaves a large freedom for pension institutions to offer 
better or worse conditions to employees. The third pillar (OPP3) is a private 
scheme to be contributed to individually. 
Existing research on gender inequalities has focused on divergent income levels 
and working patterns as causes of inequalities and tends to view gender 
inequalities as a structural problem rooted in society. This thesis opens up a new 
area of questioning: whether the Federal law of occupational pension schemes 
(LPP) contributes to inequalities in old age pension income. The significance of this 
line of enquiry is that these possible aspects of gender inequalities could be 
resolved more readily than the social issues that have already been addressed. 
The increasing pressure on the financial situations of the pension institutions and 
their obligation to guarantee the mandatory minimum has led to controversial 
headlines in the press and discussions in politics over the last few years. The 
question of inequality - a part of the debate - is in the center of this study. However, 
the thesis focuses on a specific subset of Swiss social policies analyzing gender 
inequality in the second pillar pension system of Switzerland. 
In order to answer the research question whether there is something wrong with 
the second pillar, this study looked at two specific pension funds, comparing their 
pension regulations and how they relate to the LPP. The two occupational pension 
institutions are designating two opposed pension systems, exhibiting antipodal 
characteristics. As the body of the study, an examination of empirical data 
concerning employees, contributions, retirement conditions and pension income 
allows a quantitative analysis and a survey of old-age retirees adds both 
quantitative and qualitative information. The data is completed by interviews with 
several experts of the pension institutions. 
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1.1 The Swiss pension system 
Increasing longevity has led to problems with pension provision in countries around 
the world. Switzerland is no exception, although the pension system has its own 
particularities with its three pillar pension system, anchored in the Swiss Federal 
Constitution (article 111 and 113 Cst.) with the aim to guarantee the standard of 
living for employees once they are retired. The first pillar is state-directed and 
principally financed by the working population and their employers and partly 
funded by the state and the VAT. The second pillar, the occupational pension, is 
financed by contributions paid in by each working person and his or her employer. 
The third pillar offers partial tax advantages: savings are made by the working 
population on a private basis. 
The second pillar of old age provision is the topic of this research, illustrating that 
the legal parameters of it are fixed and have not been adapted to economic 
realities. It appears that the Federal law on occupational pension schemes leads 
to increasing financial challenges for private pension institutions as they have to 
guarantee a conversion rate too high, calculated at a basis which is no longer 
adequate, leading to gender inequalities between old-age retirees of different 
generation. 
The inequality debate is of prominent importance in the light of the fact that today’s 
and tomorrow’s working population will have to work longer before retiring even 
though they will have to live with smaller pensions (OECD, 2012). This makes it all 
the more important that women should be able to keep up with men regarding 
contributions toward their occupational pension schemes, otherwise they will lose 
out even more on pension income over the coming years. In fact, gender 
inequalities in regards to pension income, and thus the gender pension gap, may 
become more accentuated, due in part also to increased female longevity. 
According to the Federal statistical office, women have an average life expectancy 
of 22.1 and men of 19.1 years at age 65 (FSO, 2012). 
The history of pension introduction sheds more light on the situation for women 
with regards to pension. The Keynesian breadwinner regime, introduced in 
Switzerland after the 2nd World War, aimed to achieve full employment for male 
workers only. This was a result of political choices at that time. In the 1970, it 
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became increasingly important to improve the existent old age provision. The left 
wing was proposing to reinforce the state pension and the right and center opted 
for improving the existent occupational pension schemes of private companies. 
The compromise led to the mandatory second pillar, based on the Federal Law on 
occupational pension schemes (LPP), established in the 1980ies.  
The LPP was created with the belief that each pension system should continue to 
have considerable freedom to offer conditions for affiliation and benefits to their 
employees at the institution’s discretion. Thus, the Swiss second pillar system is 
very heterogeneous, depending on the pension scheme of each pension 
institution. 
1.2 The Swiss workplace 
The workplace is creating gender inequality by means of disadvantaging women 
in the labor market. The empirical Swiss Social Report shows that inequalities on 
the labor market and income inequality amongst employees and retirees depend 
on gender, education and type of household. The authors illustrate that there is a 
large gender pay gap between men and women in the Swiss labor market (Suter 
et al., 2008).  
Studies on the gender pay gap have revealed large differences between the 
income of women and men. Income inequality represents an important determinant 
for pension income: Women earn approximately 20% less than men (FSO, 2012) 
and consequently contribute less to their own pension schemes and accumulate 
fewer pension credits for their old age pension. The International Labor Office ILO 
claims that “the circumstances of female employment – the sectors where most 
women work, the types of work they do, the relationship of women to their jobs, the 
wages they receive – bring fewer gains (monetarily, socially and structurally) to 
women than are brought to the typical working male” (ILO, 2010:XI).  
Gender inequality is seen as a structural problem situated in society. Depending 
on the status of women within a given group, they will be disadvantaged compared 
to men in regards to income. We may therefore discuss the existence of an 
institutional reproduction of inequalities by institutions. Indeed, the ILO points out 
that “gender justice cannot be achieved when biases remain embedded in 
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economic and social institutions and development processes” (ILO, 2010:XII). 
The Swiss Social report has revealed evidence that the income discrimination 
starts when the person enters the labor market. According to the authors “the 
income discrimination at the entrance of the labor market amounts to already 5 to 
8%” (Bertschy et al., 2014:1). Indeed, the first job is determinant, according to their 
analysis, for the income. Furthermore, there is a reinforcement of the gender 
income in the first few years of employment and inequality continue to persist. 
The effects of the labor market structure have been made evident by many 
scholars, prior to this study. However, in addition to the labor market effect on 
gender inequalities, there is another phenomenon, overlapping the first one, which 
is in the focus of the analysis presented in this thesis.  
1.3 The effect of the LPP on inequality 
What has not yet been investigated is whether the existing structure of the 
occupational pension system is actually part of the cause or merely a symptom of 
a more general and challenging systemic problem of gender inequalities in the old 
age pension system and difficult to trace. 
The thesis specifically analyzes gender inequalities in the Swiss second pillar 
pension system, looking at the effect of the LPP on pension schemes and their 
conditions for affiliation and for retirement. It investigates how two specific pension 
institutions have designed their regulations in the context of legislative freedom, 
investigating whether the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) is 
part of the problem causing gender inequalities between old age provisions. 
The study researches whether the fact that each pension institution may offer 
schemes and benefits beyond the legal minimum, while differently interpreting the 
LPP, can create inequalities between beneficiaries affiliated to different pension 
institutions. Significant statistical evidence observed in the MELAP pilot database, 
a database registering payments to beneficiaries of second pillar provision, will 
help to analyze and find proof whether inequalities occur on the level of pension 
payments. The comparison of conditions of affiliation and retirement will be 
significant in revealing possible inequalities between the insured and old-age 
retirees both within and between the pension institutions. The different 
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interpretations of the LPP by the pension institutions will be investigated, casting 
light on the creation of inequalities at the institutional level, which may result from 
specific characteristics of each private occupational pension institution prevalent 
at the time of creation and based on the mother company’s norms.  
The thesis will investigate whether pension institutions may enhance or reduce 
gender inequalities already existing due to the labor market structure and whether 
those possible inequalities are created at the intersection of the LPP and the 
pension regulations due to divergent interpretations of the law. Thus, I will provide 
evidence that gender inequality cannot be fully observed by analyzing only the 
income, labor market segregation and employment patterns, but that observing 
such an effect needs to include the analyses of the pension scheme. 
The primary hypothesis is that gender inequalities occur between private pension 
institutions, illustrated by the comparison of the liberal and the paternal type. More 
precisely, gender inequalities occur due to specific processes and mechanisms 
within the legal regulations of the LPP and are triggered by the written rules, the 
LPP and the pension regulations of private occupational pension institutions. The 
hypothesis is based on the argument that occupational pension institutions create, 
enhance or reduce inequalities on the institutional level, by drawing up their 
pension rules. This is a result of article 49 of the LPP which leaves a great deal of 
freedom of interpretation to private pension institutions, as the LPP defines only a 
minimum standard.  
The secondary hypothesis is that gender inequalities occur within pension 
institutions due to institutional mechanisms, by means of setting up pension 
regulations, creating, enhancing or reducing (pre-) existing gender inequalities, of 
the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) and of the labor market 
structure. The employer is legally bound to set up a pension institution or adhere 
to a pension scheme, providing second pillar insurance to their employees (article 
11 LPP). In fact, the employer and employee participate in the governance of the 
pension institution (article 51 LPP). The pension institution, including 
representatives of both employer and employees, is mandated to establish pension 
regulations (article 50 LPP) and has the obligation to regulate the conditions of 
affiliation and retirement. Thus, we will see whether gender inequalities result from 
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how private pension institutions differently implement the law (LPP) in their pension 
regulations.  
To test these two hypotheses, I chose two dichotomous pension schemes based 
on empirical material, having identified them amongst 5 initially analyzed pension 
institutions in the MELAP pilot dataset. This dataset contains the information of the 
beneficiaries of the second pillar pension and capital payments. I am aware that 
two may not be considered a representative sample, but the two I have chosen are 
at extremes from one another, as defined by the mandatory minimum and 
maximum benefits from the occupational pension schemes. 
1.4 What is the relevance of this topic? 
Firstly, there is a problem in the Swiss second pillar system and it has legal 
relevance. The LPP and in particular article 49 of the LPP may create, enhance or 
reduce inequality by leaving a considerable amount of freedom to the private 
pension institutions to set up their own pension regulations. In doing so, each 
pension institution may offer different conditions of affiliation and retirement. I argue 
that legal norms or laws fail (partly) to secure or promote occupational old age 
pensions by allowing the integration of institutional practices, based on the freedom 
of interpretation, and giving hereby rise to institutional inequality in regards to 
second pillar old age pensions. 
Secondly, historically, private occupational pensions go back as far as public 
pensions (AVS) and the second pillar system was established for the traditional 
breadwinner, a male working full time for his entire life in order to receive a full 
pension from the occupational scheme. In fact, at the end of the 19th century some 
employers introduced an insurance scheme in order to protect their employees 
against the risks of death, disability and old age. Occupational pension plans were 
established in cantonal pension institutions, such as the canton of Geneva, or in 
single company pension institutions, such as the SVE belonging to Sulzer or the 
pension fund of the canton of Zurich. Thus, long before the anchorage of the three 
pillar system in Switzerland in 1972, and long before the elaboration of the 
occupational pension law (LPP), private pension institutions were set up by 
employers in order to provide insurance schemes aiming to protect their 
employees. 
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Thirdly, the political, social and economic relevance; the three pillar system in 
Switzerland is based on the political, social and economic cooperation of all parties. 
By the renunciation of three popular initiatives and the consent on an aggregated 
proposition, the Swiss people accepted the instauration of a three pillar system in 
Switzerland with a vast majority in 1972. Through the occupational pension’s 
historical roots, by the will of the Swiss population, the Swiss Welfare state gave 
an important role to the employer in establishing its own pension fund (LPP, 1985). 
One major particularity exists compared to other European countries: The 
occupational pension plan creates a close bond between the employee and the 
employer. For a long time this bond was referred to as the golden tie. This golden 
tie indicated that the employer‘s part of the occupational provision could not be 
transferred from one employer to another. As this condition was restraining the 
mobility of the workforce, the Federal law on the unrestricted mobility of old age, 
survivors and disability benefits (FZG) was introduced in 1993. This law regulates 
that the accumulated occupational savings contributed by the employer also 
belong to the employee and may be transferred to another pension fund. 
In this thesis, the pattern of gender relations within an institution are analyzed 
through the lens of the concepts of gender regimes. By means of these concepts I 
aim to reveal gender relations by analyzing the workplace, the state, the pension 
institutions and the LPP. Gender inequalities may be produced, enhanced or 
reduced across different settings or institutions like the workplace, the state and 
the pension institutions. According to Osawa and Walby, gender regime as a 
concept was first referred to in the early 1990s (Walby et al., 2007). According to 
Sainsbury, “a [gender] regime can be defined as a complex of rules and norms that 
create established expectations, and a gender regime consists of the rules and 
norms about gender relations, allocating […] rights to the two sexes” (Sainsbury, 
1999:5). The principles of entitlements in the second pillar are regulated in the LPP. 
It appears that “the principles of entitlement are decisive as to whether policies 
reinforce existing gender relations or transform them” (Shaver, 1999:3). For 
Connell “gender division” in the labor market includes the “gendering of 
occupations”, the “gender relations of power” and the “attitudes” in relation to 
gender (Connell, 2002:53). Based on these concepts, I will demonstrate where 
gender inequality occurs in private occupational pension institutions in Switzerland. 
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1.5 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 presents the concepts and analyses the literature related to this topic, 
discussing institutional gender regimes, the Swiss welfare state and gender and 
organizations. This theoretical chapter provides the background for the research 
presented in chapter 3 together with the methodology, fieldwork and research 
ethics. 
Chapter 4 presents the empirical details. The data sources include a sample of 
register data, based on fiscal declarations for people who have obtained a second 
pillar pension or capital payment, a survey which I conducted amongst old-age 
retirees and data from the two pension institutions and their retirees. 
In chapter 5, the conclusion and brief discussion of the results complete the thesis. 
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2. Gender regimes 
This chapter explains the different theories and concepts used and applied in this 
thesis. The concepts of gender regimes both guide the study and explain the 
analysis. To begin with, I outline the theoretical framework with conceptual 
clarifications and include a short overview about the discussion of the theoretical 
issues surrounding inequality, demonstrating the various dimensions of inequality. 
The applied concept of gender regimes aims to show gender relations across 
different settings or institutions, the workplace, the state, the pension institution, 
and the Federal Law on occupational pension schemes (LPP). The focus of the 
analysis is those of gender inequalities that occur in occupational pension 
institutions, themselves shaped by the LPP.  
In this thesis I analyze the workplace to detect (gender) inequality within and 
between occupational pension institutions, illustrating the impact of the labor 
market on pension benefits of old-age retirees trough horizontal and vertical labor 
market segregation. The traditional breadwinner model, at the origin of the second 
pillar system, was established by the Federal State in Switzerland and is operated 
by private occupational pension institution as para-public institutions.  
Connell uses a four-dimensional model that refers firstly to, “gender division of 
labor — the way in which production and consumption are arranged along gender 
lines, including the gendering of occupations and the division between paid work 
and domestic labor. Secondly, gender relations of power — the way in which 
control, authority, and force are exercised along gender lines, including 
organizational hierarchy. Thirdly, legal power, and collective and individual 
violence, emotion and human relations — the way in which attachment and 
antagonism among people and groups are organized along gender lines including 
feelings of solidarity, prejudice and disdain, and sexual attraction and repulsion. 
Fourthly, gender culture and symbolism — the way in which gender identities are 
defined in culture, the language and symbols of gender difference, and the 
prevailing beliefs and attitudes about gender” (Connell, 2002:53).  
According to Sainsbury “a gender policy regime, [such as the second pillar in 
Switzerland], entails a logic based on the rules and norms about gender relations 
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that influences the construction of policies” (Sainsbury, 1999:5). Ann Orloff (1993) 
reveals that one “dimension is the pattern of gender stratification produced by 
entitlements” (Sainsbury, 1999:3). Indeed, there are various dimensions to 
inequality between men and women. In this context, the following may be relevant: 
“familial ideology (division of labor between men and women), entitlement 
(differentiated among spouses), basis of entitlement (breadwinner, couple, single 
person), recipient of benefits (head of household), unit of benefit (household or 
family), unit of contributions (household), taxation (joint or separate taxation), 
employment and wage policies (priority to men, breadwinner career), spheres of 
care (primarily private) and caring work (unpaid)” (Sainsbury, 1999:7).  
Bussemaker and Kersbergen confirm that although “most countries have been 
compelled to adjust their social security legislation, [and their] equal-opportunity 
policies, […] the extent to which social policy arrangements favor the family over 
the individual, and traditional male careers over female working patterns, is still 
significant” (Bussemaker et al., 1999:24). 
This thesis analyses gender relations within pension institutions in terms of the 
concepts of gender regimes. I argue that each pension institution organizes gender 
relations in its own way. In addition to that, each setting or institution is embedded 
in another gender regime. In other words, the Federal Law on occupational pension 
schemes produces another pattern of gender relations which affects the institutions 
and its settings. The consequence is that each setting or institution may inhabit 
gender inequality which may be adapted, enhanced or reduced. 
The first section of this chapter provides an in depth discussion of the workplace, 
including the labor market, education and profession and their impact on gender 
inequality. Here I propose a theoretical overview of gender inequalities discussed 
by other scholars and referred to in the empirical part of this thesis.  
The second section covers the concepts of the Swiss welfare state. In this section, 
I present the three pillar system, describing its origins, its evolution and its 
revisions.  
The third section presents the theory of organizations, including the concepts of 
gender and inequality in regards to two chosen occupational pension institutions 
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and their associated employers. It looks at organizations as para-public institutions, 
represented by two different types of pension institutions, explaining the impact of 
their pension regulations and their functioning with regard to the Federal law on 
occupational pensions. 
2.1  The workplace 
The workplace as a gender regime segregates men and women into different job 
positions and professions, and education plays a large part in creating gender 
inequality. Gender stratification occurs in the world of education and work and 
particularly affects job position.  
The following sub-chapters present the different institutional gender regimes and 
the literature relevant to this topic.  
2.1.1 Labor market 
Textiles, machines, watchmaking, chocolate and chemical production have been 
present in Switzerland for many decades. In the early days of production, children, 
women and men worked together in the factories doing the same work. However, 
it became clear early in the 19th century that without legal regulation, labor was 
exploited. So in 1815 the first factory act excluding children younger than 10 years 
old from the workforce – came into law in Zurich. Other cantons followed suit. 
However, children aged between 10 and 14 years were still allowed to work 14 
hours a day and adults 15 hours. Only in 1877, was Federal legislation put into 
force limiting working days to 11 hours, and excluding children under 14 years from 
working. Until then, no distinction was made between men and women and both 
worked equal hours and shared child rearing as well as possible. 
Switzerland was amongst the first countries to be industrialized and it quickly 
became one of the most highly industrialized countries in Europe in the early 20th 
century. Interestingly, Switzerland always had a very liberal labor market “with few 
regulatory frameworks” (Berclaz and Füglister, 2003:3). In addition to that the 
Swiss labor market became very gender biased. Switzerland preferred foreign 
(male) labor to Swiss female labor as from the early 20th century onwards. 
According to the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, foreign workers already 
accounted for 12% of the population in 1910 (FDFA, 2014). Thus, to the detriment 
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of women in the labor market, the supply and demand of female labor has 
decreased and rose again over the decades, often depending on the economic 
situation of Switzerland at a given time.  
Surprisingly, it seems that until the end of the 19th century, women neither 
questioned their role as workers nor the fact that they did work equal to men’s. 
Only from the beginning of the 20th century and in particular after the World Wars 
did it become fashionable for women to remain at home and spend most of their 
time on child rearing. There were several reasons for this; however, a large part 
may be explained economically. Whereas, on the one hand there was a strong 
women workers’ movement in the early 20th century, the counterparts to these were 
the conservative women’s circles who demanded the division of labor between 
women and men in the 1920s. They asked for women to stay at home. The counter 
movement, the Swiss association of female workers demanded the right to vote for 
women in 1893, in order for women to contribute to decision making. Between 1919 
and 1921, women's right to vote was rejected in several cantonal referendums.  
The recession in the 1930s did not help the case for women’s rights to equality and 
participation in the labor market. Until the Second World War in 1939, women were 
sent back to the kitchen as men took over the scarce jobs. The turning point came 
with the need for women to keep Switzerland’s economy going while men had to 
serve in the Swiss army. At times of labor shortages in World War Two, women 
were asked to step in for men and do their jobs in order to maintain the economic 
situation in Switzerland. A consequence of the full employment of women during 
the Second World War was that “after World War Two Switzerland was nearly in a 
situation of full employment (Berclaz and Füglister, 2003:12)”. However, as soon 
as recession started again after the World Wars, women were asked to stay at 
home again. Full employment in the following period was further guaranteed, but 
only for male labor. 
Remarkably, in the 1970s when labor shortages began again, Switzerland still 
preferred foreign male labor to Swiss female labor. This was the moment when 
women started to openly demonstrate for their liberalization and the feminist 
movement demanded equal rights for women and men. In 1968, student protests 
in Western Europe, including Switzerland, led to changes in society. Women 
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initiated a political movement of liberation in the seventies. The movement, called 
the feminist liberation movement, aimed to gain equal rights for women. As a 
political response, Switzerland’s government proposed a referendum on women’s 
rights in the seventies, and this finally gave women the vote.  
As a consequence, female labor has steadily increased its share of the Swiss labor 
market since then. Since the 1960s the proportions of people active in the three 
different economic sectors have changed considerably. In the 1960s the 
percentage of people occupied in industry was over 45%, those working in 
agriculture amounted to approximately 15% and in the service sector it was close 
to 40%. Since then, employment structure has changed significantly. The 
proportion of people employed in the service sector has risen to the top with over 
70% of the working population in 2009 and people employed in the industry sector 
representing only just over 20% (Bühlmann et al., 2012:37). 
Interestingly, Switzerland’s labor market always included both: export-oriented and 
domestic companies. The export-oriented, highly competitive sectors include the 
financial sector, insurance and the pharmaceutical industry as well as the watch- 
and jewelry industries. Conversely, domestically oriented companies have always 
been active in a well-protected interior market. To this sector belong: agriculture, 
construction, art-work and the retail trade (Merrien, 2003:12).  
The employment rate for women has risen significantly since the 1970s and the 
proportion of men employed in the labor market has decreased slightly. With rates 
of 86% of men and 42% of women over 15 years of age, the participation of male 
and female labor was very unequal in 1971 (FSO, 2012). Compared these to 
figures in 1991, where 68.2% of women in the same age category participated on 
the labor market (men 91.1%), we see that the trend is clearly rising (FSO, 2012). 
More concretely, female labor participation in Switzerland for women aged 
between 15 and 64 was 76.7% in 2011 (88.7% for men; FSO, 2012). In 2012, the 
proportion had changed for both sexes. The statistics show that 76% of men and 
61% of women between the ages of 15 and 64 years were economically active at 
that time (FSO, 2012). A large proportion of employed women (86.4%) now work 
in the service sector. Although the majority of men nowadays also work in the 
tertiary sector, the secondary sector still represents a third of jobs held by men.  
34 
 
In addition to that, a small inverse trend may be perceived, where men have also 
changed their employment pattern. Although a higher proportion of men are 
generally still working full-time, we can still see the evolution, however to a far 
lesser extent compared to women. Whereas 7.8% of men worked part-time in 
1991; today 13.6% of men do so. This picture has remained stable over the last 20 
years with 8% of men and 49% of women working part-time. This unequal 
distribution of part-time work is also the reason why women accounted for only just 
over a third of the total hours worked in 2010 (FSO, 2012).  
In Switzerland, we could talk about a modified male breadwinner model, where 
men work mainly full-time whereas women work mainly part-time. It appears that 
the modified male breadwinner model works with a formula of about 1.5. Thus, the 
relative high activity rate of women may partly be explained by a large part of 
women working part-time: 6 of 10 active women work part-time (FSO, 2013). The 
Swiss labor market has adapted its job offerings according to a modernized male 
breadwinner model, allowing women to work part time. 
Although we perceive a positive evolution towards more gender equality, the 
figures reveal clearly that “the male breadwinner model is still very wide spread 
throughout Switzerland” (Berclaz and Füglister, 2003:13). Switzerland has 
remained a rather conservative country compared to others and statistics seem to 
confirm the picture that mothers look after their offspring and fathers go out to work 
full time. Gloomily, the picture from the conservative women’s movement in the 
1930s is brought to mind as the roles of women and men seem not to have 
changed in regards to equality between the sexes. Although, women have gained 
grounds in all economic and political spheres, and some stereotypes have been 
broken in recent years.  
Clearly this pattern is of a disadvantage to women. In a meritocratic system this is 
very unfortunate and probably represents one of the reasons for inequality between 
men and women in the labor market. The labor market – based on traditional ideas 
about the functions of men and women at home or at work – put women at a 
disadvantage. Thus, structural inequality is clearly at the origin of inequality in the 
labor market. As people contribute to pension schemes, those working more hours 
will earn higher salaries and thus contribute higher credits towards theirs future 
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retirement plan. Or as Sainsbury has put it: “Although these [part-time] employment 
choices may help to accommodate multiple role demands in the short term, they 
may also reduce [women’s] employment opportunities and wages in both the short 
and the long term” (1999:119). According to Lévy et al., Switzerland continues to 
have difficulty revealing and admitting the existing gender inequalities in relation to 
unequal structures (Lévy et al., 1997). 
“Employment supporting policy and family policy or government support” (Meyers 
et al., 1999:128) could help to reduce discrimination against women in the labor 
market. According to Meyers et al. there is a “strong positive association, between 
public policies and mothers attachment to employment” (1999: 134). Women’s 
“breaks in employment”, the child penalties, may be taken off by the state providing 
maternity leave, by crediting old age wage replacements, providing nursery places 
or day care for children. The welfare state may - “with the subset of family policies 
that are predicted to facilitate continuous maternal employment” (Meyers et al., 
1999:134) - help to diminish inequalities between women and men in regards to 
the labor market. 
“Policies that increase labor market opportunities for women, without affecting the 
gender bias in responsibility for unpaid work in the home, will yield as best, a partial 
form of gender equality”. The policies should not “sacrifice either family or 
employment opportunities” which is definitely a major challenge for each welfare 
state (Meyers et al., 1999:139).  
2.1.2 Education 
The generation of women that finished their education in the late 20th century still 
has to a large extent a far lower level of education than men of the same generation 
and thus are still to be found in a lower skill-level of professions (with less income) 
than men. In early modern Swiss history education was only for the rich and mainly 
for boys. General education in Switzerland was introduced with the offering of free 
primary school education in 1874 (FDFA, 2014). For secondary school, however, 
there were cantonal or even private civic enterprises in towns to educate boys and 
girls.  
Up until very recently (at the end of the 20th century) boys were thought to have 
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better mathematical skills than girls and they did manual craftwork whereas girls 
were thought to be better at language skills and also learned knitting and sewing. 
This reveals a certain gender bias in people’s expectations of the capacities of girls 
and boys and thus of women and men. Whether people continued their education 
beyond the secondary part of the mandatory nine years of schooling was greatly 
influenced by the way people looked at women and men and their roles in society.  
The following table shows the level of education of 25 to 64 year olds with a higher 
proportion of women (15.2%) with no post-compulsory education compared men 
(10.6%). This is still slightly worse in the case of higher education as only 22.6% 
of women have a university degree compared to 27.7% of men.  
Table 2.1 Level of education of 25 to 64 year olds by gender, 2013 
 
Although the table reveals that tertiary education was more common for men than 
for women for the population aged 25 to 64, figures for the younger generation 
show a clear inverse trend. Looking at the younger generation (25 to 34 years), the 
picture is promising. According to the FSO, 25 to 34 year old women (32.4%) with 
a tertiary education represent a higher proportion than men (30.5%) of the same 
age group. 
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Figure 2.1 Level of education of 25 to 34 year olds by gender, 2013 
 
Source: FSO, table 15.8.2.1, 2014 
Evolution is also visible if we look only at 20 years old. We can draw from recent 
analysis that society in Switzerland is on the verge of change in regards to 
education. It seems that women in particular have gained ground in education. 
Interestingly however, there are still 60% of young men finishing their education 
with a professional qualification and no university degree, whereas only about 50% 
of young women finish their education at this level (Bühlmann et al., 2012:29).  
However, this does not necessarily lead to more (income) equality between men 
and women, as income also depends on the choice of study option. The picture for 
women is not yet too favorable in terms of catching up with men in recent years for 
the choice of study options and the consequent choice of profession.  
2.1.3 Labour market participation 
Men and women have, to a large extent, clearly suffered for a very long time from 
the conservative circles whose aim was the division of labor between women and 
men. Even today, the statistics of the part-time/full-time phenomenon reveal that 
women are usually the ones to stay at home with the children. The full time 
profession of mother and house-wife is still wide-spread in Switzerland. However, 
it is not (yet) attributed a salary as such. This phenomenon was even more 
accentuated for generations born not long after the World Wars; those who are 
now in retirement, as we will see in the empirical chapter of this thesis. 
"The analysis of women in new economic sectors and the gendering of new 
economic activities points to greater risks than chances for women, with patterns 
of occupational segregation persisting" (Walby et al., 2007:74). Occupational 
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gender segregation persists and discrimination remains. Executive positions are 
still rarely occupied by women and vertical segregation remains stable. Hence, 
men still to a great extent occupy the executive jobs while women occupy to a far 
larger extent the lower level jobs. The statistics reveal clearly, that women are 
gaining no ground in executive positions: the proportion of women in leading 
positions has remained stable since 1996 at only one third (FSO, 2013). It appears 
that either the labor market refuses to treat men and women equally or, women’s 
stereotyped choices lead them into female professions which are less well paid. 
Indeed, “women in the ICT industry experience occupational segregation into low-
skill lines of work, while men dominate the best jobs." Thus, also horizontal 
segregation remains stable and men still often choose technical jobs and women 
health, social sciences and teaching (Walby et al., 2007:74). 
It appears that in spite of all the efforts made to smooth out inequality in the labor 
market, the Swiss labor market structure is still clearly gender biased. The Federal 
Statistical Office (FSO) has published labor market indicators and showed the 
situation for women and men in the Swiss labor market. Inequality may partly be 
explained by the fact that Switzerland has a meritocratic system, based on the 
presupposition of merit and bound to a population which generally aims at being 
highly efficient and is outcome oriented. Status and occupation are attributed 
according to certain merits. This begins in education, continues on to the workplace 
and leads to certain statuses and occupations in the labor market (Kreckel, 2004). 
In Switzerland, the longer a function is held and the more hours invested, the more 
a higher position is merited. So women with children and a household – like a 
millstone around their neck – have far less chance to gain ground on executive 
positions. 
However, education, profession and merit are not the only determining factors for 
income. Astonishingly, women doing the same jobs and occupations with the same 
education still earn approximately 20% less than men (FSO, 2012). This is in spite 
of the fact that women represent nearly half of the working population.  
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2.1.4 The gender pay gap 
The gender pay gap is an important topic in the European Union as the regular 
publications show. “The gender pay gap reflects ongoing discrimination and 
inequalities in the labor market which, in practice, mainly affect women”. According 
to a report by the European commission, promoting gender equality, “women have 
as good or better qualifications than men, but often their skills are not valued as 
much as men’s and their career progression is slower. This results in an average 
gender pay gap of 16% in the European Union, which is clearly to the detriment of 
women. The ENEGE report on the gender pay gap reveals furthermore, that 
average old age pensions for women are 39% lower than men’s. This report 
reveals gender inequality due to the course of working lifes (Bettio et al., 2013). 
The gender wage gap is regularly discussed and the figures confirm year after year 
that there is little movement towards gender equality in regards to income. The 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office reveals that “women earn on average 18.4% lower 
salaries than men”. The FSO study reveals clearly that “this gap is only partly 
explained by objective characteristics” and women earn less for gender reasons. 
This seems to have remained stable even though “the proportion of women in the 
economically active population remained almost unchanged over five years (from 
45.0% to 45.1%)” (FSO, 2012:8). Despite the gender act and all the measures that 
have been taken in Switzerland in terms of leveling out gender inequality with 
regard to income, the average income for women remains stable far below that of 
men. The Federal Statistical office has revealed in 2010, that the gender wage gap 
grows with age. Looking at 20 to 29 year olds, we see that women earn on average 
4,544 Swiss francs a month whereas men’s average monthly salary amounts to 
4,960 Swiss francs. Compared to the oldest working age group (50 – 64/65) 
women are far more disadvantaged at 5,573 Swiss francs a month compared to 
men’s average monthly salary of 7,162 Swiss francs (FSO, 2011).  
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Table 2.2 Median wage and level of qualification by gender 
 
Looking at the standardized gross median wage, men with 6,397 Swiss francs a 
month in 2010 still earned more compared to women with a median wage of 5,221 
Swiss francs (18.4% less). It is reported that ten years earlier, the difference was 
21.3%. What is particularly astonishing that women in higher positions earn up to 
30% less than men (EGB, 2011).  
A study commissioned by the Federal Statistical Office and published in 2010 by 
the Centre for Labor and Social Policy Studies BASS showed, in 2008, that 61.1% 
of the wage differential was attributable to factors related to the workplace, that 
people worked in and personal qualifications, but 38.9% of the average differential 
was due to unexplainable characteristics” (FSO, 2012:8). Not even surveys can 
explain these discrepancies. The empirical Swiss social report shows that 
inequalities in the labor market and income inequality amongst employees and 
retirees is dependent on gender, education, type of household and job status 
(Suter et al., 2008).  
A recent study by Lévy shows that inequality in Switzerland is as widespread as in 
other countries and continues to persist (2012). According to Lévy, social life was 
always dominated by inequalities in relation to money, power and knowledge. 
Inequalities concern the “repartition of goods, gender, origin, nationality and the 
curriculum vitae” (Levy et al., 1997:11). Clearly, this inequality is anchored in the 
second pillar and pension institutions. In order to remedy these inequalities 
between men and women (e.g. retirement age, entrance threshold, etc.) 
eradicating conditions creating inequality may be an effective thing to do. 
The Swiss social report by Suter et al. provides empirical evidence and 
Gross monthly wage by level of qualificaitons and gender, 2010
Median in Swiss francs - private and public sectors
Total
demanding, 
difficult tasks 
and skilled 
work
requiring 
professional/t
echnical skills
simple, 
repetitive 
tasks
Women 5,221 6,730 5,254 4,230
Men 6,397 8,224 5,956 4,921
Total 5,979 7,715 5,724 4,540
Source: Swiss earnings structure survey, 2010, FSO
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demonstrates that the income gap in Switzerland – depending on gender, 
education, job status and age – remains significant and persistent (2008). As we 
can draw from above, the concepts starting from the fact that a person is a man or 
a woman, have a strong impact on the income of a person, segregating between 
the sexes. “The concepts of feminine/masculine [jobs] are constructed as 
oppositional, dichotomous and hierarchical where the masculine is (usually) 
privileged. Hence, the division of labor into female and male work areas is 
considered to be a key element in the subordination of women in work and society” 
(Alvesson et al., 2009:49). We can generally say that the labor market in 
Switzerland is segregated, both horizontally and vertically. There are very few 
sectors or job areas where there is an equal distribution of men and women within 
organizations and even less may be observed within occupations. In addition, 
women are more often found in less well-paid jobs, they do not do the same jobs 
as men do and thus, they have less access to higher salaries. 
This phenomenon results in lower pay and lower pensions. It appears that the 
Swiss labor market produces a pronounced difference in labor participation for men 
and women which probably explains a large part of the inequalities in income 
among pensioners in Switzerland. The Federal Statistical Office confirms this 
picture by detailing it with empirical evidence in their report about old age security 
which shows that pension inequality amongst retirees is still widespread (FSO, 
2011). In addition, the OCDE demonstrated inequalities amongst retirees in 
regards to old age pension income in OCDE-countries (2008). These results 
usually lead to the conclusion that income inequality in retirement is directly related 
to income inequality amongst these people during their working lifes. The greater 
the gender pension gap, the lower the average old age pension benefits of women 
compared to those of men. 
2.2 The welfare state 
Gender inequalities, as discussed in this thesis, affect people not only because of 
their gender, education, profession or income but also because they are living 
under a specific gender regime, here referring to the welfare state, and are affiliated 
to a certain type of pension scheme or institution, as we will see in this subchapter. 
"The gendered welfare state is considered as a stable gendered structure, which 
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evolved with national liberalization. But the issue of regulation following the impulse 
of the international women’s movement and gender politics demands a dynamic 
perspective on processes" (Walby et al., 2007:109).  
According to Vic et al., a welfare state may be described as “a concept of 
government in which the state plays a key role in the protection and promotion of 
the economic and social well-being of its citizens”. The general term may cover a 
variety of forms of economic and social organizations. A regime is understood as 
a particular constellation of social, political and economic arrangements which tend 
to nurture a particular welfare system, which in turn supports a particular pattern of 
stratification, and thus feeds back into its own stability (Vic et al., 1996:199)”.  
A welfare system is a program that provides assistance to individuals and families. 
The types and amount of welfare available to individuals and families vary between 
countries, states or regions. Welfare provides assistance to individuals and families 
through programs such as health care, unemployment compensation, housing 
assistance and child care assistance. “In an institutional program […] most 
households directly benefit in some way. […] Such a model tends to encourage 
coalition between the working class and the middle class in the support for 
continued welfare state policies” (Korpi and Palme, 1998:305).  Korpi and Palme 
argue that the “institutional welfare state model […] is likely to result in greater 
redistribution” (1998:663).  
The welfare state represented an important topic in literature for many years. 
Esping-Andersen created a typology which served many scholars to classify 
welfare states throughout time according their social benefits. Esping-Andersen 
categorized three different types of welfare states in their oeuvre called “Three 
Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990). Each type corresponds to “value 
commitments and particular views on the desirable relationship between state, 
market, community and family”. “The social democratic or institutional welfare 
states are described to be universal in coverage and in the nature of benefits based 
on citizenship. This type reflects values of solidarity and equality and the view that 
the state is charged with counteracting market forces to realize these values” 
(1990:69).  “The continental Christian democratic welfare states are characterized 
by universalism of coverage, however with different benefits under different 
43 
 
programs”. The most important characteristic that classifies Switzerland in this type 
is the old age “public insurance” (AVS), which is a system of redistribution. The 
continental Christian democratic welfare state puts “an emphasis on the paternal 
male breadwinner family” (Huber and Stephens 2005:553-557). The 
liberal/residual type reflects values of freedom and room for maneuver in the 
system. There is only partial or residual coverage with different benefits accessible 
only to people in need. Welfare benefits are generally means tested. Values of 
individual responsibility are widely accepted. This means that the state either does 
not intervene or intervenes only where absolutely necessary. The liberal market 
will provide social services for employees. Though criticized for their static and 
reducing aspects, these classifications remain commonly used in distinguishing 
types of modern welfare states (1990). 
The first type was mainly associated with the Nordic countries, in particular with 
the Swedish welfare system. It is clear that it cannot entirely correspond to the 
Finnish welfare state. The second type was associated with the German, Austrian, 
Belgium, Italian and French welfare states and the third with the American, 
Canadian, and Australian and since the Thatcher era, the UK welfare states.  
The following table gives an approximate view of the three types of welfare states, 
their characteristics, the emphasis they have regarding values and norms and the 
countries associated to each specific type according to Huber's and Stephens' 
interpretation (2007). 
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Table 2.3 Type of Welfare State 
 
It seems that through the liberal/residual system women get double independence: 
firstly in regards to their husbands and secondly in regards to the state. Thus, in 
theory this model provides the basis for de-familiarization, thus women and men 
may be equal. On the other hand there are different women rights derived from 
being a wife or being a mother. This double access seems unequal from the gender 
point of view as it represents a double opposition between the breadwinner and 
the caretaker.  
Several authors used and adapted the Esping-Andersen typologies of welfare 
states in order to show their impact increasing and maintaining inequalities. Albert 
called Switzerland a “Rheinland welfare state regime” (1991), a type closely related 
to Esping-Andersen's continental Christian democratic type. Nollert pointed out 
that two different classifications were both applicable to Switzerland, although at 
different times. He argued that Switzerland moved from being a liberal welfare state 
in 1980 to a continental Christian democratic welfare state in 2000 (Nollert in Eberle 
et al., 2007). Switzerland – when introducing the AVS - was (on paper) a 
theoretically conservative state. But clearly the Swiss welfare state evolved 
Type of welfare state Characteristics Emphasis Country
Social Democratic or 
Institutional
Universal in coverage and in the 
nature of benefits based on 
citizenship
Solidarity and equality: state must 
counteract market forces to 
maintain values
"Nordic countries" (e.g. S, Nor, Fi, 
Dk, NL)
Continental Christian 
Democratic
Universal in coverage but with 
different benefits under different 
programmes
-----
High levels of public health, 
education and welfare 
employment
-----
Low level of family provision
Harmony and subsidiarity: state 
must provide for people where 
family or society does not.
-----
Traditional male breadwinner 
model
-----
Low labour force participation of 
women
Continental European countries 
(e.g. D, A, B, F, Irl, I)
Switzerland in 2000
(Nollert, 2007)
Liberal or Residual
Partial or residual coverage with 
different benefits: means tested
Values of individual responsibility: 
state relies on market forces and 
works with these forces to provide 
social services
Anglo-American countries (e.g. 
USA, UK, Ca, Jp)
Switzerland in 1980
(Nollert, 2007)
Model according to Esping-Andersen (1990): Huber, Stephens 2007
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towards a mixed state including liberal and conservative traits (Bonoli, 2000). 
Orloff argues that “significant for gender relations is the fact that conservative 
regimes promote subsidiarity (thereby strengthening women’s dependence on the 
family) while social democratic regimes have promoted an individual model of 
entitlement and provide services allowing those responsible for care work—mostly 
married mothers—to enter the paid labor force. Liberal regimes, [Esping-Andersen] 
argues, are indifferent to gender relations, leaving service provision to the market” 
(Orloff, 1996:28). Orloff continues that “many feminist analysts have critiqued 
Esping-Andersen for the gender-blindness of his scheme: his citizens are implicitly 
male workers; his dimensions tap into states’ impact on class relations and the 
relationship between states and markets without considering gender differences 
within classes or the relations between states and families; he ignores women’s 
work on behalf of societal welfare (that is, unpaid caring/domestic labor); and his 
framework fails to consider states’ effects on gender relations, inequalities, and 
power (see, for example, Langan and Ostner 1991; O’Connor 1993a; Orloff 1993a; 
Sainsbury 1994a, 1994b; Bussemaker and van Kersbergen 1994; Borchorst 
1994a). Still, Esping- Andersen is not entirely uninterested in questions relevant 
for gender” (1996:29). 
However, despite various critics' attempts to this classifications of the welfare 
states and despite the fact that this particular typology opens up some 
methodological problems, they offer an image to explain different welfare types. 
And although, the typology represents not an optimal model for understanding the 
two types of private occupational pension institution in this study, it still offers the 
possibility to illustrate the dichotomous and distinct values of each of the two 
analyzed pension institutions. 
Such typologies may disclose that welfare states had put in place regulations which 
represent clearly defined constructs aimed at legally binding people and 
institutions. Very often, the welfare states defined different bodies to adapt legal 
regulations. This is the case with the occupational pension system in Switzerland.  
In recent years, welfare states are coming under pressure as people enjoy longer 
life spans and more people are remaining for longer years in the old age pension 
systems. Thus, welfare states are in need to adapt their initial defined welfare 
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systems. In this regard, “most [European] countries are changing the strategy of 
labor exit by early retirement and the period to be spent in employment in order to 
receive old age pensions has been lengthened in recent years. Germany 
introduced a gradual increase of retirement age for women from 60 to 65 and for 
men from 63 to 65” (Sainsbury, 1999:25). In Switzerland, the Federal Councilor 
Berset proposes in the forthcoming reform of the old age pension system 2020, to 
harmonize the retirement age for women and men, proposing the labor market exit 
for 65 year olds. Furthermore, he proposes that early retirement benefits from the 
second pillar should no longer be paid out at 58 but earliest at 62 years, which is 
at the same time as the public pension. This project of the reform of old age 
retirement system 2020 went into consultation at the end of 2014. 
However, although “such policies are in line with notions of equality, […] the 
lengthening of employment requirements may have unequal effects between men 
and women as a consequence of differences in their labor market participation” 
(Sainsbury, 1999:25). We need not to neglect the effects of part-time participation 
of women which is often a result of their other duties and unpaid care 
responsibilities. We have to be aware if pension equality is a goal of welfare state 
reform, much depends on the conditions of affiliation and possibilities to adhere to 
pension funds. Thus much depends on to which extent “labor-market status is the 
basis of entitlement” (Sainsbury, 1999:25). 
The Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) may be considered a 
gender regime. The LPP was established in 1985 around the idea of the main 
breadwinner who earns a full salary during his entire working life, contributing a 
defined contribution whose minimum is defined by the LPP. Thus, at the origin of 
the LPP stands a gender regime with the breadwinner model. It appears that this 
system is disadvantaging all those not working full-time, or who have interrupted 
careers or small salaries.  
2.2.1 The Swiss welfare state 
Nation states in general and Switzerland in particular demonstrate institutional 
inequalities as policies and regulations reflect the values of the dominant collective. 
The Swiss welfare state has mainly been implemented by male politicians, from 
right wing parties (SVP, FDP, CVP) because these parties have always 
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represented a large majority of the Swiss electorate. Hence it is no coincidence 
that gender inequality is reproduced by the Swiss pension system. 
In Switzerland, the concept of the welfare state emerged in the 1920s. Under 
growing pressure from the Swiss population, a system of welfare benefits for senior 
citizens, disabled persons, widows and orphans was established. Hence, the Swiss 
welfare state has existed since the creation of the AVS insurance, in 1925. Yet, it 
took many years and another world war before the law came into force in 1948. 
Compared to other welfare states in Europe, Switzerland developed its welfare 
state fairly slowly.  
The Swiss welfare state was created on a welfare concept based on paternal 
Christian democratic values in the 1920s. This is the case as the initial welfare 
state in Switzerland opted to protect breadwinner income (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 
2005:20). Initially, the emphasis of the Swiss welfare state lay in the paternal 
structure of the AVS. Based on paternal values, the breadwinner would provide for 
the whole family throughout his entire life and the pension would suffice for the 
whole family after retirement, as associated with the Christian democratic welfare 
state. Thus, according to the Federal Constitution, the Swiss welfare state was (on 
paper) closely situated with the Christian democratic type. However, due to a large 
number of veto points in the Swiss political system, the agenda remained largely 
unachieved and Switzerland came to belong to the liberal welfare state cluster until 
the 1990s. Switzerland was the only non-Anglo-Saxon country to be classified in 
the liberal welfare type by Esping-Andersen (1990). The formal net of social 
security in Switzerland may hide inequality as it provides for existential needs 
independently of social status. And clearly the role of women – still dominant in 
Switzerland – is that they secure reproduction and undertake familial care work, 
thus making the male breadwinner-model possible. The consequence of this 
particular evolution of the Swiss welfare state is that Switzerland has been a liberal-
conservative hybrid since the 1990s. And today, market forces largely determine 
how the system works. I agree with Bonoli, that Switzerland incorporates a mix of 
characteristics which belong to different welfare types (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 
2005:20).   
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The following table proposes an overview of the evolution of the Swiss welfare 
state: 
1890 First private pension institutions established
1925 Art. 34quarter of the Federal Constitution
1948 Disability insurance (AI)
1948 Old age insurance (AVS)
1952 Military service income compensation (EOG)
1960 Acccident Insurance (UVG)
1966 Complementary benefits to first pillar (EL/PC)
1984 Unemployment insurance (ALV)
1985 Mandatory occupational pension system (LPP/BVG)
1996 Health insurance in Switzerland (KVG)
2005 Maternity insurance
2009 Family allowances (FamZG)
Table 2.4: The evolution of the Swiss welfare state 1890 - 2012
 
We can draw from the above table that although the old age insurance (AVS) was 
established quite early in the last century, accident insurance was only introduced 
in 1960, and only in the 1980ies were unemployment insurance and second pillar 
pensions established. With the introduction of the second pillar, and third pillar as 
well, Switzerland was a pioneer. However, mandatory health insurance again took 
longer to be adopted, although it is true that most people already had private health 
insurance. Not astonishingly though, Switzerland had to wait until 2005 for 
maternity insurance and the Law on family allowances was only recently 
introduced, in 2009.  So, Switzerland has always been a very conservative country 
regarding gender roles and family policy. The limited family policy in Switzerland 
has a very traditional, male-breadwinner-oriented welfare state focus which 
reinforces inequality amongst women as well as between men and women. 
The cornerstone of the Swiss social insurance system is represented by the old 
age and survivor’s insurance. The AVS was established in the Federal Constitution 
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in 1920. It took 28 years for the mandatory insurance to come into force on 1 
January 1948. Indeed, the first old age pensions were paid out after the 2nd world 
war in order to eradicate poverty among the old-aged. The goal was to guarantee 
that old age pensions enable retirees to live in financial security. Pensions to 
disabled people and survivors pensions were established 12 years later. Their aim 
was to ensure that families who have lost their breadwinner can still have a 
guaranteed income.  
Pensions in general, and in particular private occupational pensions, are an 
important source of income for the old-age retirees in Switzerland. They guarantee 
a decent standard of living as generally the public pension does not adequately 
provide enough to live on and without private occupational pensions in Switzerland 
complementary benefits would have to be paid out to a far greater extent. However, 
this would strain the public budget even further and the amount of social insurance 
provision as a proportion of GDP (25.8% in 2010, FSIO) would rise quickly. 
In Switzerland, according to the constitution (article 113), the occupational pension 
– together with the public pension – should allow to maintain the custom of live 
before retirement. Thus both pensions together should provide approximately 60% 
of the last income before retirement, for the small earners even 80%. Thus, the 
occupational pension represents a large portion of a retiree’s income as we will 
see in the empirical section of this thesis. Without a private occupational pension, 
retirees are greatly disadvantaged. As this disadvantage is related to institutional 
matters, the focus of this thesis lies in explaining the institutional impact of the 
second pillar pension system on private pensions and how institutions produce 
inequality. According to Bonoli, “studies dealing […] with old age pensions have 
typically concentrated on the institutional design of the various systems and on 
their evolution in a historical perspective” (2000:10). This study, however, goes 
beyond that to explain inequality in the institutional context through the institutional 
pension design triggered by the legal regulation of the second pillar system. 
The following presentation of various theoretical works aims to explain the context 
and phenomena analyzed in the empirical part of this thesis. It provides invaluable 
knowledge and shows the relevance of the subject in the context of welfare and 
pension provision and in particular to (gender) inequalities in regards to private 
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occupational pension income. 
Meyer and Bridgen ”emphasize the extent to which occupational pension provision 
is distributed on the basis of class and gender” (2008:353). The authors highlight 
that “the patterns of access and their distributional consequences must be 
considered more systematically” (2008:353). This thesis analysis the pattern of 
access and demonstrates that in particular women and those with low incomes are 
disadvantaged in or even excluded from second pillar pension schemes. While 
Meyer and Bridgen argue that “class and gender are important predictors of who 
receives occupational pensions, access for the disadvantaged arises mainly as an 
accident of an employment decision made for reasons unrelated to savings or 
pensions criteria” (2008:353). This thesis shows that, independent of a person’s 
gender and class, the pension plan of a pension institution may provide better or 
worse conditions for different people. I agree that disadvantages arise due to 
decisions about employment and are most often not consciously related to pension 
criteria. However, I argue that inequality is related to the legal regulation of the 
second pillar pension system, the LPP, in Switzerland, and could therefore – to a 
large extent - be resolved by the government. 
Other academics confirm that “the direction in which the forces of social and fiscal 
policy were moving raised fundamental issues of justice and equality”. Furthermore 
it has become evident that there are increasingly “greater inequalities in living 
standards after work than in work” (Titmuss 1958: 74).  
“Pension scholars, essentially on the basis of the observation of Western European 
pension systems, have developed a two-type classification of pensions, 
distinguishing between social insurance and multipillar systems” (Bonoli and 
Shinkawa, 2005:5). According to Bonoli, “social insurance pension systems are 
based, predominantly, on one or more pension schemes of Bismarckian 
inspiration, that is, those that grant earnings-related benefits to former workers on 
a contributory basis”. Furthermore, those systems “generally include a means-
tested minimum pension, provided to those who reach the age of retirement without 
having paid contributions” or simply not enough” (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005:5). 
Multipillar pension systems, to which the Swiss system belongs, provide only basic 
state pensions. This system offers a lot of room for maneuver for private pension 
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provision. In Switzerland the state pension was complemented by a mandatory 
second pillar and voluntary third pillar in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Swiss public 
pension system is controlled by the government and “any reduction in the level and 
extent of provision” would be charged to the governing body (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 
2005:7). Retrenchment is therefore not a readily available option for politicians as 
we will see in the following sub-chapter about the evolution of the first and second 
pillar pensions in Switzerland. Nonetheless, it is becoming clear that the significant 
baby-boomer generation, entering retirement over the next few years, will cause a 
financial breach in the first pillar pension system. Possible ways out are currently 
being elaborated by the Federal Council in collaboration with the Federal Social 
Insurance Office (FSIO) in view of an all-embracing solution, jointly adapting the 
first and second pillars, providing solutions to maintain at least a minimum pension 
level (www.bsv.admin.ch). A great challenge will be that “the institutional structure 
of social insurance pension systems is the most resistant to change.  
Firstly, employees, especially those approaching retirement age, have little else to 
rely on to finance their retirement. Funded schemes are underdeveloped [as we 
will see especially with regard to people on low incomes or part-time workers] and 
in order to accumulate sufficient funds to compensate for possible cuts in the 
generosity of basic pensions, workers would need to start contributing” higher 
credits early on. Cutting pensions for those close to retirement would provoke 
opposition and would mean that younger generations would have to save more 
credits in order to receive the same level of pension. This confronts them with the 
issue of “double payment” and makes them feel exploited. This is particularly the 
case in Switzerland, as the pension system is one of those that were “instituted in 
their present form in the post-World War II years, and are widely regarded as a 
social contract between the state and the citizen” (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005:10-
11). This is clearly the case in Switzerland. 
However, in the 1960s it became clear that the first pillar would not suffice to cover 
the needs in retirement. This was the trigger for the political movement in the 
1970s, which was demanding financial security for people in old age. Based on this 
movement, Switzerland established the three pillar pension system. The three pillar 
system was embodied in article 34quarter of the Swiss Constitution in 1972.  
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The three pillars together aim to guarantee a decent standard of living for old-age 
retirees. Thus, the social insurance system in Switzerland is based on the threefold 
public, occupational and private insurance scheme. The first pillar is entirely public 
and compulsory, financed through equal contribution rates from employer and 
employee. The second pillar or occupational pension scheme was introduced in 
1985 in order to complement the first pillar public old age pension AVS which was 
declared to be insufficient to provide adequate income for the old-aged. The 
second pillar was established in the law in 1982 and became mandatory from 1985 
onwards for all employees earning above a defined threshold (20,880 Swiss francs 
in 2012). The privately organized second pillar is jointly financed by employer and 
employee, though not always in equal proportions. The third pillar is entirely private 
and optional; any active person may save for one, and the savings – up to a certain 
amount – are tax deductible. Thus, the third pillar is a private savings fund whose 
savings are paid into a particular bank or insurance account and can be released 
when the person retires. In order to promote these private savings, the law 
stipulates them to be tax deductible. If, despite this three pillar system, the income 
of an old-age pensioner is not sufficient, they have the right to claim 
complementary provisions (PC) from their canton and commune. This three pillar 
system constitutes an important part of the Swiss welfare state and is an integral 
part of the Federal constitutional law. 
Indeed, anchored in article 113 of the Swiss Federal Constitution, the public old 
age pension together with the occupational old age pension should provide an 
adequate amount to maintain the pre-retirement standard of living. The goal is to 
provide for approximately 60% of the pre-retirement income through the two pillars. 
Generally, a pension institution may restrict capital payments or it may offer a more 
generous solution than stipulated in the LPP. The third pillar should complement 
the first and second and provide the necessary income to maintain the standard of 
living from before retirement. 
Although the Swiss pension system is often regarded as a model, as it is based on 
a solid financial redistributive system and provides all retirees “with a minimum 
income level above the poverty line” (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005:137), it 
nonetheless creates inequality. It is true that the key strength of the multipillar 
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system in Switzerland is the combination of the first and second pillars. The 
problem is that demographic evolution is affecting both pillars, although in different 
ways. The great advantage for the welfare state is that it only provides the basic 
pension. Indeed, the larger portion of retirement income is usually provided by the 
second pillar. In order to achieve the target replacement rate set at 60 per cent of 
gross earnings, it is clear that the credits accumulated in the private occupational 
pension system must be increased. The precise challenge is how to achieve or 
maintain this goal for those failing to reach the conditions of affiliation. According 
to Bonoli “many part-time workers, often women, […] are excluded from the second 
pillar system”. This is particularly problematic as “today Switzerland has one of the 
highest rates of part-time employment among Western nations, concerning about 
a third of the workforce” (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005:138). In this thesis we will 
look at this topic and reveal that this is a major problem creating inequality amongst 
those participating in the workforce. 
2.2.2 Public pension: the AVS 
This first pillar is primarily financed through social security contributions. It can be 
described as a universalistic program. According to Palme, “universalistic 
earnings-related pension systems tend to produce less inequality in the distribution 
of final income among the elderly than do flat-rate systems (Palme, 2003:154)”. 
The first pillar is compulsory for all, including the employed, self-employed and 
even people without employment. Thus, once retired, every person who has paid 
in to the public pension scheme will receive a public old age pension. Since the 
introduction of the AVS in 1948, the Law on old age, survivors and disability 
insurance (the LAVS) has undergone several revisions. Indeed the insurance 
scheme was expanded until the 10th AVS revision – from the 60s and 70s until the 
90s – when other neighbor welfare states began being challenged financially. In 
the four revisions of the 1950s (1950, 1953, 1995, 1956) the public pensions were 
increased (2nd and 4th revision), the conditions for those born before 1883 improved 
(1st, 2nd and 3rd revisions), contributions after age 65 were abrogated (2nd), the 
proportion of the contributing salary was increased (4th) and the retirement age for 
women was reduced to 63 (4th). Between 1958 and 1970 eight initiatives were 
presented which resulted in four revisions (1961, 1963, 1968 and 1972). The 
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contribution rates were raised for the first time with the 7th and 8th revisions. But 
because the public old age pension from the AVS was often not enough to live on, 
in 1966 the legislator introduced complementary benefits (the PC) to the AVS. The 
9th revision brought the indexation of pensions. In 1994, the 10th revision introduced 
the splitting of pensions in the case of divorce (pension right independent of civil 
status) and raised the retirement age for women to 64 (this came into force in 
2005). The first draft of the 11th revision aimed to increase the retirement age for 
women to 65 and planned to reduce pensions for widows. However, these changes 
were rejected by the Swiss population in a referendum. Thus the 11threvision 
remained minor, improving the technical execution of the AVS. 
The Federal Social Insurance Office is the supervision body for the AVS, together 
with the AVS commission and the government. They are responsible for taking 
measures in order to guarantee the financing of old age, disability or survivors 
pensions in the long term. The administration of pensions, however, is delegated 
to regions, cantons or communes, which collect the actual contributions from 
employers and pay out the pensions. Employers are responsible for diverting the 
mandatory contributions of employer and employee towards the public pension 
fund. The assets are invested and the administrative board of the compensation 
fund is in charge of placing the AVS assets in order to create benefits. 
The AVS is an important achievement in the field of social insurances in 
Switzerland with the established generational convention, where the young pay the 
pensions of the elderly. One of the greatest challenges is that – according to FSIO 
scenarios – the financing of pensions no longer seems guaranteed beyond 2020. 
The AVS, which is organized as a pay-as-you-go system, is encountering 
increasing difficulty in financing the pensions because of the demographic 
evolution as today’s employees pay the pensions of the existing old-age retirees. 
The problem is due to the increasing disproportion between the number of retirees 
and the active population. The most determinant factors for this phenomenon are 
the falling birth-rate and steadily rising life expectancy. According to the Federal 
Statistical Office, 26.6 retirees depend on 100 employees; based on a possible 
scenario, in 2060, 53.1 retirees will be dependent on 100 of the active population, 
which means that two employees will have to finance one retiree. The economic 
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and financial crises of recent years have aggravated the difficulty in financing the 
AVS. Thus, a further revision of the AVS is in preparation in order to strengthen the 
public old age, disability and survivors insurance for the future. Initial ideas for the 
revision should be presented by the end of 2012 and a draft is planned for 
presentation at the end of 2013 by the Federal Councilor (FSIO, 2012). 
Private (occupational) pensions and public (state) pensions are both generally 
earnings-related. The role of state pensions is different from that of private 
(occupational) pensions and their operation is usually also quite different. Public 
(state) pensions are most often organized as a PAYG system where the working 
population finances the old age pensions of the retired. Thus, intergenerational 
solidarity in this first pillar is desirable. According to Clémence “solidarity may be 
considered as social justice” (Clémence, 2001:45). For him, the institutionalization 
of solidarity as regards retirement is the right to retire with a minimum pension 
income. In this regard Clémence argues that the establishment in Switzerland of 
the first pillar state pension after World War II may be considered as one of the 
most successfully achieved forms of the institutionalization of solidarity (Clémence, 
2001:52). 
According to Clark et al., “social solidarity remains an important social and political 
commitment underpinning European welfare states”. European welfare states 
continue to build up on solidarity as far as pension systems are concerned. In fact, 
the [European] nation-states and related representative institutions […] have 
played vital roles in setting (and limiting) options for pension reform” (2003:232). 
“Many liberal economists view the reduction of PAYG financing as the most 
important issue in pension policy reform”. They hold the view that “generous PAYG 
programs, with attractive provisions for early retirement, constitute an incentive for 
early exit and an implicit tax on work”. Thus, the consequence is that “the proportion 
of the population that is economically active” decreases and economic growth is 
reduced. The implicit problem amplifies as “pension programs are generally the 
largest percentage of government budgets for social expenditure” (Immergut et al., 
2009:21). In Switzerland social charges already represent over a quarter of the 
GDP. This will rise steadily if no measures are taken (www.efv.admin.ch).   
The Dutch response to this increasing pressure on pension payments was a 
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pension reform which reduced the public burden with a few measures: “increasing 
labor force participation; lowering interest rate payments by public debt reduction 
and setting up a public pension savings fund” (Van Riel et al., 2003:81). 
“The principle of combining the two systems has been adopted in [most] countries” 
in Europe (Palier, 2003:112). Although in France there is “still no consensus over 
the form funded pensions schemes should take” (Palier, 2003:104). Despite the 
fact that occupational pension savings exist in certain branches, “no 
comprehensive system of fully funded pensions has yet been introduced” (Palier, 
2003:109). 
We can say that whereas nation-state social security provides retirees with a basic 
income, employer-sponsored pension funds and individual savings accumulated in 
pension schemes, are designed to provide the majority of retiree income. 
2.2.3 Occupational pension: the LPP 
In Switzerland, the occupational old age pension funds are anchored in a history 
as long as that of the public old age provision. However, the second pillar, which 
is based on a funding-principle, was legally established only in 1985 when it 
became mandatory for all employees earning a salary higher than a legally 
determined threshold. “The mandatory, complementary (second-pillar), 
occupational pension scheme in Switzerland began in 1985, after a 13 year period 
of preparation” (Segalman and Marsland, 2006:22). Since then, the second pillar 
is based on the Federal occupational pension law, the LPP. It is financed conjunctly 
by the employer and the employee. The savings are paid into an occupational 
pension fund. The main objective of the second pillar is to complement the basic 
first pillar, the public old age pension scheme (AVS). The idea is that these two 
insurances should ensure that old-age retirees can maintain their previous 
standard of living, which is provided by an income of 60% of the last salary before 
retirement. 
The Swiss welfare state set up a mandatory occupational welfare system financed 
entirely privately by employee and employer and under the responsibility of the 
latter. With the introduction of the occupational pension pillar in 1985 (LPP), the 
government decided that employers could set up their own pension funds. And 
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even though the law stipulates a legal framework with minimum conditions, it 
leaves a high degree of flexibility to the pension institutions to provide better 
benefits to their employees. The result is that over 50% of all pension institutions 
belong to a single-company pension fund. Thus, I argue that a sub-system has 
been created. This sub-system is situated on the meso-level between the 
macroeconomic level - the state - and the micro-level - the insured and the retired.  
Within a legal and institutionalized framework, each employer has to establish a 
privately financed pension fund. This legal framework, called the Federal law on 
occupational pension schemes (LPP), leaves a great deal of freedom for maneuver 
in interpretation.  
The role of the first pillar became secondary with the mandatory introduction of the 
occupational pension law (LPP). This shift towards “privatization” of old age 
benefits made AVS income for old-age retirees less important for a large amount 
of the active population who are covered by an occupational pension plan (>80%) 
as benefits from the second pillar became more important. Before the 
establishment of the second pillar pension system in Switzerland, that is in the 
middle of the 60s, there were 13,000 pension institutions with over 1.6 billion 
employees, insured on a non-mandatory basis. At that time only two thirds of active 
men and only a quarter of active women were effectively insured. This means that 
approximately 50% of all employees were insured in an occupational pension 
system (FSO, 1999:13). These systems were established entirely free of 
obligations and without state intervention. 
Thus, since its introduction in 1985 the occupational pension has become 
increasingly important in relation to its functioning and its savings. In 2006 (2004) 
there were 1,239 (1,465) single company pension institutions and 1,430 (1,470) 
collective pension funds administering pension schemes for more than one 
company. There were 3.2 billion (3.2 billion) insured (employees) including 1.3 
billion women contributing to these occupational pension funds. In total 507,256 
(473,570) old age pensions with a total value of 15.4 billion Swiss francs (13.9 
billion) were paid out. The assets of the LPP system, totaling 698 billion Swiss 
francs, generate 3,900 m Swiss francs of yearly management costs (FSIO, 2011).  
Saving towards the old age pension scheme begins at 25 years and ends when 
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the person retires. Every employee, in conjunction with the employer, accumulates 
the old age provision in a formalized savings account. The savings are enriched 
with an annual interest rate of at least 1.5% (2012). When the age of retirement is 
reached, the accumulated capital is converted to an annuity based on a conversion 
rate defined by the Federal Council. The insured may request that up to a quarter 
(article 37 alinea 2 of the LPP) of their savings be paid out in the form of capital. 
However, the pension institutions may stipulate this percentage differently in their 
pension regulations. The savings of an insured may be split in case of a divorce. 
This measure has been introduced in order to protect the wife staying home and 
rearing children. The aim is that the husband has to share the conjunctly 
accumulated savings while the couple lived together. However, the LPP has not 
respected the original aim of the mandatory occupational pension system which 
foresees that a person retires with a pension. Indeed, the capital paid out to the 
spouse may not be paid into a pension scheme and there is no right to claim a 
pension once retired. The capital originating from the husband’s pension scheme 
may so be consumed by the spouse before retirement, leaving her with no savings 
from the second pillar once retired. Indeed, we will see in the empirical part of the 
thesis that there is a diversity of reasons leading to the gender pension gap. 
The LPP defines the minimum benefits in the event of old age, death, and disability. 
However, pension funds are free to provide benefits which go beyond the statutory 
minimum. In principle, in both cases the law allows pension funds to freely adopt 
the form of organization they desire, as well as the design of their benefits, and the 
means of financing them, as long as they respect the legal minimum prescriptions. 
The LPP is mandatory for employees already subject to AVS contributions: those 
earning an annual income of at least 20,880 Swiss francs (2012) and being at least 
17 years old. This threshold is in accordance with the first pillar (the AVS), which 
provides this amount as a minimum state pension. Thus, the active insured include 
all employees contributing from their 17th birthday to the risk insurance of an 
occupational pension plan. From the 24th birthday, the insured accumulate 
contributions towards their occupational pension plan in view of saving capital for 
their retirement.  
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There have been several partial and two main revisions of the second pillar. The 
first main revision (2005) aimed, in particular, to reduce the entrance threshold in 
order to include those with lower salaries. The structural reform of the second pillar 
in 2011 aimed to integrate a larger number of older employees and established the 
OAK, the new Swiss supervising board (www.oak-bv.admin.ch). Apart from these, 
there have been several partial revisions of the second pillar since its instauration. 
The freedom to transfer the capital from one employer to another and the possibility 
of withdrawing the capital for the acquisition of housing (FZG and WEF: 1995) were 
the first ones. Splitting of the capital in case of divorce (2000), increased protection 
against insolvency (1997), introduction of unemployment insurance (1997), 
instauration of the second pillar service for lost accounts (1999) were other small 
revisions. 
The second pillar, like the first one, is increasingly challenged because of the 
difficulty of paying pensions for an ever-increasing period of time. Steadily 
increasing life expectancy means that the annuities for each insured person must 
be paid out for more years than initially calculated. This is the reason why the 
Federal Council proposed the reduced the conversion rate of 6.4% to the Swiss 
population in March 2012. The referendum showed clearly that no reduction of the 
conversion rate would be accepted. In 2012, the Federal Council report on the 
future of the second pillar presented 14 measures altogether, the main one being 
the reduction of the conversion rate. 
Although no revision is planned, the increasing pressure from political parties, and 
from other organizations and institutions, to reduce the conversion rate, is pushing 
the Federal Council to present ideas for solving the financial challenge that the 
pension institutions are facing. Thus, most likely, the Federal Council will propose 
a first draft of measures in 2013 to solve the demographic challenge, eliminate the 
ongoing redistribution of the assets of the active population to retirees and avoid 
financial difficulties in the second pillar pension system. 
“The introduction of the second pillar […] may be considered a turning point in the 
institutionalization of solidarity. [The second pillar] represents a “purely personal 
basis as the pensions depend on individually accumulated capital. Furthermore, 
[the second pillar] accentuates the social divisions and creates a regime for 
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employees and another regime for the self-employed. And in the end, [the system] 
excludes the part of the population which is most exposed to insecurity, the 
population whose income does not allow to constitute a capital individually” 
(Clémence, 2001:54).  
Thus, (private) occupational pensions are most often based on a funded system. 
The idea is that each person – together with contributions from his employer - 
accumulates capital in order to consume it once retired, commonly as a pension. 
In Switzerland pension schemes are generally administered by autonomous 
pension funds belonging to the employer, or to a lesser extent by insurance 
schemes. Generally there is no solidarity between the insured and retirees within 
these privately managed schemes. The capital belonging to all the insured and 
retirees is administered commonly. However each member regularly receives an 
overview of savings reported on an individual basis by the pension scheme 
administering the trusted funds.  
Interestingly, due to recent economic and political pressure and social policy 
measures, the second pillar is becoming more and more important in that 
intergenerational transfers within the second pillar are also taking place and are 
even encouraged (Clark and Whiteside, 2003). This trend has been aggravated by 
the deteriorating financial markets and subsequent to the dotcom crisis the far 
lower returns on investments than were previously earned. Indeed, it became truly 
problematic when returns on investments were crumbling. There was a second 
effect on pension plans of the decreasing returns on investments, namely the shift 
from defined benefit plans (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans. Thus, “as the 
speculative bubble of the 1990s collapsed and as the value of stock market 
portfolios significantly declined many corporate DB plan sponsors reported large-
scale shifts in the value of plan assets from surplus to deficit”. Clark et al. argue 
that “both the regulatory and compliance costs associated with DB schemes have 
increased significantly [and] increasing life expectancy has raised the long-term 
costs associated with DB plans” (Clark and Whiteside, 2003:234). It is evident that 
DC plans have the great advantage that the accumulated capital provides a clear 
basis on which the annuity is paid out. Taking the example of Switzerland, the legal 
minimum conversion rate (article 14, LPP) to convert the capital into a lifelong 
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pension is defined by the government. However, the private occupational pension 
fund may fix a lower conversion rate for capital savings above the “LPP 
Obligatorium”.  According to Bertozzi and Bonoli, the shift from DB to DC plans 
was thus an obvious consequence as pension levels had to be reduced in order 
for pension funds to still be able to provide lifelong pensions (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 
2007). The shift from DB to DC schemes shows clearly that employer-sponsored 
pensions are in the hands of employers and their function as “public retirement 
income institutions” is only secondary. “Private employment institutions’ […] value 
for their individual employees […] are a function of the integrity and performance 
of national and global financial markets. Neither should be taken for granted, as 
recent events have shown” (Clark and Whiteside, 2003:236). Clark et al. have 
“illustrated the uncertainties associated with market dependent pension incomes” 
and argues that the returns on investment for those schemes are threatening the 
future pension payments of second pillar schemes (Clark and Whiteside, 
2003:242). In this perspective, European retirees are part of the global economy 
and depend a great deal upon the robustness of financial regulation. Pension 
security is a major issue and in this context, we should not forget the Enron 
scandal. In 2001 “Enron corporation employees lost their retirement savings 
because the company’s 4401(K) plan encouraged participants to hold company 
stock as a large proportion of their investment portfolios”. Subsequently, 
employees lost billions in pensions and as shareholders in stock prices. New 
regulations followed due to this disaster and legislation was reinforced in order to 
secure the accuracy of financial reporting for public companies. In this context the 
IFRS (International Financial Reporting Standards) are an instrument used to 
control the financial soundness of companies and to secure their ability to meet 
financial obligations (Clark and Whiteside, 2003:243).  
Apparently and more and more frequently, the second pillar pension system 
involves redistribution, at least partially. All the more astonishingly, in Sweden 
“occupational plans give credits during periods of parental leave, showing that this 
may also be an element of private pensions” (Palme, 2003:161). Indeed, Sweden 
has been leading the private-public debate over recent years. Palme highlighted 
that the “design of pension reform has consequences for the coordination with 
private sector benefits” (Palme, 2003: 161). This statement reveals that a general 
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pension reform, including first and second pillars, must be in the focus of political 
considerations. 
The second pillar in Holland is a “fully funded occupational pension scheme, 
managed by employers and unions”. More than 90% of all employees participate 
and over 50% of old age retirees are already receiving a pension from the second 
pillar. “The usual retirement age in occupational pension schemes is 65”. “Both 
employers and employees pay into the pension scheme”. Interestingly, the 
conditions of affiliation are negotiated by the unions and the employers’ 
associations” (Van Riel et al., 2003:67). 
The second pillar or occupational pension system in Switzerland is a private 
pension system which guarantees a minimum compulsory benefit on the basis of 
notional contributions. “Pension funds are free to finance the specified amount as 
they wish” (Bonoli, 2009:221). It is problematic as the pension institutions are under 
more and more pressure to finance pensions for generations who are living longer 
than the capital was intended for. Indeed, the government decided to set a 
minimum legal replacement rate for the second and first pillar together 
(approximately 60% of the last salary before retirement) and there is also the legal 
minimum conversion rate for the mandatory part of the occupational pension 
savings. This means concretely that the savings or capital accumulated for 
retirement need to last for more years, while guaranteeing a minimum pension, 
based on the “Obligatorium” of the second pillar (LPP). In the empirical section of 
this thesis, I will provide examples demonstrating that a pension institution loses 
out on capital to the detriment of the active population, as pensions need to be 
financed for approximately 7 more years than initially calculated, because the 
government - based on article 14 of the LPP - guarantee a legal minimum pension. 
This is a problem for pension institutions, employers and employees, as they are 
obliged to pay out benefits to old age retirees that have not been previously 
accumulated.  
In Switzerland, the private occupational pension system only became mandatory 
in 1985. However, employers could provide occupational pensions on a voluntary 
basis. The occupational pension was created very individually; thus, different 
groups of employees were covered under very different schemes. This is still the 
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case today, although the LPP regulates the compulsory part of the pension. 
Under current occupational pension law, the LPP, “the unqualified mother and part-
time worker [has the] dilemma […] that her low life-time wages mean that even with 
access to [a second pillar pension fund] she cannot build up sufficient second pillar 
provision to lift her above social assistance”. (Bertozzi and Bonoli; 2007:118). This 
thesis confirms this picture and shows gender inequality in regards to private 
pensions, in particular for women with no or low qualifications and part-time hours. 
Another important factor of pension income is retirement age. According to Bertozzi 
and Bonoli, retirement age “has an important impact on the amount of first pillar 
benefits”. According to the first pillar regulations, and also the second pillar 
regulations, the pension amount is greatly reduced if early retirement is taken. 
“Early retirement at age 63 instead of 65 leads to a lifelong reduction of the first 
pillar benefit by 13.6 percent” (2007:118). In second pillar pension funds, there are 
strong discrepancies between the reductions, as I will demonstrate in the empirical 
chapter. 
Another strong indicator and factor of influence is marriage, as has been shown by 
Bertozzi and Bonoli (2007:119). Living alone is a factor that influences the level of 
household income. This phenomenon, particularly striking women, will also be 
analyzed in the empirical part of this thesis. 
As we have seen in the former sections about the gendered labor market, job 
market segregation and the consequently lower incomes for women in general, 
have a direct impact on pension payments. Although things are changing slightly, 
inequality between men and women remains distinct. Even though in Switzerland 
there is progress - with a proportion of 37% of active females insured in 1998 
increasing to 41% in 2009 – inequality remains. The proportion of women with an 
occupational pension may have risen from 30% in 1998 to 47% in 2008, according 
to the occupational pension statistics (FSO, 1998 and 2008), but equality is still far 
from being achieved. In some organizations women tend to work and earn as much 
as their male counterparts, hoping that their pensions will be equal to men’s. This 
evolution may or may not indicate that we are moving towards more equality 
between women and men and that “the feminist revolution that began [40] years 
ago has continued to do its work” (Grant 1997:2, cited in Halford et al., 2001:1). 
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Bridgen and Meyer argue that “a large role for non-state provision in pension 
systems may be compatible with […] social justice”. However, “the role of the public 
authority is absolutely crucial. Much depends on the nature of the public/private 
mix within which non-state provision operates”. (2008: introduction). According to 
Bridgen and Meyer, “many social policy analysts view an increasing role for non-
state provision as wholly inconsistent with the traditional values of the welfare state 
(Hyde & Dixon, 2009 for a survey of this literature, cited in Bridgen, Meyer 2008: 
introduction). Bridgen and Meyer highlight that “a central feature […] is the 
relationship between non-state pensions and the state as provider and regulator”, 
which will be confirmed in the empirical part of this thesis. Indeed, the relationship 
between the non-state pension institutions, regulated by the state, may consist of 
“regulation [with a] light-touch or involve substantial elements of compulsion” 
(Bridgen, Meyer, 2008:3). In Switzerland, by means of the occupational pension 
law (LPP), the state influences the outcome of pensions, however, only to a certain 
extent. This regulation of a minimum level may lead to inequality or “social injustice” 
in regards to old age pensions from the privately-governed but state regulated 
second pillar system in Switzerland.  
In Bridgen and Meyer’s study, Switzerland’s pension system belongs to the first 
type, the public/private pension provision-type. The authors argue that “a large role 
for non-state provision - on the basis of a strongly collective foundation” - is an 
important element of this type of pension scheme” (2008:4).  
“In Switzerland in the 1990s, all male and 80 per cent of all female workers were 
given access to an occupational pension scheme. This quasi-compulsion is 
accomplished because all employers must by statute ensure that employees 
earning at least 1.5 times the amount of the lowest public pension are given access 
to a minimum occupational pension” (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2007:5). However, in 
Switzerland the coverage for men has since decreased. This is probably due to the 
fact that men – since the mid 1990’s have considerably increased their rate of part-
time employment, changing their employment patterns. Whereas 7.8% of men 
worked part-time in 1991, in 2011 13.6% of men did so. Six out of ten active women 
worked part-time in 2011 whereas in 1991 it was only five out of ten (FSO, 2013). 
This high proportion of part-time work has implications for men and women in 
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regards to access to second pillar pensions, as we will see in the empirical chapter 
of this thesis. 
Bridgen and Meyer have assessed retiree income inequality according to the 
Rawlsian concept of social justice. “According to this view, some inequality might 
be necessary to increase productivity”. However, “this means that the distribution 
of retirement income can be just if it is unequal, but social policies should ensure 
that the least advantaged achieve a significantly higher pension in relation to their 
lifetime average wage than the higher paid, and that working life income 
inequalities between men and women should be flattened in retirement” (Bridgen, 
Meyer, 2008:7). What is important is, as I will show in the empirical part of this 
thesis, that inequality in regards to access and basic income should be obliterated. 
Based on a PAYG system, the first pillar in Switzerland is constructed in this optic. 
It becomes evident that the second pillar excludes, or unfairly conditions, the most 
deprived and in particular women due to their income and/or pattern of labor 
participation during their working life. Furthermore, there is no flattening of the 
working life income inequalities between men and women in the second pillar, 
which represents a real challenge for providing equality within the system, as we 
will see in the empirical chapter of this thesis. 
“Part of the problem with second pillar pensions [in Switzerland] is the tight link 
between the insured person and the employer”. Specifically, as we have seen 
above, employees with the lowest incomes and part-time workers are generally 
excluded from the system. According to Bertozzi and Bonoli, a more open system, 
allowing active people to save up within an independent system, for example in the 
so called “Auffangeinrichtung BVG”, could ease inequality within the second pillar 
by “allowing greater continuing access to second pillar pension coverage” (Bertozzi 
and Bonoli, 2007:129). “The Substitute Occupational Benefit Institution, [the 
Auffangeinrichtung BVG], is a national occupational benefits organization. It acts 
on behalf of the Federal Government as a second pillar safety net. It is the only 
benefits scheme in Switzerland that accepts any employer and any individual who 
want to join, without exception, providing the statutory requirements are met” 
(Substitute Occupational Benefit Institution, 2014). 
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Inequality derives from the fact that “the performance of pension funds varies 
enormously” (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2007:129). Interestingly, employers in particular 
were strongly opposed, according to an informal consultation exercise in the late 
1990s. It appears that “company pension funds are an important tool for human 
resources management, especially at times of restructuring” (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 
2007:130). This makes clear that inequality may result from differing pension 
benefits over time and some generations may be offered better “retirement” 
conditions. The second pillar may be used to reduce the workforce (Bertozzi and 
Bonoli, 2007:130). It becomes evident that those insured with a second pillar 
pension system may encounter very unequal conditions in regards to affiliation and 
retirement conditions. Depending on the company pension fund, which decided on 
a more or less generous scheme of benefits for employees, a person at the end of 
his working life receives higher or lower second pillar pension benefits. The 
empirical part of this thesis offers some insight into this phenomenon, revealing the 
unequal evolution over time, unequal conditions depending on the affiliation of the 
person while employed. 
According to Bertozzi and Bonoli, “all those who cannot be efficiently insured with 
their employers may obtain second pillar pension coverage from a central public 
default fund” (2007:130). One option would be for the Substitute Occupational 
Benefit Institution to take up this role. In order to provide second pillar pension 
coverage to the entire active population, this Federal Institution could offer 
compulsory pension affiliation to all working persons, who are not affiliated to a 
company pension fund by default. “A stronger effort at making known this already 
existing option” may help to integrate a larger part of the work force (Bertozzi and 
Bonoli, 2007:131).  
This argument may partly be relativized by an Ecoplan study (2010), mandated by 
the Federal Social Insurance Office. The study was carried out to assess the first 
revision of the LPP lowering the entry threshold of occupational pension schemes. 
The study revealed that “the lower entry threshold means that 140,000 workers 
and the unemployed who fall into the low-income bracket now enjoy better 
insurance cover against the risks of death and invalidity. The second pillar revision 
in 2005 therefore reached its original target groups, with women who work part-
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time (i.e. an occupation rate of less than 50%) appearing to be the primary winners” 
(Ecoplan, 2010: Foreword). 
However, Bertozzi and Bonoli highlight that even if women, part-time workers and 
people with low incomes are included in a second pillar pension “it may not be 
sufficient […] to obtain adequate pension coverage. The strict correspondence 
between payments and benefits in these systems means that long spells of non-
employment or underemployment will result in low pensions” (Bertozzi and Bonoli, 
2007:132). It becomes evident that – specifically in cases of women rearing 
children – people with “a weak labor market connection for instance – may not 
profit that much from formal inclusion into a second pillar arrangement”. As 
introduced in the German Rieder plan, “subsidies paid for periods of inactivity due 
to child rearing” may help to build up sufficient old age pension benefits (Bertozzi 
and Bonoli, 2007:132). 
Interestingly, in Switzerland, with the first LPP revision, one of the original 
objectives “was to adapt the law on occupational pensions to increasing life 
expectancy and to improve coverage of atypical workers especially part-time 
employees. Because of the access threshold to compulsory affiliation for second-
pillar pensions, many part-time workers, mostly women with children, were 
excluded from compulsory occupational pension coverage. In a consultation 
procedure organized before the preparation for the bill, the idea of lowering or 
abolishing the access threshold to compulsory coverage (an option favored at the 
time by the unions and by the Socialists) was firmly rejected by employers” (Bonoli, 
2009:235). Afterwards, the Social Security Committee, after having examined the 
bill, “supported a modified version that included reducing the access threshold to 
compulsory occupational pension coverage by one half: from 24,000 to 12,000 
Swiss francs yearly” (Bonoli, 2009:236). However, the proposal went backwards 
and forwards between the chambers and finally, the access threshold was lowered 
only to 18,990 Swiss francs per year. Thus, employees at the bottom end of the 
income scale and part-time earners continue to be disadvantaged in this system 
and inequality within the second pillar system was hereby reinforced.  
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It has become increasingly known that although “the Swiss pension system 
includes a rather generous means-tested pension” avoiding poverty in old age, 
“equity problems are apparent, when comparing the final disposable income of 
pensioners who have a small second pillar pension that lifts them just above the 
access threshold”. The thesis will demonstrate this inequality and show the pension 
inequality amongst retirees, affecting women in particular. The empirical part of this 
study demonstrates that women are those with the lowest level of pension 
payments. So, we can agree that “low-income workers […] may be the main losers 
in the [second pillar pension] reforms adopted in the 2000s” in Switzerland” 
(Bertozzi and Bonoli, 2007:133).  
According to an article of the Swiss Sociological Association (2013), “the second 
pillar depends, among other things, on the contribution period, income levels and 
the pension fund, and in fact prejudices against those with irregular career paths 
and/or low-skilled positions. Women thus run a high risk of discrimination by a 
retirement system still largely based on the figure of the man as chief household 
provider. Other sections of the population are likewise affected, such as persons 
of foreign origin, many of whom have labored hard, such as construction workers 
or cleaners, and for whom an extension of working life would hardly be 
conceivable” (Kaeser, 2013). 
We will see in this thesis, that “pension entitlements are the outcome of complex 
interaction regarding regulation, funding and administration” (Leisering 2003, cited 
in Meyer et al., 2007:7). Thus, regulation of the second pillar system in Switzerland 
plays a major role in determining pension entitlements and depending on the 
pension fund, one is affiliated to, the pension benefits vary strongly. The 
administration of employer pension schemes creates inequality between retirees 
and between women and men. The empirical part of this thesis will demonstrate 
that although “most European governments […] are confident that steps taken 
towards privatizing national pension regimes provide good opportunities for most 
Europeans to maintain their living standards after retirement”, major challenges 
remain unresolved (Bridgen and Meyer, 2007:4). 
The study of Bridgen and Meyer about “six biographies representing working life 
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more typical for women, who have longer periods of labor market detachment and 
part-time work” confirms that [women] “are [their] lowest paid individuals”. Thus, 
the study clearly demonstrates “income and gender differentials” (Bridgen and 
Meyer, 2008:7). This is a strong argument which this thesis correlates. I will be 
demonstrating in the empirical part that women – who accumulate the smallest 
capital over their working life – are strongly disadvantaged once retired in regards 
to their pension income. Thus, while comparing the collected empirical findings 
between men and women, I will demonstrate strong income and gender divergence 
in regards to pension income once retired. 
Bridgen and Meyer analyzed income inequality and social justice based mainly on 
two specific variables. “The first indicator for inequality between pensions is the 
gap between the highest and the lowest pension”. This variable is also analyzed in 
this thesis and confirms Bridgen and Meyer’s statement. It provides an excellent 
indicator of disposable income between the lowest and highest pension incomes. 
The authors go beyond that analysis and express the highest and the lowest 
pensions in relation to the poverty line. They argue that higher replacement rates 
for lower earners indicate narrowing inequality” (Bridgen and Meyer, 2008:9). 
According to the authors, “the argument that the “retreat from the state” that has 
characterized pension’s policy in recent decades necessarily compromises the 
egalitarian values typically associated with the public pension’s model is 
questionable” (Bridgen and Meyer, 2008:10). “[Their] findings show that, firstly, 
publicly administered pensions do not necessarily achieve the aims that are 
ostensibly embedded in their underlying normative rationale”. According to the 
study of several pension systems in Europe, including Switzerland, “a retirement 
system that relies substantially on the non-state sector can be socially just, and 
can preserve the social citizenship rights of retirees”. The authors point out that 
“while private actors can play an important benevolent role for social justice, 
decisive state regulation is the hallmark of those pension regimes with the best 
outcomes” Bridgen and Meyer, 2008:11). Based on the study of 6 different pension 
schemes, “the Dutch and Swiss systems perform far better than those of the UK 
and Germany because they are built on an inclusive first pillar, which provides a 
high level of protection to most citizens” (Bridgen and Meyer, 2008:11). The 
authors argue that because of the fact that “the state facilitates broad access to 
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occupational provision, […] most Swiss biographies have a median second pillar 
that is above 10 per cent of the national relative poverty line” (Bridgen and Meyer 
2008:11). 
According to Rechsteiner ”the decentralized structure with unequal levels of 
provision, depending on the institution, leads to inequality” (Rechsteiner, 2007 :2). 
The perverse side-effect of solidarity is particular visible in the second pillar.  
Solidarity in the occupational pension system may be developed further, in favor 
of the most deprived and those with low salaries. In the empirical part of this thesis 
we will see what effect lowering of the entrance threshold would have in regard to 
inclusion of a greater number of people benefitting from a higher income during 
retirement. We will see that this concerns particularly those working part-time and 
with low salaries and thus to a large extent women. 
Equality between pensioners’ income must be achieved in order to maintain social 
cohesion. It may be achieved by reducing barriers for entering the second pillar 
system, so that all persons insured in the first pillar are equally integrated in the 
occupational pension system. The integration of part-time workers and those with 
small salaries, in particular women, is essential because of the employers’ 
contributions towards occupational pension schemes. Equality may be achieved 
by integration of the entire work force into employer pension schemes because low 
earners and part-time employees also contribute to the prosperity of a company. 
Excluding part-time employees and those not earning enough to qualify for entry 
into the pension system, and therefore withholding employer contributions which 
would be paid into their pension schemes if they were integrated, is discrimination 
against this already underprivileged group of employees. According to 
Rechsteiner, not only middle and high income classes should benefit from 
employer contributions but also income groups with basic and very low salaries 
(Rechsteiner, 2012). 
The problem arises where “individual pension funds [in Switzerland] are free to 
adopt the rules they wish to determine the level of benefits, provided that the final 
benefit is at least equal to what a worker would have received if covered by 
Obligatorium”, which represents the minimum second pillar benefits (Bonoli and 
Shinkawa, 2005:143). Bonoli confirms that “individual pension funds also enjoy 
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substantial room for maneuver with regard to the financing of pension funds. The 
law prescribes only that the fund must have sufficient reserves to fully fund the 
commitments made [based on the actuarial calculations], and that the employer 
should contribute at least 50 per cent of the total amount paid into the fund. As a 
result one finds large variations in the way pension funds are financed. […] There 
are also differences in the way in which contributions are shared between 
employers and employees” (Bonoli and Shinkawa, 2005:144). The resulting 
inequality in pension schemes and benefits is shown in the empirical part of this 
thesis. 
“Across [Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic of Ireland (ROI)], there are 
significant gender differences in reliance on the state, occupational and personal 
pensions, highlighting the economic dependence of older women on the state. In 
the ROI, in 2009 women accounted for only one-third of those receiving the state 
contributory pension and two-thirds of those receiving the state non-contributory 
pension” (Department of Social and Family Affairs, 2012:13). “Within the UK and 
the Republic of Ireland, the pensions system has begun to address barriers to 
equal access by gender. However, women continue to experience differential 
access to pensions, and particularly occupational and private pensions. There is a 
need to explore the motivations and behaviors of women in relation to their pension 
provision” (Duvvury and Price, 2012:1).  
As this phenomenon is apparently wide spread all over the European continent, 
the subject will be given attention in this thesis as regards Switzerland. We will see 
that women’s access to pension funds in Switzerland - due to the entrance 
threshold – is limited and they are to a substantial extent excluded from second 
pillar provision as they are mainly part-time workers or earning low salaries. Part-
time employees and persons with low salaries, in particular women, lose out on 
two accounts. Firstly, they lose out on pension credits paid in by the employer and 
secondly on their own contributions, as they have no easy and direct access to 
inclusion in an employer’s occupational pension scheme. Consequently, these 
income classes may not even accumulate their own pension credits for retirement. 
The aforementioned 60% replacement rate of salary may hardly be attained and 
they will depend on complementary pension benefits, so called complementary 
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benefits (PC) from the Swiss welfare state once retired. 
It is all the more important to make women aware of what possibilities they have to 
save up for retirement. This is shown by a study realized in Ireland and the UK, 
where the regulation of mandatory information had then effect of better coverage 
for women. According to the authors, “changes in legislation required employers to 
provide their employees with pension information and facilitate access to a […] 
pension plan, if they did not provide their own occupational pension scheme. The 
effectiveness of this was evident among those in formal employment”. According 
to interviews carried out by the researchers, women expressed the following: “I 
think when the employer makes an effort, you do kind of respond.” (Duvvury and 
Price, 2012:42). This clearly shows that if the employer contributes to a pension 
scheme, the employee will do so too. Thus, the impact of inclusion into employer 
pension schemes and their participation for accumulating credits is essential to 
promoting women’s old age pension provision. The step in this direction seems to 
be accurate and promising. 
2.3  Gender and organizations 
Inequality is not always easily detectable. According to Halford et al., “we are faced 
with a complex and contradictory picture of men, women and organizations” 
(Halford et al., 2001:1). According to this observed complexity, inequalities may 
only be explored through the lenses of different theories and localized through 
divergent identifiers. Furthermore, it appears that not only individuals or their 
characteristics impact on inequalities but also “institutions [as they] are the product 
of the historical conditions from which they emerged and tend to reflect and 
recreate the social pattern and belief systems that existed at their inception”. 
Hence, “from a sociological point of view, inequality is [also] the product of 
institutional processes” (Albiston, 2009: Introduction). According to Walby, “the 
analysis of gender inequality requires the theorization of the extent and nature of 
interconnections between different dimensions of the gender regime (Walby, 
2004). 
For Weber, organizations and bureaucracy are gender neutral. “In the bureaucratic 
concept of the Weber organization, it is an individual’s qualities that are valued” 
and these seem to be based on “purely objective criteria”. Weber considers 
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organizations and their structures as neutral. Thus each individual has the same 
chance within organizational structures. He argues that organizations should see 
women and men as gender neutral “individuals with a range of skills and 
competencies” (Weber, 2001:12). It appears that Weber conceptualized the 
classical explanation of social inequalities with three dimensions of social 
inequalities, these are: class, status and party. Thus for him inequality represents 
a mainly institutional phenomenon. He believes that humans are driven by 
institutions and guided by their established laws without being consciously aware 
(Halford et al., 2001). 
Structuralists argue that gender, class and race are dominant criteria for gender 
inequalities. For these authors, structural laws create the reality. Yet, the meaning 
of structures is not easily identifiable. Structuralists share a common belief that 
structures “can be understood as underlying laws governing how social and 
economic life functions”.  […] “The key to these structures is that they have been 
constructed in the interests of dominant groups and serve to perpetuate these 
groups’ dominance” (Halford et al., 2001:13). Women in this context are oppressed 
as they do not belong to the “same class of men” (Halford et al., 2001:14).  
For Marx, organizations are constructed in view of male and capitalist domination 
(1978). He believes that inequality is produced by distinct social classes and that 
these are keys to understanding capitalism and it’s functioning. He considers that 
the main classes - the bourgeoisie and the proletariat – are opponents. The 
bourgeoisie rules the other classes and hereby creates inequality. Thus, human 
beings are divided into those who have capital and property and those who do not. 
Marx considers society be dominated by capitalists governing over workers. In 
conclusion to that, Marx believes that inequality among men may be eradicated by 
simply distributing capital and property equally to everyone. 
Marxist feminists argue that the causes of stratification between men and women 
are rooted in the macro structures of society, at a level higher than that of any 
specific organization and that organizational structure do not, as such, reproduce 
gender inequality. The roots of inequality are seen at the level of the state, in terms 
of replicating female subordination. Thus, for these scholars, class domination is 
seen as rooted in gender relations and gender inequality is perceived as a class 
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phenomenon (Savage and Witz, 1992:6ff).  
Althussers Marxist view is that structure is distinct from the actual and the 
ideological. As a Marxist structuralist, he stresses that the state and its institutions 
act in the interests of the dominant class, the capitalists, and serve the ruling class. 
The state would therefore reproduce the capitalist structure in its economic, legal 
and political institutions. Hence, the state and its legal institutions would function in 
the interest of capitalism and, to a lesser extent, in the interest of the members of 
this dominant class. Institutions are thought to a certain degree to be independent 
(Boyer and Saillard, 2002). 
Kanter argues that “gender differences in organizational behavior are due to 
structure”. She believes that women are placed in “dead-end jobs” (Kanter, 
1990:143) are a consequence of organizational behavior. “Feminists writing about 
organizations assume that organizational structure is gender neutral”, “in spite of 
feminist recognition that hierarchical organizations are an important location of 
male dominance” (Kanter, 1990:143).  
Acker argues that organizational structure is not gender neutral and inequalities 
arise where the system is built for the male breadwinner. Thus, despite equal rights 
for men and women “inequality remains persistent in organizations” (Acker, 
1990:139). “Organizational logic has material forms in written work rules, 
managerial directives and documentary tools for running large organizations”. 
According to Acker this is how it produces inequality (Acker, 1990:147).  
2.3.1 Institutional inequalities 
“The idea that organizations are deeply and essentially embedded in wider 
institutional environments rose to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
“Institutional theory and research have developed since” (Scott and Meyer, 
1994:1). 
In this context, Douglas explains “how institutions think” (1996). The author argues 
that the idea that “institutions just do the routine, low-level, day-to-day thinking” is 
false (1986:111). She points out that “recognizing the social origin of ideas of 
justice does not commit us to refraining from judging between the systems” 
(1986:121). The author concludes that “individuals really do share their thoughts 
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and they do to some extent harmonize their preferences, and they have no other 
way to make the big decisions except within the scope of institutions they build” 
(Douglas, 1996:128), confirming that there are common rules within each 
institution.  
Scott illustrates that “sociologists tend to emphasize the importance of shared 
values and common understandings as the basis for social order”, whereas 
“economists are more likely to stress divergent interests and hence the need for 
referees and regulatory framework”. He argues that “institutions shape behavior by 
means of  representational rules […], constitutive rules […], normative rules […], 
enforcement mechanisms […] involving surveillance” (Scott and Meyer, 1994:67). 
Scott proposes a layered system of concepts, such as “meaning systems and 
related behavior patterns, symbolic elements including normative elements, which 
are enforced by regulatory processes” (Scott and Meyer, 1994:56). “Institutional 
rules are backed by enforcement mechanisms” (Scott and Meyer, 1994:63). Scott 
points out that “whether organizations are controlled by process (institutional) 
controls, by output (technical) controls or by some combination of these”, can be 
“viewed as an attempt to focus on the […] regulatory processes at work (Scott and 
Meyer, 1994:64). 
Berger and Luckmann demonstrate that “institutions always have a history, of 
which they are the products”. They argue that “it is impossible to understand an 
institution adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it 
was produced” (1967:54-55).  
Inequalities are generated in many ways and institutions and organizations may 
reinforce or reduce pre-existing socioeconomic inequalities. Depending on the 
institutions, the pattern of gendered behavior and organizational practices is 
different; but it is underpinned by a clearly defined gendered social order (Lorber 
et al., 1991).  
2.3.2 Employers and gender 
In Switzerland, history shows that men and women for many years formed a 
business team, though the wife stayed at home, doing less valued jobs like 
household duties and child rearing, whereas husbands went out to do the jobs 
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offered by employers and had a higher status. According to Hofstede, “the wife did 
not share her husband’s legal status” but the “family was the smallest functional 
cell of society” (2005:159).  
Early 19th century a small number of employers were offering privately financed 
insurance schemes for employees against the risks of old age, disability and death. 
However, with the specificity that only employees, and only as long as they were 
employed, enjoyed insurance coverage from their employers. The underlying 
pension expectations were and still are that the family’s survival and well-being for 
the years to come was guaranteed by the employer. One of the first companies in 
Switzerland to provide a pension was “Sulzer” in the machine industry who founded 
their own pension institution at the beginning of the 19th century.  
Employers always used employment benefits to attract and retain their workforce. 
Thus, organizations with their specific employment policies shape the employment 
conditions of their employees. Organizational policy measures define employment 
benefits which vary considerably between employers and between employees, 
creating (gender) inequality in the process (Aldrich, 1999). These employment 
benefits may include – in addition to the regular salary – paid vacation, bonuses 
and supplementary insurance coverage and second pillar pension benefits going 
beyond the mandatory part. Some Swiss employers were offering certain benefits 
before they became compulsory.  
It seems that employers may be deemed to giving particular consideration to their 
business objectives, according to the theory of the rational actor view. These 
business objectives are considered important guidelines for the arrangement of 
formal organizational structure. These organizational regulations are, according to 
Preisendörfer, considered as an institutional rationality and seen as accepted 
remedies for reaching the organizational goals (Preisendörfer, 2008: 96). 
Efficiency and thus success seems the most essential goal of an employer. 
According to Preisendörfer, efficiency within an organization is directed by the 
behavior of its members and steered by the formal organizational structure 
(2008:81).  
According to the study of Meyers et al. “the conclusion [is] that policy influences 
employment decisions”. (1999:136). Indeed, the authors argue that [with being a 
77 
 
mother] the “probability of employment decreases” (1999:131) and is like a “break 
of employment with the subset of family policies that are predicted to facilitate 
continuous employment” (1999:134). The authors argue that only countries “that 
have made generous commitments to both types of policy come closest to a 
universal-breadwinner model in which government policies equalize employment 
opportunities between adults who do and do not have child-caregiving 
responsibilities. Countries that have made a partial commitment, providing 
generous maternity leave but lacking extensive public childcare, represent a more 
ambiguous compromise between the universal-breadwinner and traditional male-
breadwinner models” (Meyers et al., 1999:137). It seems that “policies that 
increase labor market opportunities for women without affecting the gender bias in 
responsibility for unpaid work in the home, will yield as best, a partial form of gender 
equality” (Meyers et al., 1999:139).  
The employer plays a leading role as concerns pension provision in the 
occupational pension system, all the more so as the second pillar became 
mandatory for a large part of the workforce in 1985. Importantly, in Switzerland 
employers may decide to a large extent on their own pension scheme. I argue in 
this thesis that second pillar legislation (LPP) encourages the employer to set up 
its own pension institution with its own regulations and this leads to broad 
divergence between second pillar scheme conditions, depending on the 
employers’ settings and goals. Thus, the Federal law on occupational pensions 
(LPP) promotes freedom of interpretation in regard to second pillar pension 
schemes. In particular so, as the employer participates in the pension council and 
shapes the pension regulations. This act may lead to inequalities between retirees 
and employees.  
2.3.3 Two occupational pension institutions 
With the introduction of the privately financed mandatory occupational pension in 
the 1980s together with a liberal employment market and influenced by liberalism 
(Bertozzi et al., 20:2005), the Swiss welfare state opted consciously for leaving a 
lot of room for maneuver for employers to set up their own pension scheme.  
The pension institution is free to adapt the legal requirements as long as they 
provide conditions that satisfy at least the legal minimum. Every private 
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occupational pension institution establishes its own regulations regarding pension 
benefits and the general conditions they offer to the active insured and retirees. 
However, to guarantee the uniformity of the pension regulations and to ensure that 
the legal minimum is provided and guaranteed, offices for the supervision of 
occupational pensions, such as the OAK, the Federal body for supervision of 
occupational pension institutions (former ABV, FSIO), and cantonal and regional 
supervisory offices, were established. The OAK’s task is to supervise the cantonal 
and regional offices of occupational pension institutions and other institutions 
active in occupational provision. The aim is to protect the capital of the active 
insured and retirees and avoid fraud in this field. Thus, the solvency and the cash 
ratio of a pension institution, as well as its pension regulations, are checked for 
conformity. I argue that the pension regulations of pension institutions generate 
gender inequality by stipulating specific rules more likely to exclude women than 
men from the system or even promoting different regulations for men and women. 
These may be the entrance threshold, the retirement age, the conversion rate, the 
number of contributing years or the pension cuts for early retirement. Hence, 
pension and capital payments differ somewhat between women and men within 
and between the liberal and paternal pension institutions. 
In order to reveal the discrepancy between pension schemes, I have chosen two 
distinct types of pension institutions, revealing the unequal conditions of affiliation 
and their impact on pension income. We know that a typology of institutions 
facilitates the study by making it possible to relate causes and outcomes. Based 
on the idea that there are different types of organizations, organized in distinct 
ways with their own regulations and thus distinctively influencing the conditions of 
employment, whereof a part are the conditions of affiliation to a second pillar 
pension scheme. I argue that institutional structures reflect inequality and are likely 
to affect pension and capital benefits by defining clear norms in their pension 
regulations. Thus, institutional structures “are relevant for income redistribution” 
(Korpi and Palme, 1998:666).  
The typology of the private pension institutions, presented below, facilitates the 
study of inequality on the institutional level. Furthermore, the description of the two 
types permits to show the effects within a pension institution in regards to gender 
79 
 
inequalities between the affiliated members. 
The Esping-Andersen welfare state types are taken here as models to illustrate the 
two distinct types of pension institution presented in this study. My focus, in the 
usage of Esping-Andersen models, is purely analytical and intends purely to help 
the reader to illustrate the dichotomous types of the two analyzed pension 
institutions. 
The paternal type in pension institutions, analyzed in this thesis, reflects values of 
solidarity, subsidiarity and equality in its pension regulations. Thus, the emphasis 
of the occupational pension benefits, promoted by the employer and the pension 
institution, lies on subsidiarity, equality and harmony. As we will see in the empirical 
part, this pension institution reduces gender inequality and enhances equality 
between low and high income earners, independent on gender. 
The liberal pension institutions promotes values of individuality, the legal minimum 
is scheduled and efficiency is the goal of the pension scheme. The emphasis lies 
in the singularity, this means that each individual saves up for the own retirement, 
responsibility and economically conduced pension schemes are the rule. The 
empirical part will reveal that the pension fund foresees the legal minimum where 
appropriate and cross financing between the insured is not provided. 
Table 2.5 Presentation of two ideal types 
Type of institution Values 
Paternal 
solidarity 
subsidiarity 
equality 
Liberal 
individuality 
legal minimum 
efficiency 
Source: Kucera, own presentation  
 
It appears that institutional gender regimes may create within their system 
inequality amongst their members. The labor market structure, at the origin of these 
inequalities, has been widely studied in regards to gender discrepancies. Based 
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on this understanding, the paternal type of pension institution, which was founded 
in the 1920s, incorporates paternal values and displays a different pattern of 
occupational pension and capital payments from the liberal type which incorporates 
liberal values and is less generous as it was established in the 1980s (Huber, 
2002:308).  
Each company is operated according to a different economic and hence capitalist 
environment for workers and employers. The paternal company is active in “low-
tech” market segments and dominating the domestic market. This company works 
with a high proportion of over 50% female staff and operates production lines.  
2.3.3.1 Paternal pension institution 
The paternal type of pension institution exhibits strong characteristics of solidarity, 
subsidiarity and equality. The emphasis is on solidarity towards the employed 
(insured) and the retired. The breadwinner is dominant in this scheme as the 
employer provides for the whole family. The company and its paternal patriarchal 
pension institution provide for the family and for the community of their employees. 
The wide-spread paternal values enforcing the family structure of father, mother 
and children were reinforced through these types of companies and are reflected 
in the company values. The main breadwinner, except in wartime, was the man. 
Morals were based on paternal values; the employer is responsible for his 
employees. After retirement, the pension will be sufficient to provide for the family. 
In this paternal type of institution, the occupational pension was set up for a person 
who began working early in his life, worked full time and remained with the same 
company until retirement. Based on these values, the breadwinner works until the 
age where a full pension is paid out.  
According to my research, the paternal pension institution may be further 
associated with organized capitalism and Fordist production methods. The ordered 
and controlled environment with a concentration of production sites and with a 
dominant bureaucratization supervising the production processes and the 
implication in the interior market characterize the organized capitalist systems. Part 
of this capitalist system is the Fordist production methods. Economy of scale, low 
and competitive prices, standardized low-cost and low-tech consumer goods, thus 
mass production methods to improve productivity best describe the Fordist type of 
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production of the paternal pension institution (Lash and Urry, 1987). Furthermore, 
the paternal type is mainly active on the domestic market in Switzerland where the 
protective market environment has helped to furbish constant and even generous 
benefits, in particular so, as Switzerland - based on protective market laws - had a 
rather protected domestic market until a few years ago. Protectionism meant that 
the economic policy restrained trade between Switzerland and other states, 
through tariffs on imported goods designed to discourage imports of foreign 
products. Thus the paternal type had to face a far less competitive market and thus 
fewer economic difficulties. The reason was that it was active in a protected 
economic environment with little competition.  
2.3.3.2 Liberal pension institution 
The liberal pension institution incorporates liberal values: strong individual 
responsibility and efficiency. This sub-system of individual and liberal values is a 
reflection of the company values and is subsequently reflected in the pension fund 
and its regulations. Normative behavior is expressed in relation to retirement age: 
in the liberal pension institution a person is considered to be lazy if he or she does 
not work until age 65 (Dahrendorf, 1961:21).  
This type of pension institution was founded in “cultural new-land”. Increasing 
female labor workforce participation has brought about a different family structure. 
Both parents share responsibility for looking after the children and part-time work 
has become increasingly important. This behavior favors not only a balanced 
repartition of male and female workers within a company but also individualism due 
to the late foundation of families. Responsibility of the employer for the worker and 
his family is not a primary objective. The employer provides the legally defined 
minimum pension contributions for each employee. The underlying pension 
expectations are that each employee will provide for himself and survival and well-
being are the responsibility of each individual. In this context, liberal companies 
reflect the post-industrial era with strongly rationalized working processes and 
highly competitive working techniques. The requirement for strongly technology-
oriented production influences the choice of highly qualified staff. The liberal 
company is successful in this post-paternal society as it is known for its customer-
oriented production.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
When employers set up private occupational pension institutions and regulate the 
conditions of affiliation of their employees to their second pillar pension scheme, 
they create a gendered organization with specific benefits. These conditions or 
benefits may be a part of the package the employer uses to attract and retain their 
workforce. These employment benefits may include better or worse second pillar 
scheme provisions for women and men, as we will see in chapter 4, the empirical 
part of this thesis. 
The rising unemployment and stagflation of the 1970s was produced by structural 
causes, which led companies to search for new business options and new forms 
of production. In this increasingly unstable context, the liberal pension institution 
was established. It can therefore be associated with disorganized (Warde, 1995) 
or flexible (Friedman, 2007) capitalism, with post-Fordist and high-tech production 
methods, which became increasingly important from the early 1970s onwards. 
Since the 1970s this company has developed “high-tech” products which are sold 
on the international market where the economic environment is highly competitive. 
The economic activity of the liberal type pension institution is highly profit-oriented 
and may be described as a company whose economic activity has an impact on 
the level of income (Boyer and Saillard, 2002:233). Indeed, the high tech and global 
markets provoke much harsher conditions and require much more competitiveness 
compared to the low tech and domestic markets. Women in the liberal type 
company are generally less well educated and occupy the lowest paid jobs. The 
core of male workers is highly specialized. This organization has removed certain 
layers of bureaucracy for the highly skilled work force, including breakdown of 
hierarchical structures in order to create a flatter hierarchical structure and a more 
flexible work organization.  
The empirical part of this thesis provides evidence that institutional gender 
regimes, like the occupational pension institutions, based on the LPP, play a 
dominant role in creating (gender) inequalities. Based on the LPP allowing a lot of 
freedom of interpretation for the pension institutions, an institution may act on the 
“reduction of inequality” as “institutional structures may have significant effects on 
redistributive processes” (Korpi and Palme, 1998:665). Furthermore, it was 
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emphasized by Bridgen and Meyer, that “egalitarian liberal justice requires 
redistributive income transfers to protect the basic liberties of all citizens”. [This is 
especially so, as] “it has been asserted that privatization is fundamentally 
inegalitarian, and therefore likely to impair the autonomy of the least advantaged” 
(Bridgen and Meyer, 2008: abstract).  
This thesis analyses the effect of privatization of the second pillar specifically in 
regards to the legislation leaving a large amount of freedom of interpretation to 
pension institutions who therefore offer - under different schemes - a variety of 
pension benefits. Women and men with low salaries during their active life, 
interrupted careers or part-time work, depend on state benefits. The Swiss welfare 
state provides complementary benefits on a means-tested basis. Thus a significant 
section of the Swiss work force is excluded from the second pillar pension system, 
falling through the “safety-net”. This group of people has little opportunity to save 
up autonomously for an independent retirement with a decent standard of living. 
Hence, “in just systems, what counts is the role and scope of the public authority 
in framing and securing compliance with egalitarian aims and objectives” (Bridgen 
and Meyer, 2008: abstract). I believe that this study reveals elements confirming 
that public authority needs to clearly frame and secure compliance with egalitarian 
aims. The empirical chapter will show what may be done to “reduce inequalities” 
by providing more equality for all (to be) insured and retirees within the LPP.  
Each of the above mentioned theoretical perspectives offers an account of gender 
inequality and elements for understanding the relationships between gender and 
organization. People behave according to their integration within a specific 
economic and institutional environment. Gender is constructed differently in the 
two different types of institution and that inequality between men and women is not 
equally accentuated. The study of two types of pension institution which have been 
analyzed as two typical case studies demonstrate that gender inequalities occur 
due to specific processes and mechanisms within the legal regulations of the LPP 
and are triggered by the written rules, the LPP and the pension regulations of 
private occupational pension institutions. This is so as “during […] historical 
transition, conceptions of employment as a free contract between employer and 
worker replaced customary means of regulating working conditions, and the legal 
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relationship of contract […] became the center of social organization” (Albiston, 
2009:112).   
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3. Data and methodology 
This chapter presents the data, the sample population, the methodology adopted 
in this thesis and the methods used to obtain plausible, reliable and valid 
information about the social backgrounds and behavior of the population in the 
study.  
The choice of my particular research design was essential. The study of the origin 
of gender inequality due to institutional rules and regulations is little known. Thus I 
used a mixed method research approach, such as descriptive statistics, 
simulations, correlations, survey by questionnaire but also qualitative interview 
methods. In order to reveal the context and the complexity of the phenomenon, the 
study uses not only empirical research but also investigation of relationships and 
correlations are presented. The so-called mixed-method approach illustrates well 
the complexity of this research subject and demonstrates that it was most 
challenging and requires further research with an even more systematic and 
integrated approach. However, a particular experiment, with information from 
pension regulations of the paternal pension institution and collected data from the 
retirees of the liberal pension institution, demonstrates the impact of pension 
regulations. The study illustrates clearly that further research in this field should be 
undertaken while proposing first results and hints how to proceed. 
The study reveals that the data and findings are consistent, however not 
representative. The analyzed data presents a sample within the analyzed 
population. The methods used to prove my hypotheses are manifold and reveal 
that the phenomenon of institutional gender inequality exists. Based on empirical 
evidence the thesis discloses that my hypotheses: institutional gender inequality 
occurs in the second pillar system and in particular in the occupational pension 
regulations of each private pension institution - can be confirmed. 
The core of this research project is two-fold. On the one hand it consists of the 
exploitation of the MELAP dataset and on the other hand of the standardized 
survey conducted amongst old-age retirees of the liberal pension institution. Both 
datasets served primarily to analyze inequality resulting from an institutional 
context triggered by pension regulations and the Federal law on occupational 
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pension schemes (LPP) in Switzerland. Both data collections were enriched by 
document studies. The LPP and the pension regulations of two pension institutions 
as well as the explorative qualitative interviews with the heads of the pension 
institutions were analyzed in order to confirm the hypotheses. Thus, this thesis 
adopts a multi-perspective approach that questions the relationships between 
economy (the old-age benefits or pension credits accumulated by employer and 
employee), politics (the Federal law on occupational pension schemes LPP), and 
history (the origins and anchoring of the pension institution in the period it was 
founded). 
The variety and complexity of the subject of investigation demanded the use of 
different research methods to obtain the necessary information. 
 Case study design 
 Analysis of paid-out second pillar benefits from two pension institutions 
(MELAP) 
 Standardized survey through a structured questionnaire sent out to old-age 
retirees of the liberal pension institution (SICC) 
 Study of pension regulations of liberal and paternal pension institution 
 Study of the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) 
 Interviews with experts of the liberal and paternal pension institutions 
According to my analysis, the mechanism which triggers inequality can be 
observed in the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) as well as in 
the pension regulations of the two pension institutions. While using both qualitative 
and quantitative methods to explore the regulation and operation of pension 
schemes, resulting in pension inequality amongst the retiree population, the thesis 
is able to produce new knowledge in the field of pension inequality. 
  
87 
 
3.1 Data 
The following table offers an overview of the data sources used in this study.  
Table 3.1 Data sources 
 
Source: Kucera, own analysis, 2012 
The main data source, the MELAP pilot dataset, contains personal data from 
beneficiaries of five occupational pension institutions. The term MELAP stands for 
“second pillar pension and capital declarations database”. For each benefit paid 
out by a pension institution, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (AFC) in Bern 
requires a tax declaration. The information provided on this declaration or data 
sheet is stored in the MELAP pilot database. I had access to data from five different 
pension institutions which had paid out benefits in the years 2004 to 2008. I chose 
to compare two out of the five pension institutions for the purpose of this thesis. 
The two chosen institutions both revealed a clear cut pattern showing that the 
pension institutions are distinct from each other. The divergence of the two pension 
institutions is described in the analysis chapters 4 and 5.  The three other 
institutions displayed a mixed pattern of pension benefits, not suitable for the 
particular context of this study. Their data was not appropriate for comparison or 
analysis as they partially represent insurance schemes offering a mixture of 
benefits combining the two other types.  
My second important source of information is a standardized SICC survey of the 
old-age beneficiaries of the liberal pension institution. I gathered data using a 
structured questionnaire which I sent out to the entire population of old-age retirees 
of the liberal pension institution. The fully structured survey questionnaire was sent 
out to 5’500 retirees in 2008, whereof nearly 800 responded.  
Name MELAP pilot
Pension 
Regulations
SICC-Survey LPP
Qualitative 
interviews
Character
Tax register data: 
complete count
Document study Random sample Legal documents Expert interviews
Origin
Federal Tax 
Administration
Two institutions Liberal institution Laws Two institutions
Years 2004 - 2007 1985 - 2007 2007 1985 - 2007 2008
Sample size
3,800 old age 
retirees
800 old age 
retirees
2 interviews
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My third source of information is the Federal law on occupational pension schemes 
(LPP) in Switzerland which I analyzed for the period from 1986 until 2007, as well 
as the revisions of the LPP. The pension regulations of the liberal and the paternal 
pension institutions are my fourth source. I studied various versions of the pension 
regulations of both pension institutions covering the years from 1986 to 2007.  
Further evidence was provided by qualitative semi-structured personal interviews. 
I carried out an interview with two experts from the paternal pension institution and 
an interview with one expert from the liberal pension institution.  
3.2 Sample population 
The sample population of old-age beneficiaries of occupational pension institutions 
which I chose represents only a small section of the total number of all retirees 
affiliated to the 2,435 pension institutions in Switzerland in 2008, including 3.6 
billion insured and 553,400 retirees, of which 75% represented old-age retirees. 
The two types of pension institutions analyzed, liberal and paternal, belong to the 
category of autonomous private pension institutions. These private pension 
institutions representing a single employer form a smaller proportion of all pension 
institutions, 1,000 in 2009 with approximately 2.2 billion insured employees 
(www.bfs.admin.ch).  
Table 3.2 Number of insured and retirees in 2009 
  
Autonomous 
pension 
institutions 
Liberal and 
Paternal 
institutions 
Retirees 741,789 34,700 
Active insured 2,169,534 67,000 
Source: Kucera, own exploitation, FSO, Pension fund statistics, 2009 
 
If we compare the proportion of insured and retirees in the two institutions we 
observe a certain disparity between the proportions of insured to retirees. While 
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comparing my sample population of the two types of pension institutions, revealing 
the proportion they represent, we conclude that although the chosen case study 
design is not representative with 5% of retirees and 3% of all insured, but the two 
cases I have chosen are significant in the Swiss pension landscape. 
Table 3.3 Proportion of insured and retirees in 2009 
 
In the liberal type the proportion of retirees is higher with close to 40% compared 
to the proportion in the paternal pension institution at 33%. The active insured of 
the paternal type represent 67%. Of the liberal they represent 61% of all those 
insured. 
3.3 Methods of data collection 
This sub-chapter presents the design and the methods used to test and confirm 
the hypotheses. A mixed methods approach seemed inevitable in this thesis due 
to the great challenge of identifying the origin of the production of inequality. The 
various sources and methods allowed special insight into the occupational pension 
fund system in Switzerland. A formal data collection process ensured that the data 
was accurate and subsequent conclusions in my findings were validated. The data 
collection followed a plan involving the following activities: 
 Pre-collection: definition of goals, target data, definitions, methods 
 Collection: data collection from various sources 
 Findings: sorting and classifying the data for analysis and presentation 
The process of data collection involved several steps.  
Step one consisted of obtaining access to the data contained in the MELAP pilot 
dataset. The primary data included tax data from the MELAP pilot register. I 
extracted the information on all old-age retirees who received a pension or capital 
Liberal 
institution
Paternal 
institution
Both types in %
of Swiss 2nd
pillar insured
Retirees 39% 33% 5%
Active insured 61% 67% 3%
Source: Kucera, own exploitation, FSO, Pension fund statistics
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payment between 1st July 2004 and 31t December 2007 from either of two distinct 
and apparently extreme distinct pension institutions in Switzerland.  
The second step was the case study design. The two pension institutions that I 
purposely chose to analyze as case studies, I extracted from the MELAP pilot data 
set. The MELAP dataset contained information from 5 pension institutions. 
The third step was the documentary study. I collected information from the two 
chosen pension institutions. I collected annual reports, information from websites 
and the pension regulations of the two pension institutions over 10 years. The 
pension regulations formed the basis for comparison of the retirement conditions 
provided by the two pension institutions. The study of the Federal law on 
occupational pension schemes (LPP) and the comparison of both pension 
schemes with the LPP and, the divergent reactions to this law, dependent on the 
type of the pension institution, are made apparent in this thesis. Thus, I gathered 
information about the functioning of the pension institutions. All empirical data I 
obtained was analyzed, processed and compared. 
Step four consisted of semi-structured in-depth interviews with pension experts of 
the two pension institutions, the liberal and paternal. Further telephone exchange 
with experts to validate the data and findings also took place. An e-mail exchange 
with the pension experts allowed further verification and validation of data. Step 
four consisted of data collection from old-age retirees of the liberal pension 
institution by a standardized qualitative survey. The structured questionnaires, 
filled in thoroughly by close to 800 old-age retirees, provided evidence about 
education, profession, job status, health, income and living conditions. Step five 
contained in particular the secondary data collection, which I compared to the 
relevant observations of the empirical data. Thus, the hypotheses and empirical 
findings were confirmed by collected secondary data as well as official statistics in 
order to sustain its validity. 
3.3.1 MELAP pilot register 
The Swiss Federal tax administration (FTA) is setting up the MELAP register in 
order to record all tax declarations concerning second and third pillar pension and 
capital payments to individuals by occupational pension institutions. These 
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declarations can then be sent electronically from the Federal tax office to the 
cantonal tax offices in Switzerland in order to tax those who have received these 
provisions. The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) aims to exploit these tax 
declarations statistically in a few years’ time. For this purpose, the MELAP 
database in the process of development by the Federal Tax office. It is based on 
an administrative register where all tax declarations regarding pension and capital 
payments (second and third pillar) are stored. In order to test the functioning of the 
MELAP data transfer, a pilot project was established in 2004 which was called the 
MELAP pilot project. For this thesis I was able to exploit the MELAP pilot database.  
It was thanks to the FSO and the FTA that I was able to use the tax register data 
from the pilot project for my thesis in order to find out more. The MELAP pilot 
register contains information about pension and capital payments made to insured 
persons and are based on tax declarations from several occupational pension 
institutions. After having extracted the data, I chose two distinct pension institutions 
from within this MELAP pilot database, and I analyzed their pension and capital 
payment declarations for the period from the 1st July 2004 to 31st December 2007. 
I extracted information for persons aged 55 and older who received an old age 
occupational pension or a capital payment.  
The quality of the information in the MELAP dataset was excellent. Key variables 
like gender, date of birth, pension and capital benefits contained no blanks; from 
the date of birth I created the variable: age. As a result, I did not have to infer any 
information since the variables and the data analyzed in this study are of high 
quality, as I was ensuring with various data quality tests.  
The information I used is based on the tax declarations of pensions or capital 
payments to private individuals from occupational pension funds. The information 
gathered in the MELAP pilot database presents the actual payments to both 
women and men. This data is exploited for the first time in this study and provides 
information on an individual level. Hence, I am able to reveal information about the 
occupational pension and capital payments on the individual and the institutional 
levels, by comparing payments from two distinct pension institutions. 
Generally, a person may receive several payments, such as a pension payment, a 
capital payment, and a bridge pension. The latter is a complementary pension to 
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the second pillar and replaces the public old pension until paid out by the state. A 
disabled person may receive a pension for himself, his spouse and/or his child. A 
person who dies may leave family members who receive a provision from the 
deceased’s insurance. The MELAP consists of one observation per person.  
Variables of the MELAP database 
I created one dataset per year and per pension institution. I call the two institutions 
liberal and paternal. I exploit the following variables, which I created on the basis 
of the information provided in the datasets of the two institutions: 
1) Id-number 
2) Capital payment (betragswert_2) 
3) Old age pension payment (betragswert_11) 
4) Old age bridge pension (betragswert_99) 
5) Date of issue of tax declaration 
6) Date of payment 
7) Year of birth of beneficiary 
8) Year of birth of insured 
The Id-number (1) identifies the number of the tax declaration. The variable 
“betragswert_2” (2) represents a capital payment to an old-age retiree. The 
“betragswert_11” (3) is the amount of an annual pension paid out to an old-age 
retiree. The “betragswert_99” (4) consists of a bridge-pension. The variable “date 
of issue of tax declaration” (5) was useful for verifying what date the payment was 
made. The “date of payment” (6) was the information I used for establishing the 
year the amount was paid out and hence the year the person left for retirement. 
The “year of birth of the beneficiary” (7) was necessary to define the age of the 
person. The “year of birth of insured” (8) served for checking whether the 
beneficiary matched the insured as I chose to analyze only benefits to old-age 
retirees from the MELAP and not, for example, benefits to widows or orphans.  
The number of new old-age retirees in the MELAP pilot database 
The new old-age retirees in the MELAP pilot database consist only of the active 
insured who retired in a given year. Thus, every year there is a population of new 
retirees which are included in the MELAP database. So, in my sample population 
only the insured who retired between 2004 and 2007 are included. A pension 
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institution has a larger number of old-age retirees, consisting of the accumulation 
of the new retiree population for each year, as we will see in the “Survey” section. 
The sample population of newly retired people from the MELAP pilot database, for 
the years from 2004 to 2007, amounts to 3,924 old-age retirees of which overall 
53% (2,075) were women. The following table reveals that the proportion of women 
in the liberal pension institution amounts to 32% and in the paternal institution 55%. 
Furthermore, the effective numbers vary between the pension institutions, as the 
liberal one is far smaller with a total of 711 retirees compared to the paternal one, 
where the number of retirees - who left from 2004 to 2007 - is 3,213. The database 
contained the declarations of all retirees from January to December, with the 
exception of 2004, where the declarations from January to July were missing. 
Table 3.4 Number of persons: MELAP database with occupational benefits 
Year Paternal Liberal Paternal Liberal
2004 445 83 53% 30%
2005 823 212 55% 31%
2006 990 222 56% 31%
2007 955 194 56% 37%
Total 3213 711 55% 32%
Persons Proportion of women
Source: own exploitations, Kucera, 2010, Melap pilot 2004 - 2007 
While presenting the data in relation to age, we must bear in mind that early 
retirement in the paternal pension institution in 2004 was set at 55 years and from 
2005 onwards it was set at 58 years, whilst the liberal institution stipulated an early 
retirement age of 60 years, with the exception that women could retire at 57 until 
2001. The following table reveals the actual numbers according to age. 
In the paternal pension institution the actual number of insured who retired was 
423 in 2004. The biggest population was of those born in 1942. Effectively, there 
were 256 (60%) individuals who retired in 2004 at 62 years old. In 2007, there were 
over 70% born between 1944 and 1946. The biggest proportion (1945 = 40%) 
consisted again of the 62 year old retirees.  
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In the liberal pension institution the individuals born between 1939 and 1941 
represented the biggest part (71%) of old-age retirees in the sample. In total there 
were 70 people who retired in 2004 and they were between 63 and 65 years old. 
And in 2007, the largest number of old-age retirees was born in 1942 and 1943. 
Effectively, close to 60% of this population was between 64 and 65 years old. 
We observe the discrepancy between the two pension institutions in relation to the 
effective retirement age, revealing inequalities on the institutional level. 
Table 3.5: Number of persons in the MELAP pilot database by year of birth 
 
This table presents the MELAP pilot extract providing the basis for exploitation. 
This constructed extract consists of old-age retirees only and excludes other 
beneficiaries from within the MELAP pilot database. 
Data validation of the MELAP dataset 
Data validation is the process of ensuring that a program operates on clean, correct 
and useful data. I used routines, validation rules and check routines. The aim of 
the data validation check is to test the data was valid, sensible, reasonable, and 
secure before I processed and analyzed it. With the data from the MELAP pilot 
dataset, containing the information from various tax declarations from the Federal 
Paternal institution Paternal institution Paternal institution Paternal institution
2004: early retirement age = 55 y. 2005: early retirement age = 58 y. 2006: early retirement age = 58 y. 2007: early retirement age = 58 y.
Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion
1939 1 0.2%
1940 2 0.5% 1940 11 1.2%
1941 10 2.4% 1941 6 0.7% 1941 7 0.6%
1942 256 60.5% 1942 94 10.6% 1942 13 1.1% 1942 12 1.0%
1943 24 5.7% 1943 448 50.6% 1943 219 18.7% 1943 31 2.7%
1944 31 7.3% 1944 119 13.4% 1944 492 41.9% 1944 219 19.1%
1945 20 4.7% 1945 80 9.0% 1945 133 11.3% 1945 455 39.7%
1946 21 5.0% 1946 64 7.2% 1946 151 12.9% 1946 130 11.3%
1947 41 9.7% 1947 64 7.2% 1947 84 7.2% 1947 112 9.8%
1948 11 2.6% 1948 74 6.3% 1948 106 9.2%
1949 6 1.4% 1949 82 7.1%
Total 423 100% Total 886 100% Total 1173 100% Total 1147 100%
Liberal institution Liberal institution Liberal institution Liberal institution
2004: early retirement age = 58 y. 2005: early retirement age = 58 y. 2006: early retirement age = 58 y. 2007: early retirement age = 58 y.
Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion Birth year N° of obs. Proportion
1937 3 3.0%
1938 0 0.0% 1938 5 2.0%
1939 30 30.3% 1939 13 5.2% 1939 1 0.3%
1940 13 13.1% 1940 71 28.5% 1940 13 4.0% 1940 7 2.4%
1941 27 27.3% 1941 63 25.3% 1941 136 41.7% 1941 11 3.8%
1942 10 10.1% 1942 50 20.1% 1942 59 18.1% 1942 95 33.1%
1943 13 13.1% 1943 29 11.6% 1943 43 13.2% 1943 77 26.8%
1944 1 1.0% 1944 4 1.6% 1944 34 10.4% 1944 47 16.4%
1945 2 2.0% 1945 6 2.4% 1945 19 5.8% 1945 17 5.9%
1946 1946 3 1.2% 1946 12 3.7% 1946 7 2.4%
1947 1947 5 2.0% 1947 3 0.9% 1947 21 7.3%
1948 1948 6 1.8% 1948 4 1.4%
1949 1949 1 0.3%
Total 99 100% Total 249 100% Total 326 100% Total 287 100%
Source: M ELAP pilot , own exploitat ion, Kucera 2012
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Tax Office for the years 2004 to 2007, I executed various tests. For these tests I 
used SAS procedures which I had programmed myself. 
Missing values check 
I checked the missing values and used data treatment for erroneous data which I 
could validate through other sources or by checking up with the experts of the 
pension institutions by e-mail exchange. 
Coherence test 
I verified whether the values were valid; I also tested whether there was coherence 
between the values from one year to another and between the constructed data 
sources and secondary data. I created rules, maximum, minimum and average 
values and I eliminated the outlying values. I was able to detect the outliers with 
the help of information from the pension experts.  
Consistency tests 
In addition, one of my tests ensured that the data in the corresponding fields were 
coherent, e.g., If Title = "Mr.", then Gender = "M. 
I created a more sophisticated test using SAS procedures. I verified whether the 
variables sex, age and nationality of a person were correctly entered. I did this by 
setting up an SAS macro procedure testing the old (speaking) AVS public social 
security number against the information in the variables contained in the MELAP 
pilot register data set. The old social security number consisted of 11 digits 
containing the following information in a numerically coded form: 
 date of birth 
 gender 
 first three letters of name 
 nationality (Swiss or other) 
Further consistency tests included gender and date of birth. I checked the gender 
variable and the date of birth of the beneficiary with the insured; they had to match 
as my dataset included only retirees who themselves received occupational old-
age benefits.  
I could only execute these tests while working with the confidential data at the 
Federal Office of Statistics as a scientific employee. Through these tests I could 
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not only validate the data but also confirm the high quality of the data source for 
my study; the matching was generally excellent. In addition, I verified that the 
characters provided came from valid datasets. 
Check digits 
Furthermore I executed several digit tests. I checked whether telephone numbers 
included valid digits and whether the declaration contained a valid community 
(postal code) and country code. I checked whether the number of digits entered 
matched the code for the country or area specified.  
Batch total 
I tested the numerical fields by adding together all records in a variable (total of 
sum paid out) against the sum of the independent variable values from each 
pension or amount paid out. Through my SAS procedure I checked the total was 
correct as it added the 'Total Cost' field of a number of transactions from each 
person together. In the MELAP dataset I verified the total amounts paid out, 
summing up the single payments paid out to a person according to the tax 
declaration information. The main variables checked in this test included the 
following: 
‘7 Betragswert’:  total amount paid out to retiree (insured) 
‘11 Betragswert’:  old age occupational pension paid out to retiree (insured) 
 ‘2” Betragswert’:  old age occupational capital payment paid to retiree (insured) 
‘10 Betragswert’:  occupational capital payment in the case of death of insured 
‘13 Betragswert’:  occupational widow pension = widow of defunct insured 
‘15 Betragswert’:  occupational child pension  
‘16 Betragswert’:  occupational orphan pension = orphan of defunct insured 
‘99 Betragswert’:  bridge pension for insured in case of early retirement 
In my study, I did not exploit the declaration regarding the “WEF” variable, 
designating a capital payment to the insured for financing their own housing. 
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3.3.2 Case study design 
This thesis uses a comparative case study design in order to outline institutional 
inequality in the Swiss occupational pension system. The research method 
emphasizes detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of cases. The key 
strength in the case study design is the integration of multiple sources and 
techniques in the data gathering process. I determined which evidence I needed 
to gather and what analysis techniques I would have to use in order to confirm my 
hypotheses. Due to the complexity of the second pillar context and the case study 
design of the two pension institutions, I decided to collect both qualitative and 
quantitative data. 
The case study design requires meticulous preparation of the examination and the 
research tools. After having determined the hypotheses and having made a first 
test analysis of the sample populations, I selected the two cases from the MELAP 
pilot data set. After contacting the heads of the pension institutions, both pension 
institutions were happy to offer more insight into their pension schemes by 
accepting personal interviews and providing their pension regulations. This 
enabled me to gather data through multiple sources and collect data in a field 
where information is usually not available or to only a limited extent. In the 
evaluation phases of this thesis  
According to my analysis, the two chosen pension institutions represent pure types, 
which I call liberal and paternal, and are situated at the extremes of the landscape 
of pension types. Both pension institutions are private pension schemes for one 
employer.  
The third pension institution represents a mixed type which I would situate between 
the liberal and the paternal; this pension institution represents a public pension 
scheme. The mixed type, which I analyzed in a preliminary study, was purposely 
excluded from this thesis as I wasn’t able to extract a “pure” type. The evaluation 
showed that the entrance threshold was equal to the liberal type but the level of 
pension and capital payments were like both those of the paternal and the liberal, 
showing that this type inhabited a mixture of both the liberal and the paternal types. 
Saying this, it seemed an inexpedient exercise to present the data in this study as 
there would have been no clear evidence confirming either case or no clear pattern 
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of behavior could be shown. 
The fourth and fifth pension institutions within the MELAP pilot dataset were 
insurance schemes. This type of pension fund includes a variety of pension 
schemes, and in particular a variety of different employers affiliated to these 
pension funds. Thus, it would not have been possible to measure the direct 
influence of any of the employers on to a specific pension scheme. This is because 
the life insurers offer pension schemes to a broad and diverse clientele of 
employers, including companies of any sector and thus no distinct pattern of 
behavior would be evident, as these pension schemes are not directly influenced 
by one but by a variety of employers. 
The two chosen examples may not be a representative sample of pension 
institutions. However, for heuristic purposes, I have chosen the clear-cut examples 
situated at the opposite extremes of the continuum (from the most “liberal” to the 
most “paternal” ones) in order to demonstrate the phenomenon of inequality 
occurring at the institutional level. The two cases are particularly interesting as they 
reveal that institutional differences matter. I show that the Federal law on 
occupational pension schemes (LPP) creates inequalities as it allows pension 
institutions to freely operate and set up their pension regulations as long as they 
meet legally defined minimal requirements due to the flexibility within the LPP. 
Hybrid types are surely as common as the both extreme types analyzed. However 
it would produce rather blurry results not particularly useful for demonstrating the 
realm of possible divergence in the operation of the occupational pension 
schemes. Only by choosing extreme types, can I reveal extreme values of 
divergence between pension incomes, affiliation or exclusion and financing of the 
mandatory second pillar pension schemes in Switzerland.  
Although I cannot draw conclusions as to how the other 2000 institutions work, this 
thesis uses the two antipodal types of pension institutions, in order to explore the 
divergent operation of occupational pension schemes, hereby revealing the 
potential range of conditions and benefits, which result in significant inequalities. 
By presenting these case studies, I show that institutional regulations are relevant 
for the redistribution of occupational pension benefits and that the pension 
regulations of a pension institution have a normative character. 
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3.3.3 Document study 
The study of the literature within this field of research of inequality, gender regimes, 
institutional influence and welfare provision, the study of the pension regulations, 
the legislation of the Federal law on occupational pension schemes LPP was of 
importance for the classification and understanding of the new knowledge and the 
preparation of the standardized survey. 
3.3.3.1 LPP, Federal law on occupational pension schemes 
The legal framework, which I studied in order to confirm my thesis, included the 
Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP). I analyzed the corresponding 
articles in the LPP, analyzing the divergence in implementation in the pension 
regulations between and within the two types of pension institutions. 
This law regulates which bodies may create a pension institution, constituting the 
active insured and the retirees; it also provides the framework for the risk insurance 
and the old age pension and capital credits leading – in old age – to the 
occupational pension and capital benefits once retired. The LPP, well known as 
the second pillar, complements the basic first pillar: the public old age pension, the 
AVS. The first and second pillars together should provide approximately 60% of 
the final salary before retirement, according to the Swiss Federal constitution 
(article 113). The public old age system (AVS) was legally established in 1948 and 
the occupational pension system for all employees was mandatorily established in 
the Constitution in 1972 and took effect in 1986. 
3.3.3.2 The pension regulations 
I analyzed and compared the pension regulations of two distinct pension 
institutions, the liberal and the paternal type. Thus, I compared numerous articles 
in both types of institutional pension regulations and several versions of pension 
regulations issued in different years 1985 until 2007. This analysis enabled me to 
gain an overall picture of the evolution of the occupational pension benefits over 
the years. 
Furthermore, I analyzed the intersection of the pension regulations with the LPP 
minimum regulations and compared them with statistical evidence from the FSIO 
and the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The main indicators of inequality were 
100 
 
contribution rate, retirement age, conversion rate, pension cut rate in case of early 
retirement and percentage of capital payment when leaving for retirement. 
3.3.4 Semi-structured interviews 
Qualitative research methods give us a deeper understanding of the phenomenon 
which I have studied and permits to draw conclusions from the results obtained by 
quantitative data.  
The information gathered through personal semi-structured interviews aims at 
providing evidence of inequality between insured men and women and between 
the old-age retirees of two different private pension institutions in Switzerland. 
In order to understand the functioning of a pension institution I gained further 
information by interviewing three experts of two different pension institutions. The 
two qualitative semi-directed interviews provided invaluable information and have 
given insight-information into the running of the two types of pension institution. I 
could record one of the interviews.  
While during the other interview I was taking notes of the answers to my questions. 
Indeed I sent in preparation of the interviews, the clearly outlined questions to the 
participants. So they were prepared in advance for what they were expected to 
answer. The following four points represent the issues and not the actual 
questions. I present them here to the reader in order to give an indicative idea of 
how the interviews were conducted.  
Here is a brief overview of the main parts of the interview guide (see for further 
details annex): 
Interview Guide for interviews with the pension funds experts: 
1) Social integration and social security (part A) 
2) Retirement age and financial situation of retirees (part B) 
3) Behavior and culture amongst employees (part C) 
4) Corporate culture (part D) 
As questions about social integration and social security produced little evidence 
relative to this study of inequality, I have abstained from analyzing them. The focus 
of the analysis lied in the study of inequality in relation to retirement age and the 
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financial situation of retirees, gender and structural behavior of insured (active 
insured) and retirees (passive insured). 
Through qualitative semi-structured interviews with three experts of two pension 
institutions, I obtained important information about the functioning and the rules 
and regulations within the pension schemes and the pension institutions. Thus, the 
personal exploratory interviews provided invaluable information from behind-the-
scenes. Furthermore, the meetings with the experts were extremely useful for 
understanding the functioning of pension institutions and the relationships between 
the three main actors of the second pillar pension system: the pension institution, 
the employer and the insured (employees and retirees). Hence, the interviews 
served not only as a follow up to the quantitative data results but allowed me to 
investigate further and acquire significant information about the various actors 
involved in the pension schemes and their functions and functioning. 
In order to conduct the interviews, I had to identify the people I wanted to interview. 
The interviews had to be arranged a long time in advance and I had to travel in 
order to go and meet them. The experts limited the time for the interview to one 
and a half hours but were prepared to answer more questions by e-mail at a later 
stage. I chose an informal one-to-one meeting as well as a group session with two 
experts; the latter meeting was more formal than the former. I used the technique 
of guided interviews and asked semi-open questions so that the participants could 
express their own views frankly. Before the interviews I sent the interview guide 
(see annex) to the experts so they could prepare for the meeting and the questions. 
The participants allowed me either to audiotape or transcribe the discussed topics 
which were often highly technical. All the experts came from within the pension 
institutions and were extremely well informed as they had been working within the 
pension institutions for many years. The questions provided a basis for discussion 
and a variety of other topics related to this study were discussed and covered. 
Thus, invaluable information was gathered and I established a confidential 
relationship with the management which opened the door to undertaking this 
thesis. 
During the interviews, the experts were incredibly open to answering questions 
about pension regulations, why certain pension regulations were established and 
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what legal changes made them change. Hence, these expert interviews were a 
way of making tacit knowledge more explicit to me and more available for this 
thesis. The experts were able to describe not only what was done but also why, 
and they provided context and explained the judgments behind the phenomena. 
Furthermore, the interviews provided insight and knowledge from within the 
pension institutions without the experts having to write it down themselves. In a 
short space of time we covered a lot of ground and I was able to probe deeply to 
ensure full understanding. These experts have unique knowledge and 
understanding developed over a long period of time and I got answers to any 
questions I asked. The excellent relationships which I established through the 
interviews allowed me to further gather data within the occupational pension 
institution. Subsequent exchanges of e-mails provided new data and made my 
study richer and enabled me to validate data. 
3.3.5 The SICC survey 
The main purpose of this survey was to gather data directly from the concerned 
population of old-age retirees. With this approach I ensured that the responses of 
the concerned regarding occupational pension benefits and living conditions are 
as accurate as possible. The goal of this survey was to measure (gender) inequality 
amongst the entire old-age retiree population of the liberal pension institution. 
For this purpose I constructed a questionnaire based on secondary statistical 
information and in particular on the explorative personal interviews with the pension 
experts. Indeed, the interviews provided invaluable knowledge in preparation for 
the standardized survey of old-aged persons. 
I sent out over 5,000 questionnaires which were sent on by the pension institution 
to the old-aged. This procedure ensured the anonymity of the participants. Thus, I 
will be able to present data from persons who retired between 1985 and 2007 and 
exploit not only pension income data, but also data on education and living 
conditions of men and women. This survey represents the first in-depth study of 
this kind with access to information about old-age retirees of a private pension 
institution and is therefore of particular interest. There are Federal Statistical Office 
(FSO) pension institution statistics which question the structure of pension 
institutions; there are also the future MELAP statistics using tax register data. 
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However, no in-depth survey has been undertaken amongst old-age retirees 
affiliated to a single private occupational pension institution where all the relevant 
variables have been questioned. Hence, access to pension institution data is rather 
restricted and so far pension institutions have been extremely reluctant to reveal 
or publish data on their insured and retirees. 
The initial idea of the design was to conduct a survey in order to gather information 
on all old-age retirees of the two pension institutions at a given moment in time, 
which I defined as the passage to retirement in order to know more about income 
and living conditions just before and immediately after retirement. In order to 
conduct a survey of the retirees of a particular pension institution I had to get 
permission from the pension institution management. Once I was given permission 
by the management of the liberal pension institution, I had to handle the challenge 
of confidentiality. It was the pension institution who stepped in to help me by 
offering to send the questionnaires out together with the annual information sent 
out to all retirees. This approach – with the support of the pension institution - made 
the survey sincere and the support of the pension institution was clearly displayed. 
And most importantly, the questionnaires were returned anonymously to me. Thus, 
I received neither personal data nor addresses of the retirees from the pension 
institution. 
A letter of motivation to all old-age retirees of the liberal pension institution, 
explaining my motivation for conducting this survey and a short introduction 
informed the participants about the topic of research. Furthermore, a phone 
number and address allowed participants to get in contact with me: this was the 
case for a part of the retirees. At the end of 2007 the questionnaire was sent out 
anonymously to over 5,000 retirees - in two languages: French and German – and 
was very warmly received by many participants. In a separate note and detached 
from the questionnaire some people manifested their interest in receiving a brief 
analysis of the data. For this purpose I prepared a Leporello, a brief overview of 
the results, with the analysis of some important indicators and sent it out to the 
interested people (see appendix). 
The questionnaire contained different types of questions. I used a quantitative 
approach and essentially closed questions, in order to receive clear answers. 
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Purposely, I included questions which I compared with results of other surveys. 
The forced-choice questions made analysis of income and living conditions fare 
easier and represented the perfect questionnaire design for this descriptive 
research approach. As income is not the only yardstick for assessing the living 
conditions of a person, I provide an in-depth analysis of the data gathered by a 
survey of 5,100 retirees of which 800 responded to. The 5,100 old-age retirees 
represent the accumulation of all old-age retirees of the liberal pension institution. 
This liberal pension institution is a particularly interesting case as it orients itself at 
the legally defined minimum for contributions and benefits. The liberal type of 
pension institution may represent a forerunner for the occupational pension politics 
of tomorrow to fulfil the legal minimum pension requirements while keeping the 
promise that with a minimal contribution to the pension plan from employer and 
employee, people will be well off in retirement and still have a decent pension.  
Regrettably, the directors of the paternal pension institution refused to send out a 
questionnaire to their retired. Despite this, the results of this survey made it 
possible to gain in-depth insight into the income and living conditions of a large 
sample of old-aged with a second pillar pension in Switzerland.  
Number of participants and respondent rate 
Out of 5,100 persons to whom I sent out the questionnaire, 781 respondents sent 
the questionnaire back. Hence, the average response rate is 17 % of the entire 
retiree population of the liberal pension institution.  
In order to validate the data, I looked at the distribution of men and women. The 
gender analysis served to reveal whether a bias occurred in the sample. The data 
shows only a minor bias. Below I present the sample figures:  
Table 3.6: Number of persons in the SICC database 
 
Participants <= 1983 1984 - 1993 1994 - 2003 2004 - 2007 Total
Number 96 198 324 163 781
Proportion 12% 25% 41% 21% 100%
Source: Kucera, own exploitation, SICC survey, 2012
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The total of 781 retirees receives an old age pension from the occupational pension 
fund. The sample of retirees who left for retirement from 2004 to 2007 contains 163 
people. Comparing this sample with the group of retirees in the liberal pension 
institution as I presented above, it represents 22% of 747 people who left for 
retirement in this period which is still an excellent overall response rate.  
Below I present the number of observations; for validation of the sample I put this 
sample into the context of the old-age retirees of the analyzed MELAP pilot data: 
Table 3.7: Respondent rate of SICC participants compared to MELAP 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007
MELAP 89 228 227 199
SICC 37 40 41 45
Respondent
Rate 42% 18% 18% 23%  
Source: Kucera, own exploitation, SICC survey, 2012 
As we can draw from the table, the response rate is between 18 and 23%, except 
for the year 2004. Bearing in mind that the 2004 MELAP data consists only of 
persons who left for retirement from 1st July to 31st December, we can halve the 
response rate. Hence, we would have a response rate of 21% for the year 2004.  
If we look at the proportion of women in this sample, we draw from the following 
table that the years 2004 and 2007 are representative compared to the MELAP 
pilot data: 
Table 3.8: Proportion of women in liberal type 
 
Women 2004 2005 2006 2007
MELAP 32% 18% 15% 31%
SICC 31% 32% 32% 37%
Source: Kucera, own exploitation, SICC survey, 2012
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Women in the SICC survey are overrepresented in the data for 2005 and 2006. 
This is a direct effect of the adaptation of the retirement age of women. Indeed, as 
from 2005 onwards, women retire one year later than before, namely at 64. This 
may have a direct influence on the departure of women in the MELAP dataset. The 
sample of men in the SICC survey show a perfect representation for 2004 and 
2007 and an under-representation for the years 2005 and 2006.  
3.3.6 Secondary data 
In order to validate my data and to provide an insight into many sources within this 
complex field, I have cited numerous secondary data sources. I have used the 
pension statistics from the Federal Statistical Office, the SVS of the Federal Social 
Insurance Office, and the income survey from the Federal Statistical Office. I used 
statistical evidence from the FSIO and the FSO. The collected data is compared to 
the Federal law on occupational pension schemes.  
1) Pension statistics from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) 
2) Social Insurance statistics from the Swiss Federal Social Insurance Office 
3) Federal law on occupational pension schemes LPP, FSIO 
Information from various sources helped to establish and confirm key knowledge. 
3.4 Methods of data analysis 
The variety of methods of data analysis used in this thesis, the documentary 
analysis, the comparative analysis of two cases and the statistical analysis, allowed 
to analyze the subject from different angles. Indeed, I consider these methods as 
complementary. 
Based on my hypotheses I have chosen two distinct cases and did a comparative 
case study between two extremes. This approach allowed me to compare the two 
pension institutions in view of and ideal (simulation, imputation of data in model) 
versus a real environment (statistical and documentary data). 
The information obtained by analyzing the topic with different methods of analysis 
was providing more information. Using qualitative and quantitative methods with a 
comparative research design allows better understanding of the complex 
phenomenon. By using a variety of methods it becomes evident that both the 
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institutional context and the personal behavior are of equal importance for 
analyzing patterns of behaviors (Heinz, Krüger, 2001).  
The data analysis revealed the divergent mechanisms within private occupational 
pension institutions by which inequalities are (re)produced. With the analysis of 
inequality between old-age retirees and women and men affiliated to occupational 
pension systems in Switzerland, better understanding of the rules, regulations and 
processes within these occupational private pension systems may be provided. 
The understanding of the mechanisms and regulations creating inequality is 
essential to enable policy makers and pension institutions to develop the 
occupational pension system in Switzerland towards a more equal system for 
employees and retirees. 
The first step was the analysis of the quantitative data available in the MELAP pilot 
dataset. I described the data, the containing variables and information. Secondly, 
I structured the information in order to identify a pattern. I discovered a different 
pattern between the data of the liberal and the paternal pension institution. Thirdly, 
I examined the interrelationships between the variables, to see whether they were 
associated or correlated. Fourthly, I analyzed the relationships between a variety 
of variables. In this respect, the analysis of correlations served to validate and proof 
the relationships between different dimensions of inequality and the determinant of 
specific dimensions of inequality. The correlation coefficient is a measure of the 
linear relationship between two variables. It is expressed in values ranging from +1 
to -1. A zero (0) indicates that there is no linear relationship between the variables. 
The value +1 indicates a perfect positive linear relationship, both variables increase 
in value in a linear rule. The value -1 indicates a perfect negative linear relationship, 
as one variable increases the other decreases in value, via a linear connection. In 
both cases, this means, that there is a close relationship between the analyzed 
variables. Values between 0 and 0.3 – also in their negative form – indicate a weak 
linear relationship. Values between 0.3 and 0.7 – also negative – indicate a 
moderate linear relationship. Values between 0.7 and 1.0 – also negative – indicate 
a strong linear relationship via a linear connection. The final step of the thesis was 
to answer the question whether I could refer to the population as a whole from 
these chosen samples. For these statistical analyses I used SAS and SPSS. 
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The comparative analysis of the two cases, chosen from the MELAP pilot dataset, 
revealed that two distinct cases of occupational pension institutions exist. In the 
context of this study to analyze institutional gender inequality, descriptive statistics 
served best to describe the population I studied and to compare the behavior of 
the two distinct groups (men, women, employees, retirees) of people affiliated to 
the two divergent pension institutions, the liberal and the paternal. According to 
Suter, measuring (pension) income inequalities may be done with simply 
presenting deciles, quintiles and percentile ratios of particular income groups 
(2012). Thus, for describing the population of employees and retirees of two distinct 
pension institutions, I presented the minimum, maximum, median, average, 
standard deviation, univariate and bivariate analysis, cross tables, scatterplots, 
graphs and correlations. While comparing the observations and data by using 
various measurement methods, I obtained a clear and distinct pattern of behavior 
which was divergent between the analyzed two cases, the liberal and the paternal 
pension institutions. Based on the analysis of the two case studies and by 
comparing their median, mean, deciles and measures of variability, such as the 
variance, standard deviation, distribution, the minimum, maximum and the 
skewness of the variables, I was able to describe the phenomenon of institutional 
inequality.  
Furthermore, I gained new knowledge by exploring the empirical evidence of the 
information obtained from the SICC survey, which I sent out to 5,100 old-age 
retirees affiliated to the liberal pension institutions. For this purpose I used 
descriptive statistical methods. In regards to the exploited variables we need to 
distinct between the four types. The first two types are qualitative variables: these 
are the nominal and ordinal variables. As a nominal variable, where figures have 
uniquely a classifying character, I classified for example the type of household or 
gender. The ordinal variable reveals furthermore a ranking. Here I classified the 
level of education. A higher figure means that the level of education is higher. The 
second two variables are quantitative variables. I distinguish between two types. 
The first I call interval scale. I coded the variable year of birth as a quantitative 
interval scale variable. The second quantitative variable type is called ratio scale. 
Here in this study I coded income and age as ratio scale variables. 
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In addition to these statistical analysis, I created a model, and simulated a fictive 
case. The aim was to measure the impact of pension fund regulations on a distinct 
population. For this purpose, I imputed data obtained by the survey amongst the 
old-aged from the liberal pension institution, into the pension scheme of the 
paternal pension fund. The sample population of the liberal – the 781 participants 
of the SICC survey - remained in the database. I used the most determinant 
variables and compared hereby the situation of the persons affiliated in the liberal 
with those affiliated to the paternal pension institution: contribution rate, entrance 
threshold, retirement age, second pillar pension income and household income. 
Thus, specific variables of the collected data were replaced by information from the 
paternal pension regulations. With this procedure, I clearly identified the problem 
of institutional inequality between retirees, men and women, affiliated to the liberal 
respectively to the paternal pension institution. With the new inferred information I 
set up a simulation revealing the impact of the conditions of affiliation, depending 
on the pension regulations. The aim was to evaluate the situation that persons 
affiliated to the liberal pension institution meet if they had been affiliated to the 
paternal pension institution instead.  
With this approach I was able to proof that institutional gender inequality occurred 
and that income from retirees affiliated to the liberal pension institution would 
harshly differ had they been affiliated to the paternal one.  
3.5 Fieldwork and research ethics 
I have chosen to study this subject in order to reveal the inequalities within the 
highly complex system of the occupational pension system in Switzerland. The 
study’s focus lies on the inequality related to occupational pensions and offers an 
insight in retirement perspectives of men and women, depending on their choice 
of employer during their working lifes. A phenomenon which is relevant for insured 
and retirees, however, scarcely researched due to the lack of information available 
in this field. The pension institutions statistics published by the Federal Statistical 
Office offers little and only partial information about benefits from occupational 
pension schemes. 
My research was undertaken in Switzerland in two distinct pension institutions. I 
exploited tax declaration data from two distinct pension institutions, which paid out 
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occupational capital and pension benefits between 2004 and 2007. Many things 
are not directly observable as research is an ongoing process. But observation 
would not have been an option anyway as access to these pension institutions has 
been incredibly difficult. In the occupational pension environment it is generally 
very difficult to access data, information and people. So, finding two pension 
institutions that voluntarily participated in this study, nearly 800 participants to reply 
to the survey questions and finding several pension experts to reply to questions 
in an interview was very challenging. 
Further, I interviewed people within the pension institutions. People who gave me 
access to pension regulations, documents from the pension institutions, further 
information about the structure of insured persons and retirees. I undertook the 
fieldwork at various stages and over a period of several years (2007 to 2009), 
gathering information at different points in time and on different occasions. All those 
within the pension institutions and all retirees who actively participated were most 
helpful and supportive. “Gatekeepers” helped me to get in touch with people from 
the pension institutions and establish a certain level of trust with these people. 
These “gatekeepers” helped me to establish a relationship of trust and confidence 
with those people providing information and answers to my questions. I am mostly 
grateful to these people as without their help my thesis would not have been 
possible. Many participants of the SICC survey wrote letters showing their interest 
in this survey. They expressed their satisfaction or discontent with their lives in 
relation to economic and social conditions. I am extremely grateful for all these 
letters, e-mails, and telephone calls from various people showing their interest in 
my work. After exploitation of the SICC results, I sent out a brief overview of some 
results to approximately 50 old-age retirees, who were interested in early results 
of the survey. Their anonymity was always guaranteed as people sent me their 
addresses separately from the questionnaire.  
I consider ethics in research to be highly important as those participating have 
given me access to information and opened up a window to information from within 
a pension institution which is in one of the least known fields. I would like to show 
my respect by not revealing their identities or the names of the companies they 
work for. This is in order to protect their interests in their working environment. I 
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believe that omitting the names of the pension institutions and of the people 
involved does not affect the outcome of this study. More so as many different 
people provided information, agreed to interviews, sent out documentation such as 
the pension regulations, took the time to reread questionnaires and to send these 
out to the retirees in order for the mailing would be entirely anonymous. I therefore 
had no information whatsoever about the respondents’ names or addresses. As I 
have worked with both pension institutions over the course of a few years and with 
some of the people more closely, I have become quite familiar with these 
institutions and with some of the people. Nevertheless, I will restrict myself to 
expressing my personal views and taking into account the data I have obtained 
from the interviewees in order to carry out an objective analysis of this field. All the 
material and documents from other sources that I have used, text and books I have 
read, from which I have also drawn my own conclusions, will be referenced clearly 
and are presented in the bibliography.  
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4. Gender inequalities in two private 
occupational pension institutions 
This chapter presents the main part of the thesis. The aim is to gain new empirical 
evidence in the field of institutional gender inequalities with regards to the Federal 
occupational pension law (LPP) and pension regulations of two distinct private 
occupational pension institutions. Based on the findings (gender) inequalities are 
detectable in the pension regulations. They reflect the reaction to and 
implementation of the LPP in a pension institution.  
Institutional (gender) inequalities are created, enhanced or reduced through 
embedded institutional mechanisms as a result of the flexibility accorded to private 
companies for the operation of the occupational pension schemes. Thus, at the 
origin of inequality stands the mechanism of interpretation of and reaction to article 
49 of the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP). The reason for this 
is that each pension institution is free to elaborate its own pension regulations and 
has a lot of room for interpretation of the LPP with respect to the minimum legal 
requirements which are set up in this law.  
The flexibility of pension funds is leaving a wide margin for interpretation in the 
context of the Federal law on occupational pension benefits which was originally 
set up for a full-time working breadwinner. Thus, the interpretation of the LPP, in 
the context of the institutional settings – through the occupational pension 
regulations - may be viewed as strategic mechanisms of interacting and steering 
the occupational pension system according to the values of an employer and its 
pension institution. By this, the employer is (un-) consciously guiding their 
employees and retirees, making them behave according to a certain retirement 
pattern. In the context of the pension institution this results in the fact that the 
pension regulations are creating, enhancing or reducing gender inequality. 
The two distinct pension fund institutions, which I call liberal and paternal, provide 
evidence of gender inequalities in the pension fund regulations and in their pension 
and capital payments. I observed important differences between the liberal and the 
paternal types. Indeed, the causal processes lead to expect considerable 
divergence among the types of pension institutions and their outcomes in terms of 
114 
 
institutional inequality. It appears that benefits are proportionally higher in the 
paternal than in the liberal institution, although the income from the employer of the 
paternal institution is generally lower.  
Furthermore, inequality was observed as benefits and form of benefits (pension 
and/or capital payment) vary strongly between pension institutions and retirees. 
The ordinary retirement age is anchored in the public old age pension law (LAVS), 
stipulating 64 years for women (63 until 2004) and 65 years for men. Early 
retirement, however, is permitted from 58 years onwards. Concretely, an employee 
may draw out his old age pension from the occupational pension scheme far earlier 
than his public old age pension. The public pension may be perceived only two 
years early. Thus, when comparing the pension regulations of the two types of 
pension institution, a strong gender related inequality between the schemes and in 
relation to the law (LPP) is observed. Thereof, the following table offers an 
overview of the pension regulations of the two types. 
Table 4.1: Pension regulations of liberal and paternal pension institutions 
Pension regulations by type of pension institution Liberal Paternal
Old age benefits
Number of contribution years for a full old age pension 42 38
Reducation rate of pension in case of early retirement year 2% 0.15%
Partial capital payment in case of small savings 10% 10%
Capital payment (proportion to be paid out) max. 50% 25 to 100%
Early retirement age 60 55
Postponed retirement age 67 65
Ordinary retirement age: independent on gender 65 63
Financing
Insured
Contribution rate risk insurance 1% 1.50%
Contribution rate for capital savings 5.5 to 8% 8%
Employer
Contribution rate risk insurance 1% 3%
Contribution rate for capital savings 7.50% 17%
Bridge pension: replacement for AVS financed by employer possible 100%
Organes
Foundation board: number of members 16 21
employee delegates 8 11
employer delegates 7 10
retiree delegate 1 possible
President of foundation board employer employer
Vice-President of foundation board employee employee
Source: pension regulations of liberal (2006) and paternal (2005)  
The pension regulations may vary between pension funds and over the years. 
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Depending on the type of pension institution the pension regulations differ and 
have an institutional impact on pension payments. Looking at the pension 
regulations over the years, we observe an evolution of these inequalities created 
between the pension institutions. We observe that the legal regulations were 
integrated differently into the pension regulations of the two pension institutions 
and were not adopted in the same year. The paternal pension institution is more 
generous towards its employees; the liberal respects the minimum regulations of 
the occupational pension law (LPP). I argue that these differences create, enhance 
or reduce (gender) inequalities on the institutional level for insured and retirees. 
4.1 Entrance threshold, coordinated salary: articles 2, 7, 8 LPP 
The entrance threshold is one criteria defining who is in- or excluded from a 
pension plan in either the liberal or paternal pension institution. According to 
articles 2 and 7 of the LPP the entrance threshold defines that a person be included 
at the income level of 20,880 Swiss francs in 2012. On a general level, since 1985 
the mandatory occupational insurance has aimed to include all employees older 
than 17 years and earning above a certain income (entrance threshold).  
The coordinated salary, article 8 of the LPP, is another criteria defining which part 
(amount) of the salary the contribution is calculated on. According to article 8 of the 
LPP, the part of the annual salary which mandatorily insured is comprised between 
24,360 and 83,520 francs. Currently, the coordinated deduction (24,360 francs) 
amounts to 7/8 of the maximum public old age pension (AVS). This deduction is 
applied to every single income, independent on the level of occupation. A person 
who is working for two employers, working for each of them on a 50 percent basis, 
earning for example 40,000 francs annually, will have twice the deduction of 24,360 
francs. Resulting in a far lower coordinated salary of 30,860 francs should the 
person work for one employer earning 80,000 francs annually, the insured salary 
would amount to 55,430 francs. The consequence is a lower occupational pension 
insurance, resulting in lower pension benefits once retired.  
In general terms, if the entrance threshold would be lower than legally defined 
(20,880 francs), then the contribution rate would apply to a higher proportion of the 
salary and thus the savings towards the pension plan would be higher, accordingly. 
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The following graph reveals that the entrance threshold (article 2 of the LPP; 
20,880 Swiss francs in 2012) has been adapted several times since its introduction 
in order to integrate more people with low annual earnings.  
Figure 4.1 Entrance thresholds: articles 2, 7 LPP 
 
A study published by the FSIO, carried out by Ecoplan, showed that the reduction 
of the entrance threshold in 2005 has enabled the integration of 150,000 women 
into the occupational pension system. Thus, it confirms that the reduction of the 
entrance threshold favors the integration of employees with small salaries.  
There are pension institutions that go beyond these legal minimum requirements; 
they are called “over-mandatory” schemes. In legal terms, in the mandatory part, 
all those earning less than the threshold defined by law may be excluded. However, 
the pension institution is free to offer better conditions. I argue that generally 
women earn less than men and that they are more likely to be excluded from the 
occupational pension system as they often work part time and receive low salaries. 
The gender pay gap leads to the fact that women contribute less to their pension 
scheme, leading to far lower old age pensions. 
The following analysis shows that the entrance threshold and the coordinated 
salary provoke institutional gender inequality, as the law prescribes rules which 
may be adapted by the pension institutions. Thus, the application of different rules 
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regarding the integration of employees in occupational pension schemes is at the 
origin of inequality. The fact that a pension institution may stipulate in the pension 
regulations that there is no entrance threshold, thus allowing all employees to be 
affiliated to their pension scheme, clearly reveals an institutional impact, creating 
gender inequalities. Of particular interest in this respect is the extent to which 
pension institutions integrate or exclude employees from their pension schemes.  
4.1.1 Entrance threshold and labor market 
Generally speaking, the entrance threshold is a gender neutral concept. But as 
women have lower incomes, due to the Swiss labor market structure, the second 
pillar entrance threshold creates gendered effects. The division of labor, women 
occupying the less well paid job, with the horizontal and vertical labor market 
segregation, is disadvantaging women in the second pillar system by means of the 
fixed entrance threshold. The problem with the entrance threshold is, that women 
earn on average less than men and small incomes – below 20,880 Swiss francs - 
are excluded from the affiliation to an occupational pension scheme. Furthermore, 
annual earnings below 80,000 Swiss francs approximately may not contribute fully 
towards a pension scheme (maximum coordinated salary according to article 8, 
LPP). 
According to the International Labor Office (ILO), “the share of women in wage and 
salaried work grew during […] ten years from 42.8 per cent in 1999 to 47.3 percent 
in 2009. Whereas the share of vulnerable employment decreased from 55.9 to 51.2 
percent” (ILO, 2010:4), “there is a clear segregation of women in sectors that are 
generally known to be lower-paid” (ILO, 2010: 37). 
The Federal Statistical Office (2011) has revealed that 23 percent of female labor 
and 13 percent of male labor in Switzerland earn up to 26,000 Swiss francs per 
year. For part-time female labor the entrance threshold is even more discriminating 
as over 35 percent of women earn only up to 26,000 Swiss francs only. Male part-
time labor is not a lot better off, as just over a third earns maximum 26,000 Swiss 
francs per year. This phenomenon has a strong effect on pension income once 
retired, as a large part of women (~ a fifth) and a part of men (~ a tenth) are 
excluded – by means of the second pillar entrance threshold – from occupational 
pension benefits, as they are earning below this level (FSO, 2011). 
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Furthermore, the annual income of men and women differ still harshly. 
Standardized income (median of full time job equivalent), according to the labor 
survey of companies (the LSE) of the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), reveals 
clearly that in 1994 men earned 5,100 and women 3,900 Swiss francs monthly. 
This means that men with just over 60,000 and women with approximately 50,000 
Swiss francs annually were not able to contribute fully to the occupational pension 
scheme. In 2010, according to the LSE, the picture has changed. However, the 
disadvantage of the system strikes still women harsher than men. With a 
standardized median salary of monthly 6,300 for men and 5,100 Swiss francs form 
women, or annually 62,000 Swiss francs for women and 76,000 for men, reveals 
clearly that in particular women will have a lower occupational pension than men, 
as they may not contribute fully towards the pension scheme. This results from 
article 8, LPP, which stipules that the coordinated salary for the mandatory 
occupational scheme lies approximately between 20,000 and 80,000 Swiss francs. 
4.1.2 Entrance threshold and inequality between two pension 
institutions 
In addition to the effects due to the gendered labor market, there is another 
overlapping phenomenon. Indeed, gender inequalities are created between the 
pension institutions, due to the fact that article 49, LPP, allows a certain freedom 
of interpretation. This phenomenon, as described in my hypotheses, is an 
overlapping effect and is – by regulation of each pension scheme - either creating, 
enhancing or reducing gender inequalities produced by the labor market and the 
second pillar pension system. 
The paternal type has a lower entrance threshold than legally defined. Thus, the 
paternal pension institution reduces gender inequalities. Indeed, the paternal 
occupational pension politics is in favor of small incomes and part-time employees 
accumulating pension credits more easily then legally prescribed. In the paternal 
type the basis of calculation favors the integration of part-time workers and low 
earners. It offers much better conditions than legally prescribed. The entrance 
threshold in the pension scheme is at 30% of gross earnings. Hence the 
coordinated salary, that is the deduction of 30% of the salary, which means that 
the insured contribute towards the pension plan for 70% of their income, 
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independent of the level of their salary. Theoretically, this means that if someone 
earns 40,000 Swiss francs a year, the person contributes for a salary of 
approximately 28,000 Swiss francs. Hence the entrance threshold for joining the 
pension scheme is not 23,000 Swiss francs - as the LPP proposes - but for this 
income at 12,000 Swiss francs. Therefore all employees are integrated in the 
pension fund, are insured and save capital towards their pension plan on 70% of 
their annual income. Hence the level of provision is already higher as the insured 
salary is far higher than legally prescribed.  
The inclusion of employees below the defined entry threshold into the second pillar 
system further exposes the accentuated paternal provider-model and the solidarity 
of the company towards its employees, especially towards those with low salaries. 
While including those with low salaries this pension institution represents a women-
friendly and part-time friendly policy.  
On the other hand, we have the liberal pension institution which meets only the 
minimum legal requirements. As the pension expert expressed "we give to the 
employees what we owe them, however we have to be very prudent with the 
pension payments". Employees adhere to the occupational pension plan according 
to the legally defined the threshold of 22’800 in 2012. Employees earning less are 
excluded from the pension scheme. The pension expert of the liberal pension 
institution expressed that they care for their insured and retirees. "Our duty is to 
protect their capital and give it to whom it belongs", hence no solidarity and no 
transfer from the active to the retirees are planned. In this pension institution, the 
coordinated salary is the same as in the LPP. Thus, the minimum plan of the liberal 
pension institution meets the legal minimum according to the LPP. 
Inequality occurs between the pension institutions on the institutional level because 
the paternal pension institution offers far better conditions of affiliation than legally 
defined. The paternal type includes all employees, independent of their income, in 
their second pillar pension scheme, whereas the liberal type includes employees 
at the legally defined entrance threshold only (article 2 of the LPP). Hence, the 
second pillar system is favoring employees affiliated to the paternal type. 
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4.1.3 Entrance threshold and inequality within two pension institutions 
The liberal pension institution makes no difference between men and women what 
the threshold entrance concerns. Every employee earning above the threshold 
entrance stipulated by law (article 2, LPP), is affiliated to the occupational pension 
scheme. From that we could deduce that their concept is gender neutral. Having a 
closer look to that, we see that women earning 30% less on average than men. In 
the branch where the company is active, the standardized monthly salary for a full 
time job (LSE, FSO, 2010) was 5,100 Swiss francs for women whereas men 
earned 7,200 at the same time. This means that women would not be able to 
contribute full to the pension scheme, as their average annual income amounts to 
only 60,000 Swiss francs approximately. Thus women are losing out on 
contributions on a 20,000 Swiss francs gross salary yearly. Men on the contrary 
may contribute full on this basis towards the occupational pension scheme, as their 
yearly earnings amount to 86,000 Swiss francs. The consequence is that men may 
theoretically accumulate approximately 100,000 Swiss francs more on old age 
credits, as they will contribute for approximately 40 years on a coordinated salary 
of yearly 60,000 Swiss francs whereas women will only be able to contribute on 
the basis of the coordinated salary of 40,000 yearly. Gender discrimination created 
by the legal norm of the coordinated salary (article 8 LPP) is leading to far lower 
occupational pension incomes for women compared to men. 
The paternal pension institution has the same rules for men and women what the 
threshold entrance concerns. The regulation is stipulating that the threshold 
entrance and the coordinated salary is set at the 30% gross salary and not at 
22,880 Swiss francs (2013). This means, independent on the income level, every 
employee contributes to this pension scheme. Indeed, the contribution towards the 
pension scheme is based on 70% of the income. We can draw from this example 
that the paternal pension scheme is reducing inequality between men and women 
and it is reducing inequality in regards to the law (article 8, LPP). If we take the 
example of above (LSE, FSO) where we saw that women’s annual standardized 
income is 62,200 we can conclude that women would contribute on 70% of the 
salary, with a contribution of 24% (8% employee, 16% employer in this company), 
and would lose out far less in comparison to men over 40 years of contribution. 
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Having a closer look, we draw from the LSE (FSO, 2010) that women earn 20% 
less than men in this branch. In 2010, women’s annual income was just over 50,000 
Swiss francs whereas men’s was just over 60,000 Swiss francs. By means of 
setting a gender and income neutral threshold entrance at 30% of gross salary, the 
paternal pension institution reduces not only gender inequality but also inequality 
between the income categories. With this system, the paternal pension institution 
creates a neutral concept by integrating all employees independent on their salary 
and reduces (gender) inequality within their system. 
Furthermore, the reactions of the two pension institutions to the reduction of the 
entrance threshold (LPP revision in 2005) were different. The liberal pension 
institution adapted its pension regulations according to the new legislation, 
including those employees with an annual salary of a minimum of 18,990 Swiss 
francs in the scheme, thus increasing their insured population. The paternal 
pension institution did not adapt its pension regulations as - according to their 
pension regulations - all employees were already included independent of their 
level of income. We draw from this that each LPP revision triggers an unequal 
reaction creating further inequality between the affiliated, i.e. the insured and old-
age retirees, of a pension institution. 
In conclusion to that we can say that the paternal pension institution reduces 
gender inequality in regards to pension, as the scheme integrates all employees, 
independent on their income, stipulating a threshold entrance of 30% of their 
income. Indeed, the gender discrimination occurring in article 8 LPP is abolished 
in the paternal institution by integrating and enlarging the insurance cover and the 
possibility to save for old age to each employee. The paternal pension institution 
has found with this system a way to be gender neutral and integrating men and 
women independently on their salary in their occupational pension system. 
Whereas the liberal pension institution triggers gender inequality, enhances it, as 
women generally earn 30% less in this branch. With their far lower income than 
men, and due to the threshold entrance (article 8, LPP) they are contributing only 
on 40,000 Swiss francs instead of 60,000 Swiss francs, as we have seen above. 
Thus, gender inequality occurs within the pension institution, if the threshold 
entrance according to article 8, LPP, is respected. 
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4.2 Contribution rate and pension credits: article 16 of the LPP 
According to article 16 of the LPP a minimum contribution rate, depending on age, 
of between 7% and 18% must be paid in jointly by employee and employer. Article 
16 of the LPP proposes contribution rates which are based on the initial golden 
rule; to obtain savings corresponding to 500% of the last coordinated salary. Thus, 
the legal minimum contribution rate represents the proportion of income which 
must be diverted into a pension account for the employee. This is the amount which 
the employer and the employee must pay into a pension plan in order to 
accumulate occupational pension capital. The mathematical formula for 
contribution rates over the years is as follows: 
10*7% + 10*10% + 10*15% + 10*18% = 500% 
At first glance the so called golden rule rate seems to be a gender neutral concept. 
However, if we take a closer look we can distinguish different factors creating 
inequality between men and women.  
Indeed there are overlapping reasons for gender inequality, first the segregated 
labor market, second institutional gender inequality due to the LPP and the pension 
regulations of private occupational pension schemes and thirdly due to unpaid work 
during child rearing while staying at home. 
4.2.1 Pension credits and the labor market 
Although contribution rates in both pension institutions are equal for men and 
women, it appears that there is no gender equality. Resulting from the Swiss labor 
market structure, an equal contribution rate creates gendered effects. This is based 
on the fact that women and men do not have equal incomes due to structural 
effects on the labor market and/or prevalent part-time work of women. In addition 
to that, women are disadvantaged as their coordinated salary is generally far lower 
than men’s and secondly, due to maternity leaves and unpaid work for child rearing 
at home, women lose out on important contributions at a time where men continue 
to accumulate old age credits. Women often give up work for child rearing. 
Throughout this time they will not be able to contribute towards a pension scheme. 
Hence, depending on the number of contributing years they miss out on, they lose 
more or less savings towards their pension plan. If we assume that a woman takes 
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a family break from 35 to 40 years of age, she loses out on 5 years’ worth of savings 
on old age credits. Do women continue to contribute towards a second pillar 
pension plan as part-time workers, they lose out even more pension credits. For 
example, for a woman working in a 60 % job in the personal service sector, earning 
a monthly salary of 3,574 Swiss francs or of 46,400 Swiss francs annually, the 
contribution to her pension scheme would be based on approximately 25,000 
Swiss francs. In a mandatory system with the lowest contribution rates, i.e. 16% 
jointly from employer and employee, a women would save approximately 4,000 
Swiss francs a year. In particular, women may miss out on contributing at all if their 
annual salary does not qualify to join the pension scheme; this is the case if a 
woman does not earn above the threshold entrance of 22,800 Swiss francs. Thus, 
women are losing out on important contributions for accumulating capital towards 
their future occupational old age pension. The problem is that “a job in social and 
economic theory is commonly held to be filled only by a disembodied worker who 
exists only for the work” (Acker, 1990:149). Hence, only a person working full time 
until the age of retirement will accumulate the necessary credits for a decent 
second pillar pension. 
The contribution rate is based on the coordinated salary, which represents the 
gross annual income minus a coordinated deduction. In 2010, the contribution was 
based on a coordinated salary which is between 20,520 and 80, 520 Swiss francs. 
Thus, the savings depend directly on a person’s income. However, each pension 
institution is free to offer better conditions, taking into consideration that the overall 
contribution must be at least 14%. The fact that contribution rates vary between 
pension institutions leads to inequality amongst employees at an institutional level. 
Furthermore, that an equal contribution rate is applied on the coordinated salary 
(article 8 LPP) independent on the income and not taking into account that women 
or part-time workers are structurally disadvantaged hereby – leads to gender 
inequality due to an unequal pension income once retired.  
4.2.2 Pension credits and inequality between two pension institutions 
In the paternal type, employees, independent of age and gender, contribute a rate 
of 8% to the pension fund, and the employer contributes double this rate to the 
occupational pension plan. According to a pension fund expert, this is based on 
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great solidarity amongst the employees and from the employers towards 
employees. This type of pension institution aims to reward its employees for their 
corporate loyalty based on the company’s paternal values. The employer feels 
responsible for workers and employees feel bound to the company. Pension fund 
regulations have only changed slightly over the years and employees are rewarded 
for their loyalty to the employer. The experts in the paternal pension institution 
expressed that they do not let the retired down; if they are in need, they will be 
helped. The experts expressed that no changes were planned for the near future. 
However, in times of financial crisis, the employer may not continue this practice 
and future generations could be disadvantaged. 
Table 4.2 Contribution rate and total of pension credits 
"liberal" nr of years employer employee Credits
25 to 34 years 10 7.5% 5.5% 130
35 to 39 years 5 7.5% 6.0% 68
40 to 44 years 5 7.5% 6.5% 70
45 to 49 years 5 7.5% 7.0% 73
50 to 54 years 5 7.5% 7.5% 75
55 to 65 years 11 7.5% 8.0% 171
Total 41 308 278 586
"paternal" nr of years employer employee Credits
25 to 63 years 38 16.0% 8.0% 912
Total 38 608 304 912
Source: pension regulations of liberal (2006) and paternal (2005)  
In the liberal type, the pension fund regulations stipulate the legal minimum 
contribution rates; every employee contributes half of the input towards his own 
occupational pension plan. The employer contributes the other half of the payment, 
which represents the legal minimum. In this company, individualism is an important 
element for survival and comes before solidarity. Younger employees contribute 
less to the pension plan than older ones, as proposed by the legal body. According 
to the pension regulations of the liberal pension institution, employees contribute 
between 5.5% and 8% depending on the age of the insured and the employer 
contributes 7.5% towards their pension plan. Accumulation of pension credits is 
directly linked to the contribution. According to Article 16 of the LPP the minimum 
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old age credits are 7% for persons aged 25 to 34, 10% for a 35 to 44 year old, 15% 
for insured aged 45 to 54 and 18% for those age 55 to 65. Looking more closely at 
the total accumulated pension credits and the total contributing years, we see that 
the pension institutions do not precisely apply article 16 of the LPP and this reveals 
a rather unequal picture. 
In the liberal pension institution the employer contributes a total of 308 pension 
credits whereas in the paternal pension institution the employer contributes a total 
of 608 – very close to double. The insured in the liberal pension institution 
contribute 278 credits over 41 years whereas the insured in the paternal type 
contribute a total of 304 credits over 38 years. Although these pension credits seem 
to be a theoretical figure, they are directly relevant for the total capital which can 
be accumulated for old age occupational capital and pension benefits.  
I conclude that the total number of pension credits in the liberal type with 586 
credits for 41 contributing years is far lower than the total number of pension credits 
at 912 which can be accumulated in the paternal type over 38 years. Thus, the 
insured in the paternal type accumulate over a third more than in the liberal type. 
In the liberal type the contribution rate increases with age, which is favorable for 
women having children, as the lowest contribution rates are to be found between 
25 and 39 years. The paternal type, however, proposes the same contribution rate 
for the entire working life span, hence women lose out on important contribution 
years.  
The employer of the paternal scheme pays in double the employees’ contribution 
towards the pension plan. According to the expert the goal is that people manage 
the passage between employment and retirement without difficulty.  
So, the analysis reveals an accentuated difference between the liberal and the 
paternal type.  
4.2.3 Pension credits and inequality within two pension institutions 
In the liberal type, inequality arises where incomes differ, as small earners - in 
particular part-time employees - receive less than full-time employees. This will be 
even more accentuated for women as they generally earn less than men in this 
branch and women therefore accumulate less capital. As we have seen the 
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contribution rate in the liberal amount to 14%, however only for persons attaining 
the threshold entrance according to article 2, LPP (20,880 Swiss francs in 2012).  
According to the BESTA statistics (FSO, 2012), 5% of women work part-time less 
than 50%, and 30% of female workers less than 90%. On the other hand, men in 
the liberal company work to 5% just below 90%. 
If we recall that in 2010, women’s annual income was just over 50,000 Swiss francs 
whereas men’s was just over 60,000 Swiss francs in this branch, than we see the 
drawback for women. The 5% women working less than 50% would earn probably 
just below the threshold entrance. The 30% of part-time female workers would 
probably contribute on a gross income of approximately 20,000 Swiss francs 
whereas men would be able to save 14% contributions towards their old age credits 
on the gross annual salary of 40,000 Swiss francs, with the exception of 5% of men 
working 90% and thus contribute only on just over 30, 000 Swiss francs. Gender 
inequality becomes apparent within the liberal pension institution while reflecting 
the labor market context. The analysis makes it clear that there is an overlapping 
labor market effect; however, the study of the phenomenon reveals also that the 
liberal pension institution reinforces the gender effect. 
4.3 Contribution period: article 10 of the LPP 
The number of contribution years strongly influences the level of the pension. The 
longer contributions are paid into a scheme, the higher the pension level will be. 
The number of contribution years stipulated in the pension regulations defines how 
many years a person must contribute to the pension fund for in order to receive a 
full old age pension. The total number of contributing years required in order to 
receive a full pension differs between the pension schemes, depending on the 
pension regulations.  
Furthermore, there is a disadvantage for women, resulting from the fact that only 
full contribution years, 38 in the paternal and 42 in the liberal, give the right for 
receiving a full pension. Indeed, persons with shorter working lifes have a shorter 
contribution period and thus a reduced pension. This is in particular to the detriment 
of those women with interrupted careers. In addition to that, women lose out on 
one year of contributions as they are leaving the labor market early, due to the 
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legal ordinary retirement age stipulated at 64. This means that women’s pension 
credits towards the pension scheme are only paid in until 64 and not 65 like for 
men. Thus persons with interrupted careers - not attaining the 38 or 42 years 
contribution period - will receive a reduced pension (see also sub-chapter 4.7). 
4.3.1 Contribution period and labor market 
The number of contribution years for men and women is very often quite distinct. 
As we have seen, women far more often have interrupted careers and thus far 
fewer contribution years. Thus, the labor market creates inequality in regards to 
the possible numbers of contributing years towards the second pillar pension 
scheme. This is in particular so as the occupational pension is a privately financed 
pension fund, where contributions are paid in by employer and employee, that is 
when a person is active.  
The years where a woman stays home for child rearing, she has no possibility to 
contribute towards a second pillar. Although, if she has a husband paying into an 
occupational pension scheme, he has to give half of it to his wife (should they 
divorce). Problematic is that her husband’s part may not be paid in into a women’s 
own occupational pension scheme, once she is taking up work again, after a baby 
break. Thus, although a women legally owns half of her husband’s old age credits, 
she will not be able to have paid “her share” out except in case of a divorce or once 
her husband retires (she lives from his pension) or in case of his death. 
In addition to that, working in the paternal company – even with a lower salary in 
the low skill segments – will furbish a comparatively higher pension income after 
less contributing years (38 years) than if working in the liberal type (42 years), even 
though salaries are generally higher in this high tech environment. This is so as the 
pension credits paid in by the employer in the paternal pension scheme is far higher 
compared to those paid in by the employer of the liberal type. 
This observation displays clearly the interactive effect of the labor market, the 
branch (and income) and the pension regulations, confirming hereby the 
institutional impact on pension payments. Thus, the labor market, the LPP and the 
pension regulations are strongly interacting, hereby creating, enhancing or 
reducing gender inequality. 
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4.3.2 Contribution period and inequality between two pension 
institutions 
In the liberal pension institution employees need to contribute for at least 42 years 
in order to receive a full pension. In the paternal pension institution – according to 
the pension regulations – the number of contribution years is only 38 years for a 
full pension.  
Furthermore, employees affiliated to the paternal institution retire at 63 and leave 
the labor market with an unreduced public pension and - if they have 38 
contribution years, an unreduced second pillar pension. Furthermore, employees 
affiliated to the paternal pension institution receive a bridge pension when retiring 
at 63. The paternal institution is financing the old age public pension – as a bridge 
pension - fully for each employee for 1 or 2 years. This means that employees 
affiliated to the liberal pension type have to work four more years for a full pension 
compared to those affiliated to the paternal type. The analysis reveals that although 
the contribution period in both pension institutions are equal for men and women, 
there are gender inequalities as the overlapping effect of the labor market, the legal 
rules regarding the ordinary retirement age of women (64) and men (65) as well as 
the pension regulations interfere strongly.  
4.3.3 Contribution period and inequality within two pension institutions 
We have seen that contribution years are equal for men and women in the liberal 
pension institution. The same observation was made in regards to the paternal 
institution, the number of contribution years are the same for men and women. 
However, in the paternal pension institution, the bridge pension, replacing the 
public old age pension, is paid to men for two years (until 65), whereas women 
receive the bridge pension for only one year, until 64. There is gender inequality in 
respect of the number of contribution years, resulting in lower pension credits paid 
in for fewer years to women than men. 
In the liberal pension institution women and men are equal in this regard. Indeed, 
women and men must work until the age of 65 in order to receive a full pension. 
As a result of this rule, women’s contributions towards the pension scheme may 
be equal to men’s and the employer pays in the same period for women and men. 
129 
 
According to the pension expert of the liberal pension institution, a minimum of 
contributions years of 42 must be maintained in order to avoid financial difficulties 
in the future. 
It appears that there is a strong gender inequality in the paternal type to the 
detriment of women, resulting from a legal rule, the ordinary retirement age, and 
stipulated in the pension regulations. Thus gender inequality is enhanced in this 
respect by the paternal institution. On the other hand, the liberal type is reducing 
gender inequality as men and women alike are obliged to contribute until the age 
of 65 and thus women have longer contribution periods than initially foreseen by 
law.  
The analysis demonstrates that the overlapping effects of the labor market 
structure, the retirement age stipulated in the LPP and the pension regulations, 
hereby fixing the end of contributions to be paid into the pension schemes, are 
creating, enhancing and reducing gender inequality within pension institutions. 
4.4 Retirement age: article 13 of the LPP 
The retirement age stipulated in article 13 of the LPP represents the age where an 
old age pension is due; the legal retirement age according to the LPP stipulates 64 
years for women (until 2004 it was 63) and 65 for men. The ordinary retirement 
(article 13 of the LPP) age may be decisive as to whether a person receives a full 
or a reduced pension. A pension institution may offer early retirement; this right 
maybe stipulated in the pension regulations. Depending on these regulations, the 
age of retirement may differ from one pension institution to another and for men 
and women.  
4.4.1 Retirement age and labor market 
As we can draw from the following figure, the ordinary retirement age for receiving 
old age benefits from the AVS was initially fixed for both women and men at 65 in 
1948. In 1957, it was lowered for women to 63 and in 1964 to 62. However, it was 
raised again to 63 in 2001 and to 64 in 2005. The legal retirement age marks the 
end of mandatory contribution to the AVS/AHV and represents the key to receiving 
the state old age pension in Switzerland. 
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Figure 4.2 Ordinary retirement age according to the LAVS, and longevity 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations based on information from pension regulations and FSO, 2012 
Depending on the economic situation, family status or health condition of a person, 
on the LPP, the pension regulations or on the labor market situation, a person may 
retire early, at the ordinary retirement age or chose a late retirement. 
4.4.2 Retirement age and inequality between two pension institutions 
Gender inequality occurs between the two analyzed pension institutions as the 
retirement age is not equal. Indeed, each pension institution is free to offer better 
retirement conditions. There is a difference between the pension institutions in 
regards to early, ordinary and late retirement, creating inequality between the 
insured affiliated to different pension schemes and within a same generation.  
Table 4.3: Retirement age according to pension regulations 
 Retirement 2002 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Paternal 
Early 55 55 55 55 58 
Ordinary 63 63 63 63 63 
Late 65 65 65 65 65 
Liberal 
Early 60 60 60 60 60 
Ordinary 63 63 63 63 63 
Late 67 67 67 67 67 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations, according to pension regulations from liberal and paternal type 
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Thus, retirement age depends strongly on the employer as it is fixed in the pension 
regulations of a pension institution. The determination of the ordinary retirement 
age in the pension regulations has a great impact on whether a pension is reduced 
or not and to what extent as we will see later in this chapter. 
4.4.2.1 Ordinary retirement 
According to article 13 of the LPP, the occupational pension should be paid out at 
the legally defined retirement age for receiving a public old age pension (AVS). The 
legal ordinary retirement age marks the end of mandatory contribution to the AVS 
and represents the key to receiving the state old age pension in Switzerland. 
Gender inequality in relation to retirement age began in 1957 when the originally 
established legal retirement age of 65 years for women and men was lowered for 
women only to 63 years (1964 reduced to 62; 2001 raised to 63; 2005 raised to 
64). Thus, gender inequality occurs as the legally defined ordinary retirement age 
is not equal for men and women nor between the different retiree cohorts.  
The LPP stipulates that the retirement age may vary between pension institutions. 
It may be lower than the legally defined retirement age, promoting an earlier 
“ordinary retirement age” in the pension regulations or it may be higher, fostering 
postponed retirement, creating inequality on the institutional level. This is the case 
for both pension institutions. In the liberal type the “ordinary retirement age” is 65 
years and in the paternal type it is 63 years: in both pension schemes it is 
independent of gender. This can be perceived as a forerunner for the equal 
retirement age for both sexes.  
4.4.2.2 Early retirement 
Women and men may retire early receiving their public old age pension (the AVS) 
up to two years before the legal retirement age. However, the pension is reduced 
by 6.8% for men and women, with an exception for women born up until 1947; their 
reduction rate is only 3.4%. Thus, men are disadvantaged as they receive their 
public old age pension later than women and with a reduced rate. 
In the LPP the early retirement age is set at 58 years. However, the pension 
institution may offer a different early retirement age. Hence, early retirement can 
cause inequality on the institutional level between retirees of different pension 
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institutions, as those in the liberal type receive a full occupational pension only 
when retiring at the age of 65 and those working in the paternal type can already 
claim a full pension at 63. In the paternal type, people generally retire early 
compared to the legal retirement age. In the paternal pension institution early 
retirement was set at 55 until 2004 and from 2005 at 58 years for both women and 
men. Women and men in the liberal company may leave for retirement from 60 
years of age. This condition is equal for both women and men.  
The early retirement reduction rate in the paternal pension institution was set at 
1.8% per early retirement year. Inequality between women and men arises as men 
could only retire 10 years or 8 years respectively, before their legal retirement age, 
whereas women could only leave 8 years early until 2004 and 6 years early as 
from 2005 onwards. This means that men can benefit to a far larger extent than 
women from generous retirement conditions than women in the paternal company. 
In the liberal pension institution, the lifelong pension is reduced by 2% per early 
retirement year.  
In the liberal pension institution women could retire 5 years early until 2004 and 4 
years early from 2005 onwards – in comparison to their legal retirement age. Men 
may retire 5 years early. Although, women are preferentially treated in relation to 
early retirement age, they are still losing out on annually 2% of their accumulated 
capital, if retiring between 60 and 64 years. In an interview with a pension expert 
from the liberal pension institution, I learnt that the bridge pension may be financed 
by the employer, by a union or it may be self-financed through higher contributions 
accumulated as extra credits. In any case in the liberal type, people are expected 
to work until the ordinary retirement age of 65, as someone leaving for early 
retirement is considered to be "a lazy person", expressed by the pension expert. 
Early retirement rate 
The early retirement rate is the average number of years a person leaves early for 
retirement compared to the legal retirement age. The average early retirement rate 
is more divergent between men and women in the paternal pension institution and 
less accentuated in the liberal pension institution. This can be explained by the 
pension regulation in the liberal pension institution stating that women and men 
both have far more accentuated pension cuts in the case of early retirement. 
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Contrary to that, in the paternal pension institution women and men may retire 
without pension cuts at 63.  
Figure 4.3 Average numbers of years of early retirement, 2004
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
In the liberal pension institution women and men generally leave one year early in 
spite of pension cuts. In the paternal type men leave on average 5 years early and 
women 3 years early (2004). Compared to the ordinary retirement age, this means 
that women and men left on average at 60 years of age in the paternal type and in 
the liberal, both women and men at 64 years.  
If we take a look at the population of retirees of the liberal type, at samples 
calculated over different periods, we see that the average retirement age has risen 
since 1983 and is 64 years for men and 62.1 years for women, calculated for the 
years 2004 to 2007. As law has changed, women could retire at 62 until 2000 and 
at 64 between 2001 and 2004.  
Thus, analyzing the sample by cohorts leaving for retirement, the table shows a 
steadily rising average retirement age for men until 2003 and a slight down-trend 
in the years 2004 – 2007. This may be explained as the company – in the years of 
crisis and instead of letting off people – proposed early retirement for men just 
before retirement. Indeed, the economic and dotcom crisis led to restructuration in 
larger and smaller companies and provided thus early retirement plans for the 
generation just before retirement.  
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Table 4.4: Average age of retirement of retirees of the liberal type (SICC) 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations, SICC survey 
For women the rising retirement age may be explained by the legally defined rising 
ordinary retirement age, as we have seen above. This trend for retiring later is 
confirmed by a study from the FSIO in 2012. This tendency suggests that people 
leave early for retirement only when pension regulations or the law allow. 
4.4.2.3 Late retirement 
The Federal Council aims to equalize the legal retirement age for women and men. 
The reason is the greater longevity of today’s generations which engender longer 
pension payments from the accumulated pension capital. In a study about 
Retirement in the context of demographic evolution (FSIO, 2012), mandated by the 
Federal Social Insurance Office, interviewees stated that they would favor the 
harmonization of the retirement age between women and men and between the 
second and the first pillar.  
For the occupational pension system, the LPP proposes that the pension institution 
regulate late retirement for their employees according to article 10 of the LPP.  
In the paternal pension institution, late retirement is allowed until the age of 65 for 
both women and men. Beyond this age, the company will not allow employees to 
continue working. As this pension institution has stipulated the ordinary retirement 
age at 63 years for both women and men, an increase of 1.8% of the annual 
pension is already effective when retiring at 64, double this when retiring at 65. 
Thus, in the paternal type “there is not really an option to work beyond the ordinary 
retirement age” according to the pension expert. “Though, there are exceptions, 
until 1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 2004-2007
Average age of 
retirement
60.8 62.8 63.0 62.9
Men 60.5 63.7 64.0 63.8
Women 61.1 61.9 61.9 62.1
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but only if the person cannot be replaced immediately, which was the case for a 
specialist in our company. But other than that, late retirement is not fostered”.  
In the liberal type however people are expected to work at least until the ordinary 
retirement age, which is 65, and the company fosters postponed retirement. 
Hence, if someone wants to stay on working beyond the retirement age, they can. 
Late retirement in the liberal pension institution is possible up to 67 years for men 
and women.  
4.4.3 Retirement age and inequality within two pension institutions 
The retirement age in both pension institutions is equal for men and women. 
Furthermore, in both pension institutions the postponed or late retirement age is 
equal for women and men. The paternal pension institution offers an ordinary 
retirement age of 63 for both women and men. Those women and men affiliated to 
the liberal pension institution leave the labor market at 65. There is no obvious 
gender inequality detectable within the two pension institutions. 
4.5 Conversion rate: article 14 of the LPP 
The legal minimum conversion rate is defined in the LPP. Article 14 of the LPP 
stipulates that the old age pension is calculated as a proportion of the total capital 
accumulated through the contributions of the employee and the employer. The 
Federal Council fixes and submits the conversion rate to parliament for approval. 
For persons retiring in 2012 the rate is 6.85% for women and 6.90% for men (2012). 
Based on parliamentary debates, the government proposed to reduce the minimum 
conversion rate for future old-age retiree generation; this was highly disputed by 
the population. Nevertheless, the proposed reduction of the minimum conversion 
rate was submitted for vote to the Swiss population in spring 2010. The Swiss 
population rejected the proposal. With the planned old age pension reform 2020, 
the Federal Councilor Berset proposes to reduce the conversion rate and fixing it 
in article 14 of the LPP at 6.0% for men and women. 
4.5.1 Conversion rate and labor market 
The following graph demonstrates the reduction of the conversion rate until 2012 
since the introduction of the LPP in 1985. Furthermore, the figure displays the first 
project of the Federal Council to lower the conversion rate to 6.4% in 2016. 
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Figure 4.4 Conversion rate: reduction project 
 
Source: FSIO documents, Kucera, own exploitations 
It appears that even this rate would be too high for paying lifelong pensions due to 
the fact that retirees receive their old age pension for approximately 20 years on 
average. Or, life expectancy has risen since the introduction of the LPP in 1985. 
Inequality arises where the annuity may differ harshly between the old-age retirees 
from different generations. For example, for an accumulated occupational pension 
capital of 100,000 Swiss francs a women retiring in 2005 received a pension of 
7,200 Swiss francs per annum. If a women retires today with a conversion rate of 
6.8%, then the annuity is only 6,800 Swiss francs. Thus, the concept of the 
minimum conversion rate creates inequality between the generations and between 
men and women as the rate is neither equal for each generation nor the same for 
both sexes. Actually, men encounter a double disadvantage. Firstly, their 
conversion rate is lower than women’s and secondly, they have a shorter life 
expectancy and will receive their pension on average for fewer years than women.  
4.5.2 Conversion rate and inequality between two pension institutions 
Generally we could say that there is equality between men and women in both the 
liberal and the paternal institutions as the same rates are applied. 
Inequality occurs between the two pension institutions as the contribution period is 
4 years longer for employees affiliated to the liberal pension institution. Indeed, 
those affiliated to the paternal type accumulate for shorter period (38 years) and 
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are forced out of the labor market early (63 years) with less time to save up for 
retirement. Indeed, the conversion rate, applied on a lower accumulated capital 
may lead to gender inequality.  
Again, this analysis shows that there are overlapping effects from different gender 
regimes, the labor market (with its structural effects), the welfare state with the 
LPP, and the institutional pension regulations. Depending on the various effects, 
gender inequality is enhanced or reduced. 
4.5.3 Conversion rate and inequality within two pension institutions 
There is no obvious gender difference between the conversion rate of women and 
men in both the liberal and paternal pension institution. However, the structural 
effect of the labor market interferes strongly in this context. Indeed, the lower 
income or part-time salaries of women leads to the fact that women accumulate far 
lower pension credits over the years. Women are disadvantaged as they are not 
able to keep up with contributions toward their occupational pension schemes, so 
they accumulate less second pillar capital and lose out on pension income. 
The conversion rate, applied to less capital - far lower capital savings for women 
compared to men – results in strong gender inequality. 
4.6 Form of old age benefits: article 37 of the LPP  
The private pension institution may pay the accumulated capital in the form of a 
single capital payment, a so-called lump-sum, if the pension represents less than 
10 percent of the public old age pension (article 37, alinea 3 of the LPP). Or, the 
insured person may ask for a quarter (25%) of their occupational benefits in the 
form of a capital payment (article 37 alinea 2 of the LPP). Therefore the private 
occupational pension institution may stipulate in their pension regulations that the 
pension be replaced by a capital payment (article 37, alinea 4 of the LPP).  
According to article 37 of the LPP, there are three options for withdrawing the 
occupational pension capital. A person may choose to take the benefits out as a  
1. Life-long pension 
2. Life-long reduced pension and a lump sum 
3. Single capital payment (lump sum) 
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The right to obtain at least a quarter of the pension benefits in the form of a lump 
sum is all the more surprising as the main aim of the second pillar (article 37 of the 
LPP), as a general rule, is to pay a lifelong old age pension as a complement to 
the public old age pension (AVS). Experience has shown that pension institutions 
voluntarily pay out a lump sum. This practice was established in the revision of the 
LPP in 2005. The revised article 37 of the LPP followed an already established 
practice and fulfills a need of a large proportion (40% in 2005) of insured persons 
leaving for retirement. However, it does not meet the initial aim of the LPP, to pay 
out the savings as a lifelong pension hereby guaranteeing a regular 
complementary income.  
The Federal Statistical office FSO, based on data from the Swiss Labor survey, 
published the proportions of women and men with second pillar pensions and/or 
capital payments. According to this report by the FSO in 2005 on security in old 
age, over 60% of retirees took a pension only, whereas only 12% (2002) and 14% 
(2005) of retirees opted for a lump sum. Over a quarter (29%: 2002; 26%:2005) of 
the people opted for a mixed form: pension and capital payment. This confirms that 
approximately 40% of all retirees take a lump sum, some with a pension. 
Figure 4.5 Proportion of retirees with pension, capital or pension & capital 
 
Article 113 of the Swiss Federal Constitution stipulates that together with the first 
pillar (the public old age pension), the second pillar should maintain the pre-
retirement standard of living, after retirement. The goal of the legislative body in 
1985 was that the first and second pillars together should provide approximately 
60% of the last salary before retirement. However, as inequality arises at the level 
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of the pension institution, the median pension or capital payment differs harshly 
and the goal of the legislator is often not met, in particular in regards to women. 
According to article 15 of the LPP, the accumulated occupational old age capital 
must consist of all contributions from the employer and employee as well as the 
interest accrued over the contribution period. Thus, the accumulated old age 
savings depend on a) the credits accumulated by the contributions and b) the 
interest rates on the capital. Concretely, the amount of the contributions to an 
occupational pension scheme depends on the income of a person - as the 
contribution represents a diverted proportion of the salary - on the contribution 
rates which were paid in by the employee and employer over the working life of a 
person and the entrance threshold for contributing to the pension. These constitute 
three important factors triggering gender inequality in occupational pensions, two 
of them being related to the pension regulations of a pension institution and the 
third one related to the labor market.  
4.6.1 Form of old age benefits and labor market 
Income inequality is a fact, as we have seen in the chapter about the labor market. 
Women’s earnings represent a far lower part than men’s. In Switzerland, women 
still earn approximately 20% less than men (FSO, 2013). This income inequality is 
confirmed in other countries according to a study from Meyers et al. revealing that 
“women’s share of total labor-market earnings” represent only 27% in Germany 
(Meyers et al., 1999:226).  “Among working-age adults, women’s share of earned 
income is lowest in Spain, where women take home only one-fifth of their nation’s 
earnings, and highest in Finland, where women claim two-fifths of all earned 
income” (Meyers et al., 1999:227). It seems that “high levels of economic 
dependency within the family are evident” (Meyers et al., 1999:235). This picture 
is also very dominantly present once women and men are retired.  
Indeed, the form of benefits, that means whether a capital payment instead of a 
pension has been taken out, may have an impact on the income once retired. 
Although, the LPP proposes that in general the benefits of the second pillar are 
paid out in form of a pension. The law leaves a certain freedom, if the retiree 
wishes, he/she may ask the pension institution to pay out at least a quarter of the 
old age capital in form of a lump sum. Furthermore, pension institutions may 
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propose in their pension regulations that the insured may take out a higher 
proportion in form of a lump sum or the regulations may stipulate that small sums 
are in any case being paid out as a lump sum and not in form of a pension. 
In recent years, the impact of the labor market on the type of occupational pension 
benefits seems to be more and more prevalent. Depending on the economic down 
or upturn retirees withdraw to a larger extent the old age benefits in form of capital 
and to a lesser extent a livelong pension. Capital instead of a pension is taken out 
when the economic situation seems deteriorating and pensions seem no longer 
guaranteed. However, recent figures of the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSO, 
2013) reveal that a rising number of retirees have opted for a capital payment in 
recent years. 
The consequences of taking out a lump sum instead of a lifelong pension can 
become problematic at a later stage when retirees who have consumed the full 
amount of their occupational capital are left with no financial resources. In former 
years, this was even more challenging as early retirement was allowed at 58 years. 
Pension institutions were reporting former employees as they were coming back 
to their old employer wanting to work again just before retirement in order to save 
up again for retirement, as they had consumed all their old age capital even before 
65.  
The following overview of the average annuity for all retirees shows the financial 
situation for old-age retirees in Switzerland in general terms. The occupational 
pension institution statistics of the FSO reveal an unequal picture of the financial 
situations. Looking at retirees with an old age pension in Switzerland we see that 
women receive a far lower proportion of the occupational pension benefits than 
men. The sums paid to women represent a small fraction of those paid out to men 
as the following table reveals. 
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Table 4.5 Old age occupational capital and pension benefits in Switzerland 
Benefits in billion SFr. 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pension 2,561 2,902 3,097 3,328
Capital 592 418 627 856
Pension 11,263 11,816 12,254 12,944
Capital 2,338 2,534 3,170 4,060
Source: Statistics on occupational pensions, FSO, Neuchatel
Average benefit in SFr. 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pension 17,382 18,810 18,929 19,080
Capital 81,904 90,988 83,790 85,978
Pension 35,104 35,706 36,172 36,519
Capital 167,779 175,436 173,746 198,825
Source: Statistics on occupational pensions, FSO, Neuchatel
Women
Men
Women
Men
 
 
In 2007 the old age capital benefits paid out to men represented a sum of 4 billion 
Swiss francs, whereas in the same year women received only of 850 billion Swiss 
francs of second pillar old age capital benefits which represents only 21% of men’s. 
Looking at pension payments for the same year, men’s old age pensions amounted 
to 12,9 billion Swiss francs, whereas women received only 3.3 billion Swiss francs, 
and representing 26% of men’s pension income from the second pillar.  
The average benefits reveal an equally great disadvantage for women in this 
system. In 2007 the average old age pension for women was 19,080 Swiss francs 
and compared to men’s at 36,519 Swiss francs, this means that women received 
half of men’s second pillar pension income. Looking at the average lump sum, we 
see that the average for men of 198,825 Swiss francs represents more than double 
women’s average of 85,978 Swiss francs. However, putting these figures in the 
context of couple households, we ought to bear in mind that a large number of 
women receive second pillar benefits through their partner or husband and are 
insured through them, based on articles 18 to 26 of the LPP. In the light of the 
quickly rising divorce rates and the instability of marriages these figures may be 
important to be analyzed in regards to old age benefits. According to the Federal 
Statistical Office, the divorce rate in 2012 was 43%. The proportion of persons 
being divorced after 5 years has reached its peak in 1991 with 12% (FSO, 2010).  
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There may well be a growing population of women, having worked part-time all 
their lives, being divorced once retired and are in need to claim complementary 
benefits from the state. This picture has been confirmed by a study of Sainsbury, 
revealing that in particular women depend more and more “on the income of a 
breadwinner or on welfare state transfer” (Sainsbury, 1999:32). Thus, the Swiss 
welfare state is challenged as those in needs will come back to the state and claim 
subsistence aid. Indeed, age retirees in need have the right to claim 
complementary benefits from the public first pillar (AVS) which was established in 
1966 in order to guarantee old age retirees a decent living.  
This phenomenon may be enhanced by the fact that in case of a divorce, women 
may receive a large part of the second pillar capital savings of their husband. They 
may also use up this money if they are not working. Thus, inequality occurs 
between insured as the second pillar system makes possible to consume the 
savings while taking out the capital, before retirement in the form of a lump sum 
and then to go back to the welfare state asking for complementary benefits to the 
public pension.  
Thus, the above information reveals clearly the importance of new welfare state 
policies for today’s generation and in view of women’s and men’s equal economic 
and social progress.  
4.6.2 Form of old age benefit: inequality between two institutions 
The option which form of benefits is promoted varies between pension institutions 
generating inequality amongst the insured and retirees due to divergent pension 
regulations. Based on Article 37, alinea 4 of the LPP, a private occupational 
pension institution may stipulate in their pension regulations that the pension be 
replaced by a capital payment. The result is that each of the pension institutions 
proposes a different practice.  
The liberal pension institution, according to their pension regulations in 2007, offers 
to pay out a maximum of 50% of the capital. In the paternal type, people may take 
out 25%, 50% or 100% of the accumulated capital. Both schemes offer to pay out 
the total amount of the capital if it amounts to less than 10% of the public old age 
pension (AVS). Inequality between old-age retirees from the liberal and the 
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paternal institutions is strongly accentuated. In the liberal pension institution the 
maximum capital option is 50%. In the paternal, there are more options and the full 
capital (100%) can be taken out. Hence, at the end of working life the paternal 
company offers a “free choice” of how to obtain the benefits, whereas the liberal 
adopts the legal rules stipulating that the occupational pension benefits should be 
taken out primarily in the form of a lifelong pension according to the legislation 
(article 37 of the LPP). The insured tend to behave according to the institutional 
norms and values and do as prescribed in the pension regulations. 
In 2007, the paternal type had just over two thirds of retirees (67%) receiving their 
occupational benefits in the form of a lifelong pension. Women (68%) are more 
likely to take a pension only and a smaller proportion of men (63%) opt for a 
pension only.  The paternal institution offers the option of withdrawing 100% of the 
occupational benefits in the form of a unique capital payment. However, the 
pension expert expressed that “there is the fear that we would create cases of 
people being dependent on social assistance later on. People took out their old 
age savings in the form of capital and leave Switzerland. They went on a long trip 
and bought a house for their step-son. When they came back bankrupt, they asked 
if they could come back and work again”. According to the pension expert, it is the 
responsibility of the pension institution to protect these people. “We still offer the 
right to take out a 100% capital payment, and today we have about 1’000 cases 
taking this option. Another fifth (18%) of employees takes 25% of their benefits in 
form of a lump sum and the rest as a pension. The expert points out that small 
capital payments are usually paid out to people with short employment careers in 
the company or to women who worked part-time and who have a husband with a 
generous pension scheme.  
The liberal type reveals a slightly higher percentage of retirees (70%) withdrawing 
their occupational benefits in the form of pension only in 2007.  In fact, 75% of all 
women receive a pension compared to only 63% of men.   
4.6.3 Form of old age benefit: inequality within pension institutions 
There is a large difference between the form of benefits drawn out by women and 
men within each of the two analyzed pension institutions. 
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In the liberal pension institution, women receive overall 49.6% of their last income 
before retirement in the form of a pension whilst men’s pensions amount on 
average to only 48.6% of their last salary. In the paternal pension institution 
women’s pensions amount on average to 61.1% and men’s to 64.5% of their last 
income before retirement (2007). Women are better off in the liberal type compared 
to men, however, in the paternal pension institution women are disadvantaged. 
The institutional factors creating inequality: the entrance threshold in particular (by 
excluding those earning below 20,880 Swiss francs in 2012), the contribution rate, 
and the contributions paid into the pension scheme by employer and employee are 
determinant in building up the occupational pension capital.  
According to the SICC survey data of the liberal pension institution, covering a 
sample of nearly 800 old-age retirees who retired between 1985 and 2007, 56% of 
the retirees took out their occupational benefits in the form of pension only. Men 
were more likely (61%) to take this option than women (50%). And 28% of all old-
age retirees took the mixed form of benefits. The amount for men with pension 
only, matches the amount of the SICC survey. The values for pension and capital 
payments, however, are slightly lower – especially for women.  
Table 4.6 Form of benefit: capital, pension, mixed benefits in 2004 
 
Pension benefits in 2004: divergent benefits between the two institutions 
The median and the average pension in the two institutions are divergent. The 
empirical data from 2004 shows an accentuated difference between the median 
pensions of retirees depending on the type of pension institution. 
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Table 4.7 Level of occupational old-age pension and capital payments 2004 
 
For retirees who opted for a pension only in the paternal pension institution, the 
median pension (14,500 Swiss francs) was far lower in 2004 than the median in 
the liberal type (32,500 Swiss francs). In the paternal pension institution old-age 
retirees received an additional bridge pension (AVS-replacement pension) 
financed by the employer. The median pension in 2004 was 12,000 Swiss francs 
for the old-age retirees of the two types of pension institution who opted for a 
pension only, so we observe accentuated inequality. Retirees opting for a lump 
sum in the liberal pension institution received a median capital payment of 7,900 
Swiss francs which represents a third of what retirees of the paternal type (21,200 
Swiss francs) received in 2004. This reveals institutional inequality between the 
two pension institutions. 
If we look at retirees who opted in 2004 for a pension and a capital payment, we 
see that the median pension of 16,000 Swiss francs and the median capital 
payment of 92,000 Swiss francs are lower in the liberal than in the paternal type at 
17,500 Swiss francs (pension) and 62,600 Swiss francs (pension and capital 
payment respectively), disclosing a definite inequality at the institutional level. 
The liberal company reveals a much less accentuated difference between the 
average pensions for women and men. The average pension for women was 55% 
of men’s in 2004 and 53% in 2005. The median offers a similar picture of the gender 
gap: in 2004 the median pension for women was 44% of men’s. If we take into 
account that Swiss old-age retirees receive a median income of 52,100 Swiss 
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francs, of which 20% represents the occupational pension (10,420 Swiss francs), 
women and men are both well rewarded (Wanner, 2008). It can be concluded that 
the pension income gap between retirees in the liberal and the paternal institutions 
vary strongly.  
Pension benefits in 2007 
Pension benefits are the direct result of the capital accumulated during the working 
life of a person. It is evident that the income as such has also an influence on the 
level of the pension benefit. This means that a person may have a low income but 
still have a decent second pillar pension in retirement. Concretely, as we have 
seen, is the pension institution responsible for defining the entrance threshold and 
the second pillar contributions. 
It appears that the double contribution of the patronal institution towards the 
pension scheme and the lower entrance threshold have a positive impact on the 
second pillar pension payments of retirees. This is in particular so in regards to 
women. As we have seen, the paternal pension institution includes all employees 
independent of their income on a 30% income basis. Furthermore, the double 
contribution (16%) of the paternal employee towards the pension scheme helps in 
particular small earners to build up their pension credits more easily. It appears 
that women have – despite their lower salaries in the paternal type far higher 
pension incomes in comparison to women affiliated to the liberal type. This 
observation is confirmed in the following empirical section. Indeed, we observe a 
strong discrepancy between the pension benefits of retirees of both pension 
institutions who took out pensions-only in 2007. The median pension was far higher 
in the liberal type (26,400 Swiss francs) than in the paternal type (15,300 Swiss 
francs). Looking at the mixed benefits, we observe that the median capital payment 
was far higher in the liberal (155,000 Swiss francs) than in the paternal type (84,000 
Swiss francs). And the retirees of the liberal type with a lump sum only received a 
median payment of 13,000 Swiss francs whereas in the paternal type the same 
population received a median capital payment of 35,900 Sfr.  
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Table 4.8: Median benefits in 2007: pension and capital payments 
paternal liberal paternal liberal
All 83,870 155,054 35,883 13,081
Women 41,838 156,388 36,092 6,480
Men 105,197 153,720 35,588 15,367
paternal liberal paternal liberal
All 20,052 15,678 15,348 26,376
Women 9,804 14,532 10,392 16,080
Men 24,000 17,580 27,552 34,284
pension  & capital
Median 
Capital
capital only
Median 
Pension
pension  & capital pension only
 
Source: MELAP pilot, own exploitations, Kucera, 2012 
The median capital-only payment between 2004 (paternal: 20,000 Swiss francs, 
liberal: 8,000 Swiss francs) and 2007 (paternal: 36,000 Swiss francs, liberal: 
13,000 Swiss francs) has increased quite sharply. However, the pension only 
payments paid out in 2004 and 2007 were equal in the paternal type and very close 
in the liberal pension institution. In 2004 the paternal paid out a median capital of 
15,000 Swiss francs and the liberal 32,000 Swiss francs. In 2007 the paternal paid 
out a median of 15,000 and the liberal of 26,000 Swiss francs. Inequalities between 
the two pension institutions is rather accentuated in regard to these benefits. 
4.6.3.1 Pension only 
Average pension of retirees with pension only 
According to the Federal Statistical Office FSO, old-age retirees with a pension 
only received an average annuity of 33,400 Swiss francs in 2005, paid out by 
autonomous pension institutions in 2005, according to own calculations based on 
the pension institution Statistics (FSO, 2005). In the liberal pension institution, the 
average annuity for men (35,200 Swiss francs) in 2007 was double what it was for 
women (18,400 Swiss francs). In the paternal type, women received an average 
annuity (12,700 Swiss francs) of approximately 40% of men’s at 30,900 Sfr. 
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Table 4.9: Average occupational pension: liberal and paternal institutions 
2007
men Sfr. 35,227 100% Sfr. 30,936 100%
women Sfr. 18,474 52% Sfr. 12,768 41%
Liberal Paternal
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2013, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
Following from unequal capital savings, the average annuity differs harshly 
between women and men. The beneficiaries with the option “pension only” reveals 
that women benefit from a far lower pension than men. On one hand this gender 
inequality reflects women’s lower occupational benefits due to structural 
determinants such as income inequality and part-time employment and as women 
often lack of contributing years due to educational or household duties. On the 
other hand, women are disadvantaged in regards to pension credits, as they are 
often excluded from the system, earning less than the entrance threshold of 20,880 
Swiss francs (2012). Inequality results from article 2 and 7 of the LPP and the 
pension regulations, which has been demonstrated in this study. The paternal 
institution includes all employees in the pension scheme independent of their 
salary which is not the case of the liberal type. 
Median and quartiles: retirees with pension only 
At the lower quartile the divergence between annuities for men and women is even 
more accentuated. The lower quartile pension for women amounts to only 6,000 
Swiss francs, whereas for men it is 19,000 Swiss francs. The median annuity for 
women amounts 10,000 Swiss francs, representing approximately a third of men’s 
with 28,000 Swiss francs. At the upper quartile annuities for women amount to 
17,000 Swiss francs, representing 44% of men’s at 39,000 Swiss francs. 
Table 4.10: Annual old age occupational pension: both pension institutions 
 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2013, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
2004 to 2007
men 19,680 100% 27,788 100% 39,732 100%
women 6,624 34% 10,776 37% 17,352 44%
Lower Quartile Median Upper Quartile
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4.6.3.2 Mixed benefits: pension and capital payment 
According to the FSO, retirees with mixed benefits, capital payment and pension, 
received an average annuity of 27,000 Swiss francs and an average capital 
payment of 138,000 Swiss francs in 2005. This figure represents average pension 
and capital payments actually made to persons affiliated to autonomous pension 
institutions in 2005 (Pension Institution Statistics, FSO, 2005). Women with a 
mixed benefit of capital and pension payments received an average annuity of 
11,000 Swiss francs and an average capital payment of 58,000 Swiss francs. Men 
in the same category received an average lump sum of 150,000 Swiss francs, and 
an average annuity of 33,000 Swiss francs. Women received approximately 40% 
of the average capital paid to men. If this capital was converted into a pension, the 
average pension for women would amount to 350 Swiss francs a month and for 
men to 890 Swiss francs. On average, people with mixed benefits would receive 
600 Swiss francs a month more if they took out their occupational pension benefits 
exclusively in the form of a pension. Gender inequality remains a structural problem 
as the occupational pension system is not redistributive and women’s – generally 
smaller - capital is converted at almost the same conversion rate as men’s, based 
on article 14, LPP.  
Table 4.11: Mixed benefits: both pension institutions 
 
Mixed benefits: liberal and paternal 2004 - 2007
Swiss francs Annuity* Pension**
Women capital 58,330 4,200 350
pension 11,294 11,295 941
Men capital 150,901 10,714 893
pension 33,836 33,837 2,820
Both capital 112,579 8,049 671
pension 24,505 24,506 2,042
*Annuity: calculated with a conversion rate of 7.1% (men)/7.2% (women)
**M onthly pension: calculated from annuity (12 months)
Source: own exploitat ions of M ELAP pilot data, Kucera  
 
Retirees from both pension institutions who chose mixed options – capital and 
pension - received an average monthly pension of 2,042 Swiss francs. If they had 
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taken out all of their benefits in the form of a pension then the monthly pension 
would have amounted to 2,713 Swiss francs. 
Comparing these benefits with those for women, we observe that women receive 
an average monthly pension of 941 Swiss francs. If taken out only as pension 
payments, the monthly sum would come to 1,291 Swiss francs. This means that 
women receive 35% of the men’s average (3,713 Swiss francs.). Gender inequality 
is dominant as men's occupational pension benefits are far higher than women's. 
This phenomenon puts women at a disadvantage in general terms once they are 
retired. Institutional gender inequality clearly appears here due to the Federal law 
on occupational pension schemes (LPP) and differing pension regulations, as 
women may not save as much capital, because of the entrance threshold excluding 
or restricting savings from small earners - thus, women miss out on pension credits 
when they interrupt their careers for child rearing. 
Median and quartiles: retirees with mixed benefits 
The median capital payment for beneficiaries with a pension and capital payment 
is far lower for women than for men. Between 2004 and 2007 the median capital 
payment for women varied from 30,000 and 50,000 Swiss francs and for men from 
90,000 to about 130,000 Swiss francs. Gender differences between men and 
women with mixed benefits are strongly accentuated at the lower quartile, the 
median and the upper quartile.  
The lower quartile payment for women was 30,000 and for men it was 70,000 Swiss 
francs (2004 to 2007). The median for women of 40,000 Swiss francs was about a 
third of that for men (110,000 Swiss francs). The upper quartile for women was 
80,000 Swiss francs, whereas men in the same category received more than 
double that (190,000 Swiss francs).  
Furthermore, the annuity for women was far lower than for men; this represented 
by the lower quartile of 6,000 compared to 17,000 Swiss francs for men. The 
median annual pension for women at 9,000 Swiss francs was just over a third of 
that for men at 25,000 Swiss francs. The upper quartile for annuities for women 
amounted to 15,000 and for men to 37,000 Swiss francs. The category of mixed 
benefits reveals accentuated gender inequality, with women at a disadvantage. 
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4.6.3.3 Capital benefits: retirees with a lump sum only 
According to article 37, al. 3 of the LPP, the occupational benefits may be paid out 
in form of a lump sum if  - paid out as a pension, they would add to less than 10% 
of the minimum public old age pension (AVS). And, alinea 4 of article 37 stipulates 
that pension institutions may allow for the capital to be paid out as a lump sum, 
even though the amount would be higher than 10% of the public old age pension 
(AVS). 
Distribution of capital benefits 
The following chart makes it evident that capital payments are not equally 
distributed. Women’s benefits (red line) are most commonly up to 40,000 Swiss 
francs. Capital payments to men (black line) are most frequently around 100,000 
Swiss francs. 
Figure 4.6: Distribution of capital payments 2004 to 2007: sums in Swiss 
francs paid out to women and men: the two pension institutions 
 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2013, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
Men receive for the majority between 80,000 and 100,000 Swiss francs, whereas 
women receive between 20,000 and 40,000 Swiss francs. The distribution graph 
reveals clear and distinct gender inequality due to unequal distribution of capital 
Number of observations 
Amount of capital paid out 
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benefits from occupational pension schemes. 
Median and quartiles: retirees with capital payment only 
If we look at the median for 64 to 70 year olds, we see that the median for men at 
93,850 Swiss francs is far higher than for women at 32,561 Swiss francs. The upper 
quartile for men (189,000 Swiss francs) represents more than double that for 
women (74,000 Swiss francs). As does the 90th percentile for men (300,000 Swiss 
francs) compared to women (131,000 Swiss francs). 
Figure 4.7: Capital payments in SFr. for aged 64 to 70 years: both types 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
We draw from the graph that men are by a long way those with the highest portion 
in all distributional categories and women are far below the median for men and 
women together. The upper quartile reveals even more clearly the discrepancy 
between capital benefits for men and women. For men’s capital benefits it is 188’00 
Swiss francs, whereas for women in the same category it is 73’000 Swiss francs in 
the same category. Capital benefits for women in the 90th percentile amount to 
130,000 Swiss francs whereas men receive 300,000 Swiss francs in this category. 
Gender inequality is most accentuated where women receive a median capital 
payment of 32,000, whereas the median for men is 93,000 Swiss francs. 
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Average capital payment: retirees with capital payment only 
Based on the FSO statistics for pension institutions in 2005, close to a fifth of 
retirees opted for a lump sum and the average amount was 160,200 Swiss francs. 
These figures represent the average capital payments actually paid out by all 
autonomous pension institutions in 2005, according to own calculations based on 
the pension institution statistics (FSO, 2005). We observe generally low savings in 
the liberal pension institution of those people with a lump sum only. This leads us 
to conclude that moderate savings in a pension scheme are often the reason 
behind opting for a capital payment only. With low savings, the lifelong pension 
would be low and pension institutions prefer to pay out a “lump sum” in these cases 
instead of a pension. Gender inequality arises as women’s annuity would amount 
to half of that for men. The capital calculated as a monthly pension would be of 300 
Swiss francs or women and approximately 600 Swiss francs for men. 
Table 4.12: Theoretical pension based on capital payments: both types 
 
Capital only: liberal and paternal pension institutions in 2005
Swiss francs Annuity* Pension**
Women 63,119 4,545 379
Men 109,682 7,787 649
Both 103,030 7,367 614
 
*Annuity: calculated with a conversion rate of 7.1% (men) and 7.2% (women) 
**Monthly pension: calculated from annuity (12 months) 
Source: own exploitations based on Melap pilot data, Kucera 2012 
We draw from above table that there has not been an increase in the number of 
capital payments since 2004. People are still drawing out the same average 
amounts and over the years retiree behavior seems not to have changed. The 
average capital payment to women of 60,000 Swiss francs in the form of a “lump 
sum” makes sense as the administrative costs for the pension institutions would 
exceed the value of the pension payment. For men, with an average capital 
payment of 100,000 Swiss francs, the pension question is also an issue. The cost 
for the pension institution to administrate the monthly pension payments is 
calculated at approximately 500 Swiss francs per person. 
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4.7 Pension reduction rate 
The pension reduction rate is applied when a person leaves early for retirement, 
reducing the annuity in the case of early retirement.  
The reduction rate applied on the annuity differs strongly between the two types of 
pension institutions.  
4.7.1 Pension reduction rate and labor market 
The Federal Social Insurance Office recommends applying a ~ 6% pension cut per 
year of early retirement. This would mean that a retiree leaving for retirement at 60 
would actually lose one third of their yearly pension payments or their capital 
benefits. The consequence of this is that both pension institutions pay out higher 
lifelong benefits to each of the retirees, than necessary according to the legal 
recommendations. 
The labor market impacts on that insofar as women have to retire at 63, 64 
respectively. This means theoretically, that the pension institution may apply a 
pension reduction rate even though women have the right to exit the labor market 
and claim a public old age pension. Thus, the labor market drives women to stop 
working and retiring, early compared to men, and therefore having to live with a 
lower pension as they have accumulated less pension credits for old age. 
Depending on each pension institution, this may have a different impact on the 
pension level, as the scheme may provide better retirement conditions than legally 
defined. 
4.7.2 Pension reduction rate and inequality: two pension institutions 
Early retirement for employees in the paternal type is possible at 58 with a slight 
reduction in pension payments. According to a pension fund expert, early 
retirement is seen as a reward after a long period of employee loyalty and is 
fostered for the benefit of the employees and their families. If a person retires early, 
that is from 58 to 62 years old, their pension will be reduced by 1.8% per early 
retirement year. If a person retires at 60 it means that the life-long pension is 
reduced by 5.4%.In comparison, a person affiliated to the liberal type and retirees 
at 60 years will lose out on 10% of the occupational pension benefits. 
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Table 4.13 Early retirement pension cuts 
age paternal liberal FSIO
64 1.80% -2.0% -6.4%
63 0% -4.0% -12.5%
62 -1.80% -6.0% -18.2%
61 -3.60% -8.0% -23.7%
60 -5.40% -10.0% -28.9%
source: pension regulat ions; Kucera source: FSIO  
The result is that accentuated inequality on the level of the pension institution 
occurs as these divergent pension cuts are regulated in the pension regulations. 
The early retirement rules in the pension regulations of each pension institution 
therefore create strong inequality between persons affiliated to different pension 
schemes. 
4.7.3 Pension reduction rate and inequality within two institutions 
There is no difference between the pension reduction rate of women and men in 
both the liberal and paternal pension institution. Indeed, the paternal pension 
institution neither enhances nor reduces gender inequality in this respect. 
The liberal pension institution applies a reduction rate if women leave according to 
the legal retirement age, at 64 years. This leads to inequality between men and 
women, as men leave legally at 65 years. We observe in this context an 
overlapping effect of the labor market, not prepared to employ women until 65, the 
Swiss welfare state while stipulating the legal retirement age at 64 for women. 
Indeed, we can conclude that the liberal pension institution is reducing the 
gendered effect of the labor market and the Swiss welfare state proposing to 
employ and include women in the pension scheme until the age of 65. 
4.8 Pension income and gender inequality  
The labor market, as we have seen in the former chapters, is one of the important 
determinate of pension income. Besides the income from work, the Federal law on 
occupational pension schemes (LPP) and the pension regulation of a private 
occupational pension institution is at the origin of pension inequality. Thus, post-
retirement gender inequality occurs due to the fact that women's pension income 
is still trailing men's. We may observe a persistent gender pension gap. 
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The second pillar system in Switzerland is not built for todays’ generation of 
couples, splitting up or divorcing, leaving behind a wife not having contributed 
equally as her partner or husband. While splitting up, women have the right to claim 
half of the partner’s occupational pension savings; however, the amount is not paid 
into a pension scheme and leaves women with little security for their old age in 
regard to occupational pension income. 
4.8.1 Pension income and labor market 
The following presentation of the Lorenz Curve is one of the most efficient methods 
to reveals the disparity between the pensions of the first, second and third pillars. 
The following figure results from the exploitation of data from the tax declaration of 
2006, carried out by Wanner in 2008 (University of Geneva). The study was 
mandated by the Federal Social insurance office (FSIO) and contained fiscal data 
from the following cantons: Aargau, Berne, Basel, Neuchatel, Nidwald, St. Gall, 
Wallis and Tessin) for the years 2003, 2005, 2006). According to Wanner, retirees 
have a variable income, depending on the family status. “The median of single men 
is about 46,000 Swiss francs, 38,000 Swiss francs of single women and 71,000 
Swiss francs of couples” (Wanner et al., 2008: 29). 
We can draw from the following figure that the more the state relies on private 
solutions, or here in this case, on the privately financed second pillar pension 
schemes and the private third pillar, the more the state creates inequality. 
This distribution makes it clear that public pensions are the most equally 
distributed. Pensions from the 2nd and 3rd pillars are very unequally distributed. 
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Figure 4.8 Lorenz curve of 1st, 2nd, 3rd pillar benefits: retirees in 2006 
 
Source: Wanner et al., 2008 
The horizontal axis represents the percentage of income compared to the 
percentage of the population, on the vertical axis.  
The Lorenz curve reveals the income distribution from the public pension (first 
pillar, AVS), the occupational pension (second pillar, LPP) and the private third 
pillar. Income from the public pension appears to be distributed rather equally. 
There were 30 percent of the population which received 38 percent from the first 
pillar (AVS) in 2006. For the second pillar pension benefits (LPP), the picture is 
different: 30 percent of the population received 60 percent of the occupational 
pension benefits. The inequality is even more accentuated if we look at the third 
pillar benefits. Indeed, 30 percent of the population received 75 percent of the paid 
out third pillar benefits in 2006.  
As the SAKE study of the FSO reveals that only about half of the old-age retirees 
between 65 and 70 years old receive a pension. However, according to Bianchi 
(2011) the larger part of women does not receive an occupational pension. 
These observations reveal clearly that women are disadvantaged in the second 
pillar system in regards to access and benefits. 
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4.8.2 Income inequality within the two pension institutions 
The following graph shows firstly, the distribution of income from second pillar 
pensions from the liberal pension institution (SICC) and secondly, the impact of the 
number of years of employment in a company on pension income from the second 
pillar. 
At the horizontal axis the value of the pension income from the second pillar 
indicates the amount of the old age pension a person receives. The axis indicates 
the values from 0 to 10,000 Swiss francs of a monthly pension income. 
The vertical axis indicates the number of years a person was working for the same 
company. Thus the loyalty a person showed towards its employer. 
The scatter plot illustrates that there are very few people with a monthly pension 
income above 6,000 Swiss francs. Nevertheless the scatter plot reveals a slightly 
raising curve from the left bottom angle toward the right upper angle. This indicates 
that the longer a person works for the same employer and is affiliated to the same 
pension institution, the higher the pension income will be. 
Figure 4.9 Distribution of second pillar pension income in the liberal type 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, MELAP pilot data from liberal pension 
Obviously, it pays to work for a longer period in the liberal type and for the same 
employer as this then means receiving a higher pension income from the second 
pillar.  
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4.8.3 Income inequality between the two pension institutions 
The following Lorenz curve displaying the income distribution between the liberal 
and paternal pension institution is a clear indicator of pension inequality. The 
graphical representation of the cumulative distribution of the empirical data of 
pension income demonstrates inequality between and within the pension 
institutions. The graph shows which proportion of retirees get what proportion of 
the total income from second pillar. The proportion of retirees is plotted on the x-
axis and the pension income on the y-axis.  
Figure 4.10 Lorenz curve for second pillar from liberal and paternal type 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
The figure reveals that the distribution of income from occupational pensions is 
more equally distributed between retirees of the liberal pension scheme. Indeed, 
inequality is more accentuated between retirees of the paternal pension institution. 
Based on the SICC survey, women’s annual average pension is about 15,000 
Swiss francs and the income from the occupational pension for men is around 
27,000 Swiss francs in 2007. Hence, the occupational old age pensions for women 
amount to approximately half of men’s. Based on the analysis of the MELAP pilot 
data we see the following picture: 
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Table 4.14 Average occupational pension old age retirees 2004 and 2007 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type and SICC survey: liberal type 
The survey data is validated by the results from the MELAP pilot data. Women 
receive on average an annuity of approximately 17,800 Swiss francs; men have a 
far higher second pillar income (32,134 Swiss francs) than women. Their income 
from the second pillar is nearly double that of women.  
If we analyze those retirees who took out a pension only, and not the mixed form 
of pension and capital payments, we observe a slight difference. Indeed those 
people who took out their capital savings in the form of a pension only receive a 
slightly higher annuity compared to those who took out pension and capital. The 
following table is a comparison of the pension-only beneficiaries from the liberal 
and paternal pension institution. The relational picture between the annuities for 
men and women remains distinctly unequal. And the divergence between pensions 
received from the liberal and the paternal institutions also remains unequal. 
Although the paternal pension institution reduces inequality with its pension 
regulations – including women and men independent of their salary – there is a 
particularly unequal picture of annuities between men and women ((30,940 and 
12,770 Swiss francs respectively). The liberal type pays out less divergent 
pensions to men and women (35,230 and 18,470 Swiss francs respectively).  
Table 4.15 Average annuity “pension only”: liberal and paternal institutions 
Average annuity 2007 Liberal Paternal 
Men 35,227 100% 30,936 100% 
Women 18,474 52% 12,768 41% 
Source: Own exploitations MELAP 2007, Kucera, 2012 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, MELAP pilot data from liberal and paternal type 
The average annuity reveals a notable pension inequality between women and 
men and between retirees affiliated to different institutions. It results that women 
receive on average 40% (paternal) or 50% (liberal) of the average annuity for men. 
Average occupational pension
women men women men
MELAP pilot 17,827 32,134 17,875 33,413
SICC survey 17,208 28,596 15,403 26,871
20072004
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The household income for retirees of the SICC survey reveals further details about 
the income of retirees. Indeed, it presents the total household income, consisting 
of all the different income sources of the household and not only of the retiree. 
Thus, I am able to present the data on household income in relation to different 
household types. The characterization of the household is an important indicator 
in determining the sources of income people have once retired. Furthermore, the 
survey demonstrates the place the second pillar occupies and the role it plays in 
income composition.  
The following graph illustrates that a large part of old-age retirees’ depend on 
income from different sources and only a small proportion depend solely on the 
second pillar. 
Figure 4.11 Income sources by household type: retirees from liberal type 
 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, SICC survey: liberal type 
Over three-quarters of the survey participants replied that they depend on the 
public old age pension and the second pillar pension. Whereas in couple 
households (353 persons) and in family households three-quarters (10 persons) 
live on first and second pillar income only, in single-person households this is the 
case in 82% of cases (135 persons). In single-person households (23 persons) 
and in family households (2 persons) approximately 15% live on several sources, 
such as first, second and/or third and/or other income. In family households the 
phenomenon of several income sources is widespread at over 20% (97 persons).  
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Income from work represents an important income source for a portion of the old-
age retiree population. For some people, it is a necessity to continue working. In 
the category “other income” this most often refers to income from work. This is 
confirmed by a new study from the Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO, 2012) 
stating that over a third of the population continues to work beyond the ordinary 
retirement age. However, the main income sources are clearly first and second 
pillar pensions, as the following table illustrates. 
Table 4.16 Income sources by household type: retirees from liberal type 
Income sources by household type (SICC) couple single family 
AVS/LPP 353 135 10 
AVS/LPP and/or  
Third pillar and/or other income 
97 23 2 
Second pillar pension and other income 13 2 1 
Second pillar pension only 2 5 0 
Source: Kucera, own exploitations 2012, SICC survey: liberal type 
The following table shows the average monthly income of retirees from liberal type, 
based on the survey data. 
Table 4.17 Household income by gender: retirees from liberal type (SICC) 
Household income 
 
Average 
 
Variance 
 
Men 5,474 2,300 
Women 3,784 1,783 
Total 5,050 2,301 
Source: Own exploitations SICC survey, N: men: 490, women:164, Kucera 2012 
 
The average household income of participants’ differ harshly between men (5,474 
Swiss francs) and women (3,784 Swiss francs). Among men, the variance is far 
greater (2,300 Swiss francs) than among women (1,783 Swiss francs).  
An analysis of fiscal data showed that the median income of retirees in 2008 was 
52,100 Swiss francs. This income comes from the second pillar pension or capital 
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benefits (20 %), from the public pension (AVS: 40 %), from capital resources (30 
%) and only 10 % from work (Wanner, 2008).  
Table 4.18 Income of retirees: information resulting from tax declarations  
Median 
annual 
income
1st pillar 2nd pillar
Income 
from fortune
Income
from work
52,100 Sfr. 40% 20% 30% 10%
Source: Fiscal register data, Wanner Philippe, University of Geneva, CHSS 3/2008  
Based on the SICC data, we can assume that couple households most probably 
receive the maximum couple public pension. And we can confirm that women live 
on average on less income than men, despite the fact that a woman with a partner 
benefits from a second income.  
4.9 Scenario / simulation: Impact of pension fund regulations  
This empirical section aims to confirm the hypotheses that the flexibility accorded 
to private companies in the operation of the occupational pension schemes results 
in significant inequalities and confirms that the pension income – based on the 
Federal law on occupational pension schemes, the LPP, and the pension 
regulations’ - varies strongly between the pension institutions.  
This sub-chapter provides a simulation of the conditions of affiliation and its impact 
on the pension payment. Based on collected data from the retirees of the liberal 
pension institution, I created a fictional scenario. The purpose of this simulation 
was to predict the effect of a changing institutional environment on the retirement 
conditions of the old-aged. With this I evaluated the situation of persons affiliated 
to the liberal pension institution as if they had been affiliated to the paternal one 
instead.  
I constructed a dataset based on theoretically created parameters drawn from the 
pension regulations of the paternal institution with a limited number of clearly 
defined variables which I inferred into the database of the SICC database, in order 
to transfer the liberal environment into a paternal one. Counterfactuals are obtained 
by applying the pension regulations of the paternal pension institution to persons 
insured with the liberal type.  
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For this purpose I simulated the entrance threshold, the contribution rate, the 
second pillar pension income and the retirement age, by imputing the values of the 
paternal pension regulations into the data set of the retirees of the liberal pension 
institution. Based on the SICC data set, this scenario pursues the question: what 
would the old age pension benefits of retirees be, had they been affiliated to a 
paternal instead of to a liberal pension institution?  
The following analysis confirms that women employed in the liberal type, are 
disadvantaged in regards to occupational pension benefits. Women occupy the 
lower paid and the less valued jobs. This gender inequality is reinforced by the 
occupational pension system in Switzerland. Indeed, the second pillar system 
seems inappropriate for those with small incomes. It creates gender inequality. In 
the strict sense, the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) and the 
pension regulations are creating (gender) inequality through the partial exclusion 
of a considerable portion of the active population, in particular women. It appears 
that the flexibility accorded to private pension institutions for operating the LPP, in 
the liberal type, enhances gender inequality.  
The idea of this simulation was to extend my conclusions from the analysis of the 
SICC Survey. Although this experiment provides a very limited insight into the 
possible divergences between the pension institutions, it provides important 
information about the origins of the phenomenon of institutional gender inequality. 
The outcome of this experiment clearly displays that institutions matter. 
4.9.1 Simulation with entrance threshold: articles 2, 7 of the LPP 
The following scenario regarding an imputed entrance threshold reveals to what 
extent employees affiliated to the liberal pension institution would be better off if 
they were affiliated to the pension system of the paternal pension institution. 
As we have seen, the paternal pension institution strongly favors low income 
categories, as the scheme integrates all employees independent on their salary. 
This is the reason why up to an income of around 6,000 Swiss francs, people 
affiliated to this scheme have a great advantage as their insured income is higher 
compared to those affiliated to the liberal type. Interestingly, for persons earning 
around 7,000 Swiss francs or more the system of the liberal pension institution 
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seems better. However, as we have seen it is not only the insured income that is 
determinant but even more important are the contributions, that is the diverted 
capital, based on the contribution rates, which strongly determine the pension 
income at the end of a working life. 
Table 4.19 Insured incomes: liberal and paternal scenario 
Income from work  Insured income  
monthly yearly  Liberal Paternal Difference 
1,000 13,000  not insured 9,100 9,100 
2,000 26,000  1,640 18,200 16,560 
3,000 39,000  14,640 27,300 12,660 
4,000 52,000  27,640 36,400 8,760 
5,000 65,000  40,640 45,500 4,860 
6,000 78,000  53,640 54,600 960 
      
7,000 91,000  66,640 63,700 -2,940 
8,000 104,000  79,640 72,800 -6,840 
9,000 117,000  92,640 81,900 -10,740 
10,000 130,000  105,640 91,000 -14,640 
11,000 143,000  118,640 100,100 -18,540 
12,000 156,000  131,640 109,200 -22,440 
Source: own exploitation based on data from SICC, survey, Kucera 2012   
From above table we may resume that, from 655 persons in the dataset, 476 
persons from the liberal pension institution would have been able to contribute 
more capital towards the pension scheme if they had been affiliated to the paternal 
pension institution.  
In total, there would have been 1,657,550 Swiss francs more in assets which would 
have been insured under the scheme with the paternal institution and thus 
available for pension income of employees once retired. 
The conclusion is that there is strong inequality between the two pension schemes, 
being affiliated to the liberal pension institution means that in particular persons 
with low salaries are highly disadvantages as they lose out on pension credits over 
the years, contributed by both the employee and employer. The consequence is 
that (gender) inequality between the pension schemes are triggered by the 
definition of the legal threshold entrance of the LPP, resulting in lower pension 
benefits for the old-aged affiliated to the liberal pension institution. 
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4.9.2 Simulation with the contribution rate: article 16 of the LPP 
Above we have seen, that for those insured with the liberal pension institution, the 
contribution rate from employee and employer amounts to 14%, if looked at 
independent of age. Compared to that, employee and employer of the paternal 
pension institution contribute 24% of the salary to their pension scheme. Based on 
the pension regulations, a person affiliated to the liberal pension institution 
accumulates fewer pension credits over their working life and thus, their annuity 
will be lower. However, both pension schemes provide more than the legal 
minimum according to the golden rule established by the legislator in the 1980’s 
with a total of 500%. 
Taking a closer look, we see that the divergent contribution rate is based on the 
fact that the employer of the paternal pension institution contributes 16%, and the 
employee 8%, whereas the employer of the liberal pension institution contributes 
7%, and the employee, depending on age, between 5.5% and 8%. This provokes 
not only a large difference concerning income in regards to fringe benefits during 
the working life of a person, as the paternal type is far more generous than the 
liberal one; but it makes in particular a large difference when it comes to pension 
income.  
This example illustrates clearly that the pension institution and their pension 
regulations are determinant factors for income once retired. Thus, affiliated to a 
paternal pension scheme the contribution is on average 10% higher compared to 
the liberal type. Surprisingly, in this context, there is no gender inequality 
detectable as contribution rates are equal both for men and women. However, 
inequality is strongly accentuated between the pension institutions. 
4.9.3 Simulation of pension income 
I also simulated the second pillar pension income by imputing the values of the 
paternal pension regulations into the SICC data set. Assuming that the conversion 
rate or replacement rate is the same in both schemes, that the benefits regarding 
the over-mandatory part are close to equal in the liberal and the paternal type, then 
we theoretically calculate the pension as if a person was insured with the paternal 
instead of with the liberal pension institution. We already know that employees 
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accumulate in total 586 credits for a full pension, whereas in the paternal they 
would accumulate a total of 912. 
This simulation reveals that theoretically, the unequal credits saved over the years 
lead to the fact that persons insured with the liberal type would have a 
proportionally lower occupational pension at the end of their working lifes.  
The following table shows that the minimum income as well as the maximum 
income would be very divergent in the two pension schemes. It illustrates that 
persons affiliated to the paternal type instead of being insured with the liberal 
pension institution, would receive far higher old age pensions. 
Table 4.20 Median, minimum, maximum, average pension: liberal, paternal 
Pension income in Sfr. Median Minimum Maximum Average
 « Liberal » - SICC survey 2,000 300 9,600 2,320
 « Paternal scenario » 3,113 514 16,457 3,976
N=655; Source: own exploitat ions SICC survey, own simulat ion, Kucera 2012
 
It can be concluded that inequality occurs between persons affiliated to different 
pension institutions and arises where the contribution rate is divergent.  
Concretely, if a person was affiliated to the paternal pension institution then the 
median pension from the occupational pension scheme would have been 3,113 
Swiss francs a month, which is 1,113 Swiss francs more than if the retiree were 
instead affiliated to the liberal pension institution. In addition, the average 
occupational pension of a retiree affiliated to the paternal type would be 1,556 
Swiss francs higher.  
Table 4.21 Pension income by gender: liberal and paternal scenario 
 
Source: own exploitations SICC, Kucera 2012; N= 655 women; N=489 men; 
Analyzing gender differences between the schemes, the difference between the 
averages is far more accentuated in the paternal between women and men with 
nearly double the pension income for men (4,091 Swiss francs). However, between 
liberal paternal liberal paternal
Men 2,629 4,091 1,490 2,318
Women 1,410 2,194 964 1,501
Average pension Standard deviation
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men in different types the standard deviation is far stronger - 2,318 Swiss francs in 
the paternal compared to 1,490 Swiss francs in the liberal. The average pension 
for women - if affiliated to the paternal instead of to the liberal - would have been 
784 Swiss francs higher. Gender inequality and inequality between the pension 
institutions is hereby clearly demonstrated. As the income in the liberal type is 
higher of women compared to the income of women in the paternal type, the 
paternal pension institution reduces gender inequality, by integrating all employees 
independent on their income into the second pillar pension scheme. Furthermore, 
the paternal scheme integrates all employees on a 30% income basis, thus smaller 
salaries are having a great advantage what concerns pension credits. In addition 
to that, another great advantage is that the employer contributes the double of the 
pension credits towards the pension scheme. The liberal type excludes all 
employees not earning a legally defined entrance threshold, which is actually 
approximately 20,000 Swiss francs annually (FSIO, 2012). Thus, women in this 
scheme are clearly disadvantaged as they work often part-time and earn on 
average less than men. 
4.10 Conclusion and verification of my hypotheses 
The study illustrates that gender regimes, such as the work place, the welfare state, 
with the Federal law on occupational pensions (LPP) and organizations such as 
occupational pension institutions create gender inequality on the institutional level.  
The study demonstrates that although the labor market, while determining the 
income of a person, is an important factor for pension income, there is another 
factor influencing the level of old age pensions. The analysis displays clearly that 
the affiliation of an employee to a specific type of pension institution is most 
important as the pension regulations are strongly determinant for the level of 
second pillar benefits. It appears that the Federal law on occupational pension 
schemes (LPP) leaving each pension institution a great freedom of interpretation 
contributes to creating gender inequality.  
Thus, the empirical findings in this chapter confirm the hypotheses that each 
occupational pension institution reproduces, enhances or reduces gender 
inequality at the institutional level by incorporating their own norms in their pension 
regulations as they offer better or worse conditions than legally defined. The 
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analysis confirms that gender inequalities occur within and between two distinct 
types of private occupational pension institutions in Switzerland.  
In the liberal type, the entrance threshold is fixed according to the legal 
requirements – at the level of 22,880 Swiss francs (2012). In the paternal type 
however, the threshold of entrance is set at 30% of the salary and all employees 
independent on their salary are included in the scheme. This means that the small 
earners in the liberal pension institution are excluded from the scheme, only 
becoming insured when they earn more than the legally defined entrance 
threshold.  
The most interesting observation is that the freedom of implementation of the 
Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) has led to a particular 
phenomenon, as the paternal organization, paying generally lower salaries, 
integrates all employees in their occupational pension schemes, irrespective of 
their income. Plainly speaking, the paternal pension institution abolishes the 
entrance threshold. Thus, the freedom for interpretation creates institutional and 
gender inequality resulting in lower benefits for affiliated employees of the liberal 
pension institution, despite their higher incomes. The paternal type favors the 
inclusion of women in the occupational pension plan by applying an entrance 
threshold for the pension scheme of 30% of the net income. This type employs a 
large proportion of women (51%) and hence has constructed a pension scheme to 
suit their employees, allowing the inclusion of low paid women workers and part-
time employees, of which they have many. Thus part-time work and low income 
does not lead to exclusion from the occupational pension system. There is a sense 
of solidarity in this system where the high income groups participate in financing 
the low income groups. We could call this corporate responsibility, caring for the 
low income employees and not diverting social groups into complementary benefits 
systems. The consequence for the low-earners concerned is that they will to a far 
lesser extent depend on complementary benefits from the state once retired. This 
specific regulation in the paternal pension institution allows us to see that even 
those with low salaries - mainly women and part-time workers - are treated equally 
in the pension system.  
The contribution rate, in other words the amount the employer and employee 
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contribute towards the pension plan influences strongly the capital savings of each 
employee. In the liberal pension institution the employees and employer contribute 
together a total of between 12.5% and 15.5% of the salary as pension benefits, 
depending on age. In the paternal pension institution the employees and employer 
however, accumulate a total of 24%, independent of their age group. These 
divergent contribution rates lead to a different overall accumulation of pension 
benefits (see section 4.2 contribution rate). Furthermore, the system of the second 
pillar as such focuses on the breadwinner model. There is no compensation in the 
occupational pension system for having spent time raising children instead of 
working. The so-called educational credits can only be accumulated in the public 
old age insurance (AVS) for bringing up children until the youngest child is 16 years 
old. 
The contribution period, or in other words, the number of years an employee needs 
to contribute in order to receive a full pension depends on the pension regulations. 
When the contribution period is shorter, then the old age pension is reduced 
accordingly. The employees of the liberal pension institution – in order to have a 
full pension – need to have accumulated a total of 42 years. In the paternal 
institution the employees need only to contribute 38 years for a full pension.  
The retirement age is two to years higher in the liberal type. This is clearly due to 
the pension regulations stipulating an ordinary retirement age of 65 for employees 
affiliated to the liberal and 63 for employees affiliated to the paternal pension 
institution. Retiring early means a reduced pension, as we have seen in section 
4.7, that a pension reduction rate is applied for employees leaving the labor market 
early. 
The conversion rate is based on a defined method of calculation of the pension 
benefits. Indeed, the conversion rate is not the only defining parameter for the 
pension income once retired. The conversion rate is – according to these 
reflections – only one parameter to take into account when adapting the second 
pillar in order to make it more accessible (including all employees) and more equal 
by insisting on the equal application of legal prescriptions – not leaving it up to the 
pension institutions. 
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The form of the old age benefit means that there are three options for withdrawing 
the occupational pension capital at retirement. The choice for a pension, a mixed 
benefit with pension and capital or a lump sum only depends not only on the total 
savings of a person. Indeed, newly retirees of the liberal pension institution may 
take out a maximum of 50% of the old age capital as a lump sum. The paternal 
type offers to take out up to 100% of the capital savings. Inequality between the 
pension institutions appear due to their pension regulations. 
The pension reduction rate is applied to capital savings of a person who leaves 
early for retirement. Pension cuts when retiring early are far more accentuated in 
the liberal pension institution compared to the paternal type. While a retiree leaving 
at 60 years loses 10% of their occupational benefits in the liberal type, a retiree 
affiliated to the paternal type loses only 5%. This inequality occurs at the level of 
the institution as it is regulated in the pension regulations. In addition to that, both 
pension institutions provoke inequality between generations in the long term, as 
they pay out higher lifelong benefits to their retirees than according to the legal 
recommendations. The risk of this is that too much capital is paid out to retirees 
leaving early and the capital of future generations is used up. We could talk about 
a transfer from younger towards older retiree generations. 
The pension income as such is also dependent on gender, as we have seen in the 
analysis of this chapter. Indeed, the distribution of capital payments (see section 
4.6) reveals clearly that women’s lump sums are most commonly up to 40,000 
Swiss francs whereas men receive most frequently capital payments around 
100,000 Swiss francs. In addition to this structural impact of the labor market, there 
is a pension income difference, depending on the affiliation to a liberal or paternal 
pension institution. Indeed, depending on the income during the working life and 
thus the contribution paid in by the employer on this salary, the pension income 
from the second pillar may vary strongly. Thus, the conditions of affiliation are 
determinant for the pension income once retired, and the LPP, due to the flexibility 
accorded to the pension institutions to implement the LPP in their pension 
regulations, is leading to inequality between the employees of the two types of 
pension institutions.  
The scenario, where I simulated the impact of the pension fund regulations of the 
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paternal pension institution on the conditions of affiliation of employees or retirees 
from the liberal type, confirms the hypotheses that gender inequalities occur due 
the institutional settings. It illustrates that institutional (gender) inequalities are 
created through embedded institutional mechanisms as a result of the flexibility 
accorded to private companies for the operation of the occupational pension 
schemes. The simulation demonstrates the impact of the pension regulations, with 
the fictive contribution rates, simulating the entrance threshold and the contribution 
rates, it illustrates that a person’s second pillar pension benefits will be higher or 
lower depending on their affiliation to a liberal or paternal pension institution. The 
Lorenz curve confirms the unequal distribution between the pension schemes of 
the liberal and the paternal institutions and it shows the unequal distribution 
amongst retirees within the same pension institutions. 
Thus, the simulation of a theoretical paternal environment for persons affiliated to 
the liberal pension institution reveals interesting information and proves that 
pension regulations create inequality amongst old-age retirees in regards to their 
pension income. Pension regulations are determinant for the pension income once 
retired. This is the case even though both pension institutions set up "gender-
neutral" pension regulations. The liberal and the paternal pension institutions 
stipulate the same retirement age for women and for men. The liberal type 
stipulates an equal retirement age of 65 years, whereas the paternal type proposes 
the same retirement age of 63 for both women and men. 
Furthermore, this simulation illustrates that statutory sameness does not 
necessarily mean that everybody receives the same benefits. Apparently, it is not 
necessarily true that there is no gender inequality when everybody is treated in the 
same way. Inequality, as we have seen in this thesis is generated in many ways. 
Indeed, institutional inequalities often reinforce pre-existing socioeconomic 
inequalities or more generally the broader gender order from gender regimes as 
we have seen in above analysis. 
The analyzed income sources by household type from the liberal pension institution 
(SICC) reveal that over three-quarters of the survey participants depend on the 
public old age pension and the second pillar pension only - 76% to 82%. The 
household income for retirees of the SICC reveals further details about the 
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inequality between women and men regarding the average income of retirees. Men 
(5,474 Swiss francs) are strongly advantaged compared to women (3,784 Swiss 
francs). 
The Lorenz curve displays that the distribution of income from occupational 
pensions is more equally between retirees of the liberal pension scheme. In other 
words, inequality is more accentuated between retirees of the paternal pension 
institution. This is astonishing as the paternal pension institution makes every effort 
to reduce pension inequality while allowing affiliation to their pension scheme for 
all employees, independent of their income. 
The generalization of the results, based on a comparison of two distinct pension 
institutions, is possible to a limited extent. The collected material represents a 
sample and is not representative in a statistical sense. The study reveals divergent 
conditions of affiliation to different pension institutions and for men and women in 
regard to the mandatory occupational pension plan leading to inequality amongst 
employees, old-age retirees and between men and women. The phenomenon 
triggered off by the interpretation of the LPP is creating, enhancing or reducing 
gender inequalities occurring in the pension institution.  
The comparative study of the two cases, the paternal and liberal pension 
institutions, allows to illustrate two extremes in the landscape of the types of 
pension institutions. The validation of the results by comparison with secondary 
statistics and the simulation of the data reveal that the observed phenomenon and 
the presented hypotheses may be trusted.  
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5. Final conclusion and outlook 
The thesis set out to explore whether there is something wrong with the second 
pillar in Switzerland and what causes gender inequalities in occupational pension 
income. It has analyzed the most relevant mechanism deployed by private 
occupational pension institutions to implement the Federal law on occupational 
pension schemes (LPP) into their pension regulations. The study illustrates that 
these issues deserve both academic and political attention as occupational 
pension institutions produce, enhance or reduce (gender) inequalities by their 
embedded institutional mechanisms and their organizational settings. By doing 
this, I confirm the theory that gender regimes create gender inequalities and may 
reproduce the broader gender order.  
The study provides relevant information in a field where little investigation has been 
made so far. Importantly, it exposes the inherent structural problems of an 
occupational pension system which was constructed specifically for serving the 
then-presumed full-time male worker based on the breadwinner model. This 
research also has implications for social policy-makers and practitioners, and the 
study proposes options for actions in order to reduce gender inequalities within the 
second pillar pension system and to adapt it in order to respond to the needs of 
diversified contemporary workers. 
5.1 Key empirical findings 
The primary hypotheses was that gender inequalities in occupational pensions can 
be expected to increase in the liberal-type pension institution and to decrease in 
the paternal type. The secondary hypotheses was that gender inequalities occur 
within pension institutions due to institutional mechanisms. This study supports 
both hypotheses. Below are the key results of the study relating to each of these 
hypotheses. 
The present study focuses on the effects of the mechanisms and processes 
introduced within the second pillar pension system in Switzerland that make 
(gender) inequalities possible. Within this framework, institutional inequality was 
examined within two types of private pension institutions, the liberal and the 
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paternal, and measured by the following parameters. 
The empirical part of the study demonstrates that the example paternal pension 
institution, by means of measures or conditions of affiliation and retirement, 
reduces overall gender-based inequalities pre-existent in the labor market or in the 
Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP). The paternal institution 
offsets the gendered effects linked to the earning threshold, contribution rate and 
the conversion rate. The liberal pension institutions, by means of measures and 
conditions, generally enhances gender inequalities pre-existent in the labor market 
or in the LPP by choosing to endorse statutory minimums and gear its benefits to 
a universal retirement age of 65. 
5.1.1 Entrance threshold: articles 2 and 7 of the LPP 
In the liberal type of pension institution, the entrance threshold lies – in accordance 
with the legal requirements – at 22,880 Swiss francs (2013). In spite of this legally 
defined threshold, the paternal pension institution includes all employees with a 
lower entrance threshold set at 30 percent of annual income. So employees 
working for the paternal type are all affiliated to the second pillar pension scheme, 
regardless of their salary.  
This means we see gender inequalities occurring between the pension institutions 
as many women (as well as other employees with salaries under 22,880 Swiss 
francs in 2013) enrolled in the liberal pension institution are excluded from the 
occupational pension scheme. 
Therefore inequalities can be seen to occur within the very structure of the liberal 
pension institution as the lowest earners are excluded from the second pillar 
pension system. The pension institution is hereby reproducing inequality inherent 
to the LPP. 
5.1.2 Contribution rate: article 16 of the LPP 
The study showed how inequality is produced over the years of accumulating 
pension credits in a pension scheme. On the one hand employees affiliated to a 
liberal pension institution accumulate together with the employer a total of between 
12.5 and 15.5 percent pension credits, depending on their age. On the other hand, 
employees affiliated to a paternal pension institution accumulate a total of 24 
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percent - together with their employer - and regardless of their age.  
The universal coverage of all employees and the far higher contribution rates in the 
paternal institution lead to a far greater total of pension credits over the years 
compared to employees of the liberal type. By doing this, the paternal pension 
institution is reducing gender inequality occurring in the LPP whereas the liberal 
type is reproducing it.  
Gender inequality also appears within an institution where the contribution rate 
increases over the years. This occurs as women commonly have interrupted 
careers for childrearing responsibilities, a crucial period for accumulating pension 
credits. A constant contribution rate would allow women to have equal possibilities 
for accumulating credits over their working lifes, regardless of when they take 
maternity leave or interrupt their careers. 
5.1.3 Number of contribution years 
When affiliated to a liberal pension institution a person contributes for 42 years in 
order to receive an unreduced pension. Affiliated to a paternal type, an employee 
needs only to contribute for 38 years for a full pension. So it is obviously an 
advantage to belong to the paternal institution rather than to the liberal. 
In both institutions, however, women with generally interrupted careers are 
disadvantaged in so far as they often would have to work beyond the legal 
retirement age to achieve the 38 (paternal) respectively 42 (liberal) contribution 
years for a full pension. Consequently, women often end up with a reduced old age 
pension and are far more dependent on the complementary benefits paid out by 
the public pension. 
5.1.4 Retirement age: article 13 of the LPP 
The legal retirement age is set at 63 years (2004; changed to 64 in 2010) for 
women and 65 for men. This retirement age, with men leaving later than women, 
is unequal between men and women.  Inequality appears between the two private 
pension institutions as the retirement age for women in the liberal system is 65 and 
in the paternal it is 63. So, pension inequality occurs due to the different 
interpretations of the Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP).  
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5.1.5 Conversion rate: article 14 of the LPP 
The conversion rate serves to calculate the annuity, based on the total capital 
savings. Although the conversion rate is not a unique defining parameter for the 
pension income, it represents the determinant for the level of the old age pension.  
Gender inequality occurs when the conversion rate for men and women is not 
equal. For the year 2013 the Federal Social Insurance Office published a 
conversion rate of 6.85% for men and 6.8% for women, to be applied to the legal 
LPP minimum capital. 
5.1.6 Pension and capital benefits: article 37 of the LPP 
The empirical analysis revealed that in the liberal pension institution the maximum 
capital pay-out option is 50 percent. In the paternal institution, there are more 
options and the full capital (100 percent) can be taken out. Nevertheless, in the 
paternal type over two thirds of retirees (67 percent) take out their occupational 
benefits in the form of a lifelong pension. Women (68 percent), to a slightly larger 
extent than men (63 percent), opt for a pension only. The liberal pension institution 
has a higher percentage of retirees (70 percent) with pension only. Women, (at 75 
percent), receive a pension to a slightly higher extent than men (63 percent). This 
is because different pension institutions may propose divergent rules to allow 
taking out a higher or lower proportion of capital in the form of a lump sum.  
The consequences of taking out a lump sum instead of a lifelong pension may be 
that retirees who have consumed the full amount of their old age capital at an early 
stage of their retirement are left with no remaining financial resources. This is even 
more problematic as early retirement (with reduced pension) is still allowed at 58 
years. 
5.1.7 Pension reduction rate for early retirement 
Pension cuts for early retirement are far more accentuated in the liberal pension 
institution than in the paternal type. Whereas a retiree leaving at the age of 60 
loses 10 percent of their occupational benefits in the liberal type; an old-age retiree 
affiliated to a paternal pension institution loses only 5 percent when leaving the 
labor market at the same age. These rules are stipulated in the pension regulations 
of each pension institution. The consequence of the divergent application of the 
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lifelong pension reduction rate is that the pension level can vary strongly between 
old-age retirees, and may in particular disadvantaging women, depending on the 
pension institution to which they are affiliated.  
5.2 Potential implications for social policy 
The Swiss Federal government, under the auspices of the Federal Councilor Alain 
Berset, is leading the way in the reform of the old age pension system 2020. 
This reform occurs in a contemporary pension environment in which not only 
women but also men have increasingly interrupted careers and/or work part-time 
and face therefore difficulties to accumulate the necessary capital for a decent 
(occupational) old age pension. Accordingly, when adapting the second pillar 
system, any pending policy measures must take into consideration that men’s and 
women’s working patterns in contemporary society have changed since the 
introduction of the LPP, and that the government and pension institutions need to 
responsively adapt conditions of affiliation accordingly. With my empirical results 
as a basis for argument, I would suggest the following policy changes in the review 
of the second pillar pension system. 
5.2.1 Freedom of interpretation: articles 49 and 50 of the LPP 
Limit the freedom of interpretation of the Federal law on occupational pension 
schemes (article 49 of the LPP), thereby reducing inequalities in the conditions of 
affiliation between the pension schemes. This would reduce the likelihood of 
benefits varying to an extent where beneficiaries are unequally treated. As a 
consequence, article 50 of the LPP could be abolished and it would no longer be 
possible to freely set up the determinants of benefits. 
5.2.2 Age of affiliation: article 7 of the LPP 
Standardize the age of affiliation at 18 years, to harmonize the public pension 
(AVS) and the occupational pension scheme (LPP). This would be a great 
advantage for employees at the lower end of the income scale. By beginning to 
save for retirement at the age of 18 in both schemes, the most deprived workers, 
starting their career often immediately after obligatory schooling at 15 or 16 years 
of those finishing their apprenticeship at 18 or 19 years, could save up more old 
age capital for their retirement. To do this, article 7 of the LPP should be adapted 
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so that all workers contribute towards old age insurance from their 18th birthday 
onwards. 
This measure would boost the second pillar capital savings of a part of the poorer 
working population between age 18 and 25. This is so as these persons often start 
with nearly the same salary at 18 years as they can count on when they are 60. 
This measure may be particularly interesting as salaries of this working class are 
not increasing notably between the beginning and the end of their careers. 
5.2.3 Entrance threshold: articles 2 and 7 of the LPP 
The current second pillar system in Switzerland is a system designed for the middle 
and higher income classes and excludes those at the bottom scale of income. The 
system discriminates against part-time workers and therefore, in particular women 
not earning enough to adhere to the pension scheme due to the entrance threshold 
or having interrupted careers. The abrogation of the entrance threshold would 
eliminate (gender) inequality as employees were to be insured and affiliated to the 
second pillar pension system independent of their salary.  
Articles 2 and 7 of the LPP regulating the entrance threshold and the coordinated 
salary have been adapted on several occasions since the instauration of the LPP. 
Despite the many attempts of a variety of political actors to adapt and enlarge the 
circle of employees, including those having only short-time engagements (3 
months), the decision to abolish the entrance threshold has never been taken.  
Today, this topic deserves even more attention as a growing population of part-
time employees, and of workers with interrupted careers, will lose out on pension 
income once retired. For these groups of persons there is a strong need to secure 
and improve the old age benefits. Even though the building up of the old age capital 
may be much slower by low income persons, it still grows over time until retirement 
and could represent an important supplementary income for those earners at the 
lower end of the scale.  
5.2.4 Coordinated salary: article 8 of the LPP 
The calculation of a coordinated salary is another disadvantage for low earners. If 
the coordinated salary was abolished or extended to the full salary up to 80,000 
francs, a large portion of women or generally those workers earning below the 
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entrance threshold would be able to accumulate greater pension credits and could 
then improve their second pillar pension considerably.  
5.2.5 The contribution rate: article 16 of the LPP 
The harmonization of the contribution rate aims at creating equality between 
insured persons affiliated with different pension schemes. All employees should be 
able to save the same proportion of their income towards a pension scheme. 
Currently, article 16 of the LPP stipulates that the pension credits are accumulated 
according to a class system based on age. While for young employees until 34 
years old the contribution rate amounts to 7% of the insured income, the rate goes 
up to 18% for persons aged older than 54. Inequality between persons occurs as 
every pension institution may set up a different rule.  
Concretely, article 16 of the LPP could be modified to propose a constant 
contribution rate throughout the worker’s active life which would eradicate 
inequality between generations and between men and women, in particular those 
with interrupted careers at certain periods of their working life.  
5.2.6 Retirement age: article 13 of the LPP 
The harmonization of the retirement age between men and women is a measure 
which would help to eradicate inequality in regards to pension benefits, as both 
sexes would have the possibility to contribute for the same period of time, until 
retirement.  
5.2.7 Conversion rate: article 14 of the LPP 
The much-discussed and debated conversion rate raises many questions. The 
constant rise in life expectancy of retirees threatens the pension institution in 
regards to the conversion rates. 
It should be made transparent to the insured employees and the pension 
institutions by the government that the accumulated pension credits have to last 
for a clearly defined number of years, according to the life expectancy of each 
cohort, and be calculated on this basis, the moment a person retires. Although this 
means clearly that the capital has to last for more years for future generations, this 
doesn’t imply that the paid out provision is lower than the accumulated second 
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pillar savings. The constituted second pillar old age savings assets could be 
converted to an annual old age pension on the basis of a conversion factor defined 
on the basis of the life expectancy of each retiree cohort. Thus, an adequate 
actuarial base has to be provided for this purpose and for the insured population 
of each pension institution in order to guarantee their annuities. 
5.2.8 Pension and capital benefits: article 37 of the LPP 
In order to reach equality in this context, a first step could be to adapt article 37 of 
the LPP so that capital payments are available only to a very limited extent. Thus, 
the rule that occupational benefits must mandatorily be paid out in the form of a 
lifelong old age pension should be adopted. Or else, the capital payment may only 
be paid out as a defined percentage of the total of the accumulated capital. This 
could include a capital payment if the total savings amount to less than 10 percent 
of the minimum public old age pension or if the capital is higher than that a 
maximum of 25 percent could be paid out in the form of a lump sum. 
5.2.9 Pension reduction rate in case of early retirement 
The observed divergence amongst the pension regulations in regards to pension 
cuts in case of early retirement reveals clearly the importance of stronger regulation 
in this context. It is not in question that pension benefits are reduced in case of 
early retirement. However, inequalities are rather accentuated as the rate of 
reduction varies from 0 percent (paternal at 63 years) to several percent in the 
liberal type at the same age. The pension reduction rate is even more accentuated 
in the public old age insurance (AVS). Thus this thesis proposes that the pension 
cut rate is harmonized between the AVS and the LPP and between the regulations 
of the pension institutions. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
The study illustrates that, independent on the labor market mechanisms, the 
affiliation of an employee to a specific type of pension institution is most important. 
Based on two case studies, the thesis confirms the hypotheses and demonstrates 
that the implementation of the LPP, allowing the employer and pension institution 
to adapt the rules according to their values, can create divergent effects. By the 
implementation of the LPP into their pension regulations, a pension institution may 
enhance or reduce (pre) existing (gender) inequalities within or between pension 
schemes by incorporating their own norms in their pension regulations, hereby 
offering better conditions than legally defined. The thesis shows that pension fund 
regulations are of crucial importance. Although statistically not representative, the 
two case studies reveal clearly the divergent implementation of the LPP.  
The findings from this research suggest that there is a correlation between pension 
inequality and the flexibility accorded to private companies in the operation of their 
occupational pension schemes. The results reveal that this phenomenon of gender 
inequality observed in the occupational pension institutions and produced by the 
Federal law on occupational pension schemes (LPP) is independent of labor 
market conditions and the welfare state. The thesis finally provides insight into the 
functioning of and the mechanisms within the LPP and suggests propositions how 
to improve the second pillar pension system in regard to gender inequality. It 
demonstrates the need to act in order to smooth out gender inequality in the future 
by adapting or abrogating some articles of the LPP and thus regulating the LPP 
more equally and more harmoniously as outlined by the propositions for action.  
The study reveals a clear need for further research on this topic in order to prepare 
the occupational pension system in Switzerland for the future. It makes apparent 
that more analytical efforts would be required in order to estimate the overall impact 
of pension funds on gender inequalities, particularly regarding the financial impact. 
Further research could also address whether gender inequalities are more or less 
accentuated in companies or economic sectors where women are over-
represented. Furthermore, a field of interest would be why gender inequalities 
persist although women are increasingly full-time working and having higher 
earnings, especially those with higher education. In addition, research could be 
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most revealing in the context of whether gender inequalities are more dominant 
before or after retirement. The study is relevant for scholars as it systematically 
presents data and results from research about how pension institutions shape their 
pension regulations based on the flexibility accorded to them in the operation of 
the occupational pension schemes. In this regard, pension institutions have been 
largely unobserved by researchers interested in this field.  
Article 8 of the Federal Constitution stipulates clearly that women and men have 
equal rights. The Federal law on Gender Equality (Leg), article 3, promotes equality 
in regards to working conditions. Nevertheless, the pay gap amounts to 18 % (FSO, 
2014), and even worse, the second pillar pension gap is as high as 37 % (FSIO, 
2015). Measures should be taken so that expected amounts of private old age 
pensions are no longer lacking. More awareness of the outlined problem is required 
to set up social policy measures in order to increase the occupational pension 
savings of women. Or, on a general level, financial education of children and 
adults, in particular with the focus on lifelong savings for old age, is needed for a 
better understanding on the long term. 
Last but not least, the second pillar pension is a system which has been built up 
during over a century, although it became only mandatory in 1985. The system 
represents a triple relationship between employer, employee and the pension 
institutions and is guided by the LPP. It represents hereby a great opportunity to 
accommodate needs of employer, employees and retirees as it allows each type 
of pension institution a large freedom of interpretation. With the re-emergence of 
the debate as to whether pre-funded pensions may be regarded as superior to pay-
as-you-go pensions or whether the public system in Switzerland is more adapted 
to secure old age pensions, it is high time in Switzerland to open the debate.  
Federal law about the occupational old age, survivors and disability 
insurance (LPP): article 1 purpose: 1 The occupational provision contains all 
measures on a collective basis, which permit the elderly, the survivors and the 
disabled in case of an insurance case (old age, death or disability) together with 
benefits from the federal old age, survivors and disability insurance (AVS/AI), the 
continuation of the accustomed standard of living in an appropriate way.  
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Annex II: The MELAP pilot dataset variables 
My main quantitative data source was the MELAP pilot dataset.  
I used frequency analysis and exploited the variables in cross tables. Thus I 
analyzed the quantification according to frequency according to specific 
categories. The variables I used served as categories. Thus the variable with the 
date where the benefit was perceived was transferred into the category of “age of 
retirement” and sub-categories of early retirement, late retirement and ordinary 
retirement. This transformation enabled me to disclose what kind of benefits (and 
how many) persons claim at what average or median age. This kind of analysis 
offers on one hand quantitative and on the other hand qualitative information about 
the type of person, type of benefit and affiliation to the type of pension institution.  
I used the following main variables in order to analyze the phenomenon of 
inequality: 
1) age of retirement (early, late, ordinary) 
2) retirement spread (calculated variable) 
3) second pillar capital payment (type of payment) 
4) second pillar capital and pension payment (calculated variable - type of 
payment) 
5) second pillar pension payment (type of payment) 
6) Average, median, quartiles of amounts (calculated variable) of pension and 
capital payments 
7) Date of payments (defined period of examination) 
8) Gender of insured and beneficiary 
9) Date of payment 
10) Year of birth of beneficiary 
11) Year of birth of insured 
12) Gender of person receiving benefits 
The information gathered through these key variables provided the main 
information for revealing inequality between insured men and women in pension 
institutions and between retirees of the two different types of pension institutions.  
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Annex III: The SICC Survey 
The questionnaire I constructed for the SICC survey consists of a large part of 
closed questions. In order to assess the relationship between two variables, which 
I analyze in the empirical section of this thesis, I used different types of variables.  
Two types are qualitative variables: the nominal and the ordinal. In the case of 
ordinal variables, I ranked for example respondents educational levels from basic 
education to University degree. There is another type called nominal variable which 
I used for the household type. And for gender, I used a quantitative variable, as I 
coded women as 0 and men as 1.  
In the SICC survey, the variables and types of variables are the following: 
Table 3.11 Survey variables     type of variable 
Income source (AVS, second pillar, other income):  nominal 
Household type       nominal 
Gender        quantitative 
Income (pension, annuity, other income in Swiss francs) quantitative 
Health condition in general     ordinal 
Chronic illness       nominal 
Limited in activities of daily live     ordinal 
Health status (1 to 5)      ordinal 
Age         quantitative 
Level of education (1 to 5)      ordinal 
I used only closed questions as I needed clear quantitatively exploitable data was 
appropriate for generating specific results for my thesis. In this part I did frequency 
analysis, analysis of variance, and analysis of average and median and coherence 
tests with other data sources. In total I exploited 781 questionnaires. 
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Annex IV: The Leporello 
Résultats préliminaires de l’étude SICC 
«Le revenu à la retraite & les conditions de vie» 
 
La prévoyance professionnelle des personnes à la 
retraite 
 
 
                             
                        2008 
Un grand MERCI aux nombreux participants ! 
Tout d’abord un grand MERCI à vous ! 
Le nombre de personnes qui ont rempli et renvoyé le questionnaire ce présente ainsi : 
Nombre de 
participants 
Retraite 
jusqu'à  
1983 
Retraite  
1984 à  
1993 
Retraite 
1994 à  
2003 
Retraite 
2004 à  
2007 
Total 
Nombre 96 198 324 163 781 
Taux 12% 25% 41% 21% 100% 
C’est un excellent taux de participation et je vous remercie chaleureusement !  
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Le revenu à la retraite 
Le tableau suivant montre les sources principales de revenus qui sont l’AVS et la 
prévoyance professionnelle.  
Suivant les réponses des participants le revenu se présente ainsi : 
 
D’autres études révèlent des chiffres similaires.  
Conditions de vie à la retraite 
Les graphiques suivants montrent les résultats groupés par années de retraite. 
Selon vos réponses, les hommes vivent principalement en couple. 
 
Les femmes - par contre - vivent plutôt dans un ménage à une personne. Ceci d’avantage 
à partir de 77 ans quand ce phénomène est d’autant plus répandu.  
 
Ceci avec l’exception des « jeunes femmes à la retraite » qui révèlent un image inverse 
(2004 à 2007). 
revenu 
annuel 
moyen
2e pilier AVS 2e pilier AVS
femmes 17'208     21'516     15'403     21'096     
hommes 28'596     22'095     26'871     21'895     
total 22'902     21'805     21'137     21'495     
2004 2007
T ype de ménag e par année de retraite:
les  hommes
0%
50%
100%
"en couple" 47% 79% 80% 79%
"vivant s eul" 28% 15% 12% 12%
"autre ménage" 26% 6% 8% 9%
jus qu'à 1983
retraite 
1984 bis  1993 1994 bis  2003 2004 bis  2007
T ype de ménag e par année de retraite:
les  femmes
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
"en couple" 22% 29% 37% 64%
"vivant s eul" 69% 60% 36% 31%
"autre ménage" 9% 12% 27% 5%
jus qu'à 1983 1984 bis  1993 1994 bis  2003 2004 bis  2007
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La santé à la retraite 
Les personnes à la retraite sont généralement en bonne santé. Les graphiques suivantes 
montrent une légère tendance à une détérioration de la santé avec l’âge croissant.  
Selon les femmes qui ont participé à cette étude, l’état de santé en général est ainsi : 
 
 L’état de santé en général des hommes qui ont participé à cette étude se montre ainsi : 
 
Avec l’âge croissant le taux de personnes en bonne santé diminue.   
  
"Etat de santé en général" 
par année de retraite: les femmes
11% 12%
25%
19%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2004 
à 2007
1994 
à 2003
1984 à 1993 jusqu'à1983
en bonne santé en mauvaise santé
"Etat de santé en général" par année de retraite: 
les hommes
5% 6%
16% 21%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2004 
à 2007
1994 
à 2003
1984 à 1993 jusqu'à1983
en bonne santé en mauvaise santé
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Rentes et capital 2e pilier 
A l’âge de la retraite et selon le règlement de la caisse de pension une personne peut 
retirer son capital de la prévoyance professionnelle en forme de a) rente, b) rente et 
capital ou c) uniquement en forme de capital. La graphique montre le taux de personnes 
à la retraite avec leurs sources de revenu: 
 
Dans cet échantillon toutes les personnes reçoivent une rente de la prévoyance 
professionnelle. Parmi  ceux qui reçoivent une rente de deuxième pilier, il y 26 % femmes 
et 26 % hommes qui recevaient également du capital quand ils sont parti à la retraite.  
Comme nous le montre cette graphique, les personnes à la retraite vivent de divers 
revenus. Ce sont 31 % des femmes et 46 % des hommes qui ont reçu une rente de pont.  
Une autre source de revenu dans les premiers années de la retraite représente l’activité 
rémunéré au-delà de la retraite afin d’améliorer leur revenu.  
L’âge de la retraite  
Les personnes qui ont participé à cette étude sont parties à la retraite en moyenne à : 
 
Selon ce tableau l’âge moyen de la retraite est légèrement en hausse.  
Pour les hommes l’âge légal de retraite est resté inchangé à 65 ans depuis son instauration 
en 1948. Pour les femmes  l’âge légal de retraite était baissé, pour ensuite être remonté 
à 64 ans.  
  
Taux de personnes à la retraite de 2004 à 2007
avec un revenu de la source indiquée
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Autre revenu
Activité rémunérée
3e pilier
Rente pont
Capital 2e pilier
Rente 2e pilier
hommes
femmes
T.1.0 jus qu'à 1983 1984-1993 1994-2003 2004-2007
Ag e moyenne 
de la retraite
61.2 62.7 63.2 63.2
Homme 61.3 62.7 63.2 64.1
F emme 61.3 62.7 63.2 62.3
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Adresse de contact : 
Je vous remercie d’avoir participé à cette étude qui inclut les informations des rentiers de 
la caisse de pension à laquelle vous êtes affilié. Votre contribution est très appréciée et 
me permet de conclure mon doctorat.  
Si vous désirez savoir plus, vous pouvez me contacter : 
Jacqueline Kucera 
Doctorante en Sociologie 
Université de Neuchâtel 
Case postale 583 
2001 Neuchâtel 
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Annex V : The interview Guide 
 
 
Expertengespräche  
mit der Leitung der 
Pensionskasse 
 
 
Interviewleitfaden 
„Einfluss auf die Renten- und Kapitalauszahlungen der 
beruflichen Vorsorge“ 
 
 
 
Dissertationsprojekt von Jacqueline Kucera 
Doktorat in Soziologie 
Universität Neuenburg 
Leitung der These: Prof. Dr. Christian Suter 
2002 Neuenburg 
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Interviewleitfaden Expertengespräche 
Einleitung (5 Minuten) 
Vorstellung des Interviewers und dieser Studie sowie Dank und Anonymität zusichern 
Ziel des Interviews: Der Einfluss der Unternehmenskultur des Unternehmens auf die Pensionierung.  
Vorgehen des Interviews erklären: Expertengespräch 
 
Fragen zu den Interviewpartnern (5 Minuten) 
Stellung und Funktion in der Pensionskassenleitung 
Stellung und Funktion in der Abteilung 
Wie lange sind Sie bereits in der Pensionskasse? 
Wie lange sind Sie bereits in dieser Abteilung / Funktion? 
Wie lange sind Sie bereits in der Pensionskassenleitung? 
Können Sie mir kurz Ihre Haupt-Aufgabe umschreiben? 
Welches sind für Sie die Ziele und Strategien der Pensionskasse? 
Werden diese Ziele und Strategien den Pensionskassenversicherten mitgeteilt? 
 
Geschichten / Feste / Ausflüge (5 Minuten) 
Haben Sie Anekdote, die spontan erzählt werden kann? 
Beschreibung der letzten Feierlichkeiten (Abteilungsfeste) 
Wichtige Anlässe / Feste in der Vergangenheit 
Ausflüge / Feste, die in der näheren Zukunft geplant sind 
Gibt es regelmässige Firmenanlässe um mit den Mitarbeitern zu feiern? 
Werden Pensionierungen von (langjährigen) Mitarbeitern gefeiert?   
Werden Erfolge oder Jubiläumsfeiern des Unternehmens gemeinsam gefeiert? 
Gibt es eine jährliche Endjahresfeier für alle Mitarbeiter der Firma?  
Werden Beförderungen am Arbeitsplatz gefeiert? 
 
Unternehmenskultur (D) 
Was ist die Geschichte dieser Pensionskasse? Was sind die Werte, Normen, Grundeinstellungen? 
Vision, Mission dieser Pensionskasse? 
Wird langjährige Firmentreue von langjährigen Mitarbeitern mit Dienstaltersgeschenken belohnt? 
Wenn ja, nach wie vielen Jahren? 
Kann ein vorzeitiger Rücktritt in den Ruhestand  ein Dienstaltersgeschenk sein? Wenn ja, nach wie 
vielen Jahren? 
Glauben Sie, dass Männer und Frauen in Ihrem Unternehmen unterschiedliche Kulturen pflegen? Wie 
äussert sich dies konkret? 
Besetzen Männer und Frauen in Ihrer Pensionskasse bzw. in den angeschlossenen Unternehmen 
unterschiedliche Rollen? (Männerarbeit / Frauenarbeit, Führungsrolle, Positionen, etc.) 
Glauben Sie, dass Männer und Frauen an sie gestellte Anforderungen unterschiedlich erfüllen?  
Werden Frauen und Männer unterschiedlich gefördert oder weitergebildet in Ihrem Unternehmen? 
(Bereichsbezogen, Arbeitsbezogen, Führungsbezogen) 
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Verhaltenskultur der Mitarbeiter (A/C) 
Was sind für die Pensionskasse und für die angeschlossenen Unternehmen gängige Arbeitshistorien 
(langjährige Mitarbeiter sind sehr verbreitet: 30 Dienstsjahre in der Firma ist alltäglich)? 
Der Aufstieg in der Firma läuft über Dienstalter oder über Fachliches Wissen? 
Sind Beziehungen zwischen den Mitarbeitern innerhalb der Firma wichtig für eine bestimmte Position 
zu erhalten? 
Gibt es institutionalisierte Kaffeepausen für die Mitarbeiter? (Wie häufig?) 
Gehen Mitarbeiter in der Gruppe oder eher alleine zur Kaffeepause? 
Vereinstätigkeit innerhalb der Firma für aktive Versicherte / für Pensionierte? 
Freizeitaktivitäten durch die Firma organisiert für aktive Versicherte / für Pensionierte? 
Pflegt die Pensionskasse weiterhin Kontakt mit den Personen im Ruhestand? Handelt es sich um 
institutionalisierte Kontakte? 
 
Ruhestandsalter und finanzielle Situation (B) 
Welches sind mögliche Gründe einer Frühpensionierung? 
Welches ist der frühste mögliche Zeitpunkt einer Frühpensionierung? 
Gibt es generelle Überbrückungsrenten für Frühpensionierte? Werden diese von der Pensionskasse, 
der Unternehmung oder aus einem separaten (Branchen-) Fonds gespiesen? 
Inwiefern entspricht das Einkommensniveau vor Ruhestand demjenigen im Ruhestand? In % 
beziffert? Welches sind die Einkommenskomponenten? (AHV, Überbrückungsrente, 2. Säule) 
Entspricht die Rente – zusammen mit der Überbrückungsrente - dem Einkommen vor der 
Pensionierung? Oder ist die Überbrückungsrente variabel je nach Dienstaltersjahren? 
Kann eine Überbrückungsrente als Kapitalabfindung ausbezahlt werden? 
Ist das effektive Ruhestandsalter abhängig  vom Beruf und besteht ein Sicherheitsfonds für 
Risikoberufe? 
Ist Arbeiten trotz Pensionierung bei Ihrer Unternehmung grundsätzlich möglich? 
 
Fragen zu den Veränderungen der Pensionskassenreglemente (E) 
Gründe für die Änderung des reglementarischen Ruhestandsalters  
Kommunikation an die Versicherten der Pensionskasse? 
Probleme beim Übergang zum neuen Reglement für direkt betroffene Versicherte, welche kurz vor 
dem Ruhestand stehen? 
Klima (Kultur) vor, während und nach der Änderung der Reglemente 
Haben Sie das Gefühl, dass die Unternehmenskultur durch diese Änderung der reglementarischen 
Richtlinien verändert wurde? 
Treten Versicherte heute gegenüber von früher eher früher oder später in den Ruhestand?  
Generell in Ihrer Firma, gibt es eine Tendenz, dass die Mitarbeiter die Firma möglichst früh verlassen 
oder arbeiten sie eher möglichst lange? (Klafft das effektive Ruhestandsalter weit auseinander vom 
gesetzlichen Ruhestandsalter?) 
 
Abschluss des Gesprächs 
Dank und Vertiefung des Expertengesprächs (wie weiter). 
